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Title: Mission of Protest: General John Armstrong's Response to 
the Continental System, 1806-1810. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITI'EE: 
B~rnard Burke, Chairman 
Although not well known to students of American history today, 
General John Armstrong was, in his day, a prominent and colorful public 
figure. From 1804 to 1810, he held the difficult position of United 
States Minister to France at a time when the world was in upheaval 
resulting from the Napoleonic Ware. Aa Great Britain and France 
struggled for supremacy, the United States--the world's foremost 
neutral cOD111ercial power--was slowly, but inevitably, drawn into this 
struggle, becoming the victim of the hostile edicts of the two major 
belligerents, as they wantonly violated established practices of 
international law. 
As the diplomatic representative of the American government in 
France, General Armstrong was reponeible for defending the rights 
and pursuing the interests of his country. The difficulty of his 
task was compounded by the United States• military and naval weak-
ness. General Armstrong's position was further undermined by the 
philosophical beliefs of American leadership, who shied away from 
possible confrontation, and who would have done ao even if they had 
possessed adequate military and naval strength. American leadership--
as epitomized by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison--substituted 
peaceable economic coercive practices for military force as a means 
to exert pressure on the belligerents in order to secure concessions 
from them. In a world governed by force, these principles were 
unrealistic. 
From 1806 to 1810, the period emphasized in this thesis, 
Armstrong's greatest concern by far was defending American neutral 
rights being violated by Napoleon's Continental System, formally 
inaugurated by the Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806. Armstrong's 
mission became one of protest and frustration as Napoleon's decrees 
were brutally applied to American CODlllerce. 
The picture that emerges of Armstrong from this study is one 
of a determined, forceful, unintimidated, and outspoken defender 
of American interests. Fully cognizant of Napoleon's character, 
he was under no illusion aa to hie prospects for diplomatic success. 
Armstrong was-a realist who, having exhausted normal diplomatic 
means, urged American leadership to employ force in order to acquire 
desired territorial objectives, to force Napoleon to respect American 
2 
rights, or to at least make a show of arms for the sake of National 
honor. Thia advice, however, was consiatently rejected by Jefferson 
and Madiaon. 
In the final analysis, Armstrong's mission vae a failure, in 
the sense that he was unable to force Napoleon to respect American 
neutral rights by repealing his offensive decrees. Nor was he able 
to convince American leadership to accept his suggestions on several 
occasions when standard diplomatic practices were unproductive, to 
use more forceful measures. However, given the circumstances of the 
times and Napoleon's character, Armstrong's performance was remarkable 
indeed, and he did as well as anyone could have. The United States 
of the early 19th century would have had great difficulty finding 
another person who could have done better. There were certainly many 
who would not have done aa well. 
3 
The unpublished records of the Department of State in the 
National Archives, and the American State Papers are the moat important 
sources for this thesis. They have been augmented with published and 
unpublished papers of such key f igurea as Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison. 
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PREFACE 
Although not well known to students of American history today, 
General John Armstrong was, in his day, a prominent and colorful public 
figure. From 1804 to 1810, he had the dubious honor and difficult task 
of serving aa United States Minister to France, at a time when the 
world waa in upheaval resulting from the Napoleonic Ware. As Great 
Britain and France struggled for supremacy, the United States--the 
foremost neutral commercial power--was slowly, but inevitably, drawn 
into this struggle, becoming the victim of the hostile edicts of the 
two major belligerents, as they wantonly violated established practices 
of international law. 
As the diplomatic representative of the American government in 
France, General Armstrong was responsible for def ending the rights and 
pursuing the interests of his government. The difficulty of hie task 
was compounded by the United States• military and naval weakness. 
General Armstrong's position was further undermined by the philosophi-
cal belief a of American leadership, who shied away from confrontation, 
and would have done so even had they posseaaed adequate military or 
naval strength. American leadership--as epitomized by Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison--substituted peaceable economic coercion practices 
for military force as the means with which to exert pressure on the 
belligerents. In a world that was being governed by force, these prin-
ciples ware unrealistic. The inability of the United States to take a 
firm posture in its defense only encouraged the two great belligerents 
iv 
to persist in policies which were so detrimental to the welfare of the 
United States. The military posture of the United States and the 
inclinations of its leaders, coupled with the amoral character of 
Napoleon, made any mission to France by an American miniater almost 
hopeless from the very beginning. 
With the exception of Henry Adams• monumental work, A History of 
the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1889-91), Armstrong'• career as a 
minister to France has moat often been examined only superficially. By 
far the most important aspect of Armstrong's career, on which historians 
have concentrated, is hia tenure as Secretary of War from 1813 to 1814. 
Even in Adams, in which Armstrong is at least a central figure through-
out a great portion of the narrative, Armstrong's diplomacy represents 
only one part of his work devoted to the comprehensive examination of 
two important presidencies. 
Believing Armstrong's diplomatic career to be deserving of 
greater attention, this study will examine and assess General 
Armstrong's performance aa United States Minister to France. Though 
his mission involved many issues, the moat important aspect of his 
mission was to def end American neutral rights that were violated by 
Napoleon's Continental System, and this study will be moat concerned 
with this issue, concentrating on the years from 1806, when Napoleon 
formally inaugurated hie Continental System with the Berlin Decree of 
November 21, 1806, until the end of General Armstrong's mission and 
his departure from France in October, 1810. 
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CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARIES 
John Armstrong was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on November 
25, 1758, the son of the elder John Armstrong, a major-general in the 
Continental Army during the American Revolutionary War. The younger 
Armstrong also participated in the war, serving on the staffs of Gener-
ala Mercer and Gates, repectively. He was involved in the Saratoga 
campaign, and was present at the surrender of British General John Bur-
goyne. At the conclusion of hostilities with Great Britain, Armstrong 
had attained the rank of major, and waa aide-de-camp to General Gates. 
While serving in this position, Armstrong authored what became known as 
the "Newburgh Letters" in March, 1783, while the Continental Army was 
encamped along the Hudson River.1 Although written with good inten-
tions, this act earned Armstrong a reputation as an intriguer, which he 
was never able to completely shake, although the authorship of the let-
ters was not irmnediately known. 2 The letters "exhibited a facility in 
caustic reasoning, mixed with akillfull emotional appeal," for which 
3 Armstrong was noted. 
After the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, Armstrong held 
several important positions in Pennsylvania--Secretary of the Supreme 
Executive Council, Adjutant-General, and elected delegate to Congress 
in 1787. His marriage in 1789 to Alida Livingston, aister of Chancellor 
Robert R. Livingston of New York, placed him in one of America's most 
2 
prestigious and ariatocratic familiea, and guaranteed hie future as an 
important political figure in New York State and national politica. He 
moved to Red Hook, Dutchess County, New York, where he devoted h11 
energiea to the pursuit of agriculture for eleven years, and prepared 
himself for the active and demanding public career that was to follow. 
Although the Livingston clan had nominally been Federalists, 
their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acta of the Adams Administra-
tion caused the family, including Armstrong, to join the Republicans.4 
Armstrong's literary talents greatly contributed to the standing of the 
party with the succesaful publication of a "vitriolic" petition calling 
5 for repeal of the acta. 
The political alliance of the Livingston and Clinton f amiliea 
helped to carry the state for the Republicans in the election of 1800. 
Thia victory made George Clinton Governor of New York, and the two 
families succeeded in destroying the patronage privileges of Clinton's 
rival, Aaron Burr, the newly-elected Vice-President of the United 
States. Consequently, the Livingstone and Clintons reaped the politi-
cal apoila that came their way. The Chancellor was appointed by Presi-
dent Jefferson as minister to France, and Armstrong, in November, 1800, 
was chosen by the New York State Legislature to represent that state in 
6 . 
the United States Senate. In February, 1802, Armstrong, resigned his 
7 Senate seat to make way for DeWitt Clinton. In November, 1803, when 
DeWitt Clinton resigned to become Mayor of New York, Governor George 
Clinton appointed General Armstrong to fill the vacancy in the Senate.8 
He aerved in thia capacity until June 30, 1804, when Armstrong again 
resigned, thia time to accept President Jefferson's offer to become 
9 Chancellor Livingaton'• aucceaaor aa minister to France. 
APPOINniENT AND ARRIVAL IN FRANCE 
In a letter of May 26, 1804, General Armstrong was informed by 
President Jefferson that he wae the choice of the Administration to 
10 
succeed Robert Livingston as the American minister to France. If 
3 
Armstrong accepted, he was to proceed to Washington as soon as possible 
to familiarize himself with the diplomatic correspondence from Paris, 
London, and Madrid, as the Chancellor was anxious to be relieved of 
his duties in France.11 
In accepting the appointment to become the next minister to France, 
Armstrong was certainly not motivated by the prospects of pecuniary re-
wards. A deficient salary was not, in itself reason for Armstrong to 
reject the appointment. He had long ago learned to live within his 
means and was not an extravagant man. If he hesitated at all in ac-
cepting this call, it was due only to his desire to posses• the neces-
sary ability to perform the duties required in such an important posi-
12 tion. 
Jefferson's motives in appointing Armstrong are questionable. 
The most logical reason appears to be hia desire to maintain political 
harmony with the Livingston-Clinton faction of the party in New York. 
Another plausible motivation was hia friendship with Chancellor Living-
aton. Some historians have suggested that Jefferson may alao have 
seen an opportunity to remove a far too independent Senator from the 
13 Senate. Armstrong'• independence is unquestionable. 
In hia instructions from Secretary of State James Madison, Arm-
4 
strong wae informed of possible changes in the form of the French 
goveril!Xlent, since Livingston•a despatches had intimated the creation 
of, or the intention to create, an empire with Napoleon as emperor. If 
this was indeed the case, Armstrong was to transmit this iIImediately to 
the United States if the new government refused to receive him because 
14 
of his inappropriate credentials. Further indications of changes in 
the government were related to Armstrong just prior to his departure 
for France, although no official notification of this event had as yet 
been received. Recognizing a potentially embarrassing position for the 
United States, and not wanting to offend the sensitivities of Napoleon, 
Madison informed Armstrong that, in order to reduce possible delays in 
his reception at Paris, he would be furnished with a blank conunission 
and letters of credence, to be filled in when he reached Paris and the 
15 disposition of the French government was fully known. 
On about September 7, 1804, General Armstrong and his family set 
sail from New York. They arrived in Nantes, France on about October 14, 
1804.16 From Nantes, the Armstrongs travelled to Paris, arriving there 
October Jo.17 
Armstrong immediately had an interview with Charles Maurice de 
Talleyrand-Perigord, the French Minister of Foreign Relationa.18 Li-
vingston requested fromTalleyrana that Armstrong be allowed to conduct 
business at leaat informally before his preaentation to the emperor, 
but this vaa deemed impossible. In describing the changes that were 
taking place aa the Republic was being transformed into the Empire, 
Livingston made an obaervant comparison with former times: 
Here everything that resemble the old Court is eagerly 
aought after & imitated, & we are ao hedged in with aome forms 
that are not yet we119understood, that we are all somewhat at 
a lose how to act--. 
In a few daya, however, General Armstrong and Chancellor Living• 
ston were admitted to a private audience with Napoleon, the man who 
would make Armstrong's six years in France extremely frustrating and 
5 
difficult. Livingston presented his letter of recall, and apologized 
for its having been addressed to the First Consul. He referred to 
Armstrong for assurances that the Preaident had recognized that a 
20 
change in the form of the French government had indeed occurred. 
Armstrong presented hie credentials to the Emperor, then delivered a 
21 few complimentary remark• regarding the F.mperor'• recent elevation. 
Having completed hia laat official diplomatic functions, Living-
aton departed Paris for Italy, where he planned to pass the winter 
before returning to the United States. 22 No doubt, Livingston was 
anxious to extricate himself from the claims controversy, and was all 
too willing to let his prother-in-law deal with it. This controversy, 
and negotiations for West Florida were more than enough to keep the 
new minister occupied during the early stages of hia diplomatic 
23 
career. Thia experience in dealing with Napoleon and other French 
off iciala during thia early period, would prove to be invaluable when 
he was called upon later to defend American neutral rights against the 
Continental System. To this i•eue we will now turn. 
Notes 
Chapter I 
1wh11e the army was camped at Newburgh on the Hudson River, 
discontent over the failure of Congress to meet arrears of pay was 
widespread. At the instigation of Horatio Gates, Armstrong composed 
the "Newburgh Letters" which called a meeting of the field officers 
and representatives of the off icera of each company to consider relief 
measures. They suggested that, aa petitions to Congress had not been 
heeded, the army should take matters into its own hands if Congress 
£ailed to fulfill its obligations. For an examination of the "Newburgh 
Letters" controversy, aee Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the 
Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd aer., XXVII(l970), 187-213; Paul David Nelson with a 
rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, "Horatio Gates at Newburgh, 1783: A 
Misunderstood Rule,~ William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd aer., XX.IX (1972), 
143-158; c. Edward Skeen with a rebuttal by Richard H. Kohn, "The 
Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsidered," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd aer., 
XXXI (1974), 272-298. 
2 George Washington withdrew the harsh opinion he had held of the 
letters and their author in a letter to Armstrong of February, 1793. 
He stated that he had "since had auf f icient reason for believing, that 
the object of the author was just, honorable, and friendly to the 
country, though the means suggested by him was certainly liable to 
much mieunderatandlng and abuse." John c. Fitzpatrick, ed., !.!:!.! 
7 
Writings of George Waahington, 39 wola. (1940; rpt. Westport, Conn., 
1976), xxxv, 397. 
3 1 . Al en Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary of American Bio-
graphy, 22 vols. (New.York, 1946), I, 355; hereafter cited as Diet. of Am. Bio. 
4see DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, A Political History of the State 
of New York, 3 vols. (New York, 1906), for an account of New York 
political history. Describes the intense partisan nature of New York 
politics at this time. Author is occasionally critical of Armstrong, 
though. 
5 Alexander, I, 89. 
6other members of the Livingston family were also appointed to 
important offices: Edward, a brother, was made Mayor of New York; 
Thomas Tillotson, a brother-in-law, Secretary of State; Morgan Lewis, 
another brother-in-law, Chief Justice; and Brockholat Livingston, a 
cousin, justice of the Supreme Court. Diet. of Am. Bio., I, 356. 
7 Annals of Congress: Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of 
the United States, 42 vols. (Washington, D.c., 1834-1856), 8th Cong., 
lat s_er., P• 185; hereafter cited as Annals. 
8 Diet. of Am. Bio., I, 356. Armstrong was known ae "General" 
prior to and during his years as U.S. minister to France, although he 
did not actually hold a commission aa a Brigadier-General until June, 
1812, when he was appointed by Madiaon to take charge of the defenee of 
New York City. According to Beckles Willson, America'• Ambassadors to 
France, 1777-1927; A Narrative of Franco-American Relations (London, 
1928), 93, as Armstrong roae in political favor, ao too did hie rank, a 
cotmnon practice of the time. He waa almost always referred to aa 
8 
"General." 
9Dict. of Am. Bio., I, 356. 
10 Jefferson to Armstrong, May 26, 1804, Paul Leice1ter Ford, ed., 
The Writings of Thomas Jefferaon, 10 vols. (Nev York, 1892-99), VIII, 
302-303; hereafter cited aa Writings of Jefferson. 
11.rhe convention of 1803 which concluded the sale of Louisiana 
also established a fund of $3,750,000 to liquidate legitimate American 
claims against France. Although Livingston thought that this amount 
was more than adequate, it was far too little. The shortage of funde, 
plus the complicated procedures for diaperaing claims money, soon 
embroiled Livingston in quarrels with the American Board of Commission-
era. Livingston waa charged with favoritism by hi• own associates, and 
the situation was not improved when he in turn attacked the Board with 
similar chargee. These events, plua Livingston'• own political ambi-
tiona, made him anxious to return to the United States. When Armstrong 
arrived in Paris to take up hi• post, he was imnediately thrust into a 
controversy not of his making, but exaacerbated due to his family 
connection with Livingston. For an account of the claims controversy, 
see Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. (1948-61, Indianapolis), IV, 
213-229. 
12 Armstrong to Jefferson, June 2, 1804, Thomae Jefferson Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congreae, Washington, D.C., microfilm 
copy, Reel 30; hereafter cited aa Jeffereon Papera LC, followed by 
reel. Jeff eraon was ~oncerned that Armatrong might not accept the 
poaition becauae of rumor• that had circulated regarding the inade-
quacy of salaries for American diplomata. See Jefferson to Armstrong, 
9 
May 26, 1804, Writing• of Jeffer1on, VIII, 302-303. William Pinkney, 
American mlniater to London, waa one who was upaet about the amount of 
his aalary and wrote that it vaa "dreadfully inadequate" and believed 
that General Armstrong waa probably no better off in Parie. Pinkney to. 
Madison, Aug. 19, 1809, in Henry Wheaton, ed., Some Account of the Life, 
Writings and Speeches of William Pinkney (New York, 1926), 96-97. In 
another letter to Madison of August 13, 1810, Pinkney requested permis-
eion from President Madison to end his mission aa the amount allotted 
to repreaentativea abroad was a "pittance," and he was a "constant and 
progressive loser, and at length ••• incapable of supplying the deficien-
ciee of the public allowance." Pinkney to Madison, Aug. 13, 1810, ibid., 
105-107. Armstrong's salary was $9000 per year with one-fourth salary 
earmarked for hia return trip. 
13 
Diet. of Am. Bio., I, 356. See also Henry Adams, A History of the Uni-
ted States of America Duripg the Administrations of Tbgmes Jefferaon and 
James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1889-91), II, 15 7; hereafter cited as Adame. 
14 Madison to Armstrong, July 15, 1804, U.S. Department of State 
Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Instructions, All Coun-
tries, Vol. VI, p. 247, microfilm copy; hereafter cited as NA Instructs., 
followed by volume and page. 
15
Madiaon to Armstrong, Aug. 21, 1804, NA Instructs., VI, 253-254. 
16 Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 14, 1804, U.S. Department of State 
Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Despatches From United 
States Miniatera to France, Vol. IX, microfilm copy; hereafter cited 
as NA Despatches, followed by volume. 
17Armstrong to Madison, Nov. 21, 1804, NA Despatches, 
10 
18 Ibid.; Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and 
Diplomacy of the Undeclared War With France, 1797-1801 (New York, 1966), 
41, refers to Talleyrand as "an unscrupulous, pleasure-loving aristo-
crat of elegant taste and loose morals who had once been a biahop in 
the Catholic Church and whose talent as a diplomat was known throughout 
the world •••• 11 
19Livingston to Madison, Nov. 17, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. IX. 
20 Livingston to Madison, Nov. 21, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. IX. 
21 Armstrong to Madison, Dec. 24, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. x. 
22Livingston to Madison, Sept. 14, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. IX; 
Livingston to Madison, Nov. 21, 1804, NA Despatches, Vol. DC. 
23 Following the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, the acquisition of 
the Floridas--especially West Florida--became Jefferson's overriding 
desire. In the negotiations which followed, Armstrong sought to solicit 
French support in this endeavor. He quickly learned that Napoleon was 
a man of expediency whose promises were frivolous. At one point, the 
Emperor would seem to aide with the Americans, then he would quickly 
reverse himself and aide with the Spaniards when it appeared to be to 
his advantage. As early as 1805, Armstrong, recognizing the precarious 
position in which the United States found itself, advised the use of 
force as a meana to acquire territorial objectivea--a course that he 
would continue to advocate throughout his career in France whenever 
standard diplomatic means had failed. Armstrong to Monroe, May 4, 
1805, NA Despatches, Vol. X. When the Chesapeake incident of June, 
1807 occurred, the negotiations for West Florida ended, for all practi-
cal purposes. However, Napoleon still did not hesitate to dangle the 
11 
prospect of acquiring the Floridaa before Jefferson and Madison on 
various occasion• when it worked to his advantage. Although Armstrong'• 
miaaion after 1807 became more concerned with the defense of American 
commercial rights, he also continued to promote American interest in 
the Floridaa. For a detailed account of the West Florida negotiation•, 
see Isaac Joslin Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A Study 
in American Diplomacy (Baltimore, 1918). 
C}W)TER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTlli 
The British naval victory at the Battle of Trafalgar on October 
21, 1805, for the most part guaranteed British control of the seaa, and 
the ability to cut off French trade with France's colonies or her al. 
lies' colonies, or with neutrale. For the time being, the threat of an 
1 invasion of Great Britain by France had been eliminated. Unable to 
defeat Great Britain at eea, Napoleon therefore tried to strike where 
he thought that it would hurt moat--her ability to trade. After Tra-
falgar, Napoleon decided that he would become the master of the land 
if Great Britain were to be the miatreaa of the seas. In his scheme, 
not only would European port• be closed to British commerce, but also 
the ports of colonies of European countries. With no place to trade, 
the financial basis of Britieh naval and military power would collapse. 
The ensuing commercial warfare of the two belligerent• necessi-
tated the United States being drawn into the middle of this great 
struggle. Both Great Britain and France resorted to retaliation, or 
the pretext of retaliation in their atrugglea. Exactly who was respon-
aible for the "original ain" which may have juatified the initial 
retaliation, ia atill a point which haa yet to be determined. Each 
adversary, however, was more than happy for the pretext to use the 
2 
weapon of blockade. Parallel to the French commercial blockade, a 
systematic persecution of trade with enemy countries was taking place, 
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primarily on the British aide. Both of these developments were united 
3 to form the characteristics of the Continental System. 
In the system of maritime blockade, blockading an enemy's port• 
and coaa~e unquestionably formed the primary basis of the Continental 
System. Characteristic of the system, however, was the practice 
adopted by Great Britain of establishing a so-called "paper blockade," 
a declaring in a atate of blockade, long stretches of coast which she 
could not, or would not, enforce effectively by providing the necessary 
naval forces. On the strength of this declaration, she would capture 
4 
neutral vessels bound for almost any enemy port. 
The Continental System originated, therefore, on one side, in a 
blockade that followed the general lines of mercantile trade policy, 
and on the other aide, in a maritime blockade dominated by the same 
ideas. Owing to the British mastery of the seas, however, the practl-
cal effect of this plan in France was to produce a self-blockade. To 
complete the antecedent conditions of the Continental System, there was 
only one feature lacking. It waa the feature that has given the system 
its name--that is, combining European countries to the exclusion of 
Great Britain, creating a common self-blockade of the Continent against 
Great Britain.5 
In a strictly technical aense, the responsibility for prompting 
the chain of retaliation reata upon Great Britain. It was ostensibly 
her Order in Council of May 16, 1806, that triggered the aeries of 
French decrees and British Orders in Council which ao harshly violated 
6 American neutral rights. To understand the aignif icance of the British 
action of May, 1806, a brief outline recounting practices and events 
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prior to the passage of these orders may be useful. 
ANTECEDENTS FOR THE BRITISH ORDER IN COUNCIL OF MAY 16, 1806 
After the truce of Amiena between Great Britain and France ended 
in May, 1803, American• continued to enjoy a profitable commerce from 
the war, just aa they had during the earlier years of the Anglo-French 
conflict. This rich trade led to the tremendous growth and development 
of the American merchant marine, making the United States the world'• 
moat important neutral carrier. Americans were able to enjoy a trade 
denied them during the years of peace, in carrying goods between French 
ports and Spanish colonies. Since this trade was a violation of the 
7 British Rule of 1756, Americans took their cargoes from French or 
Spanish ports to an American port where they went through certain for-
malities, such as the payment of duties, which might later be refunded. 
The cargoes were thus considered American property, making them "free 
goods." The ships with their "neutralized" cargoes might then proceed 
to France or Spain. England herself recognized the legality of this 
trade in 1800, in a decision handed down by the High Court of Admiralty 
in the case of the American ship, Polly. Thia type of trade, which 
circumvented the Rule of 1756, was known as "broken voyage." In 1805, 
however, this trade came to an end. With increasina protest in England, 
the Lorda Commiaaionera of Appeals in London reversed the Polly deciaion 
in the caae of the American brig, Eaaex. 
Good• could no longer be neutralized by bringing them into a 
neutral country. The •hipper had to pay a bonafide import duty. To 
refund the duty upon re-exporting the goods was considered subterfuge 
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and constituted a "continuous voyage" from enemy homelands to an enemy 
colony. According to the British, "broken voyage" violat_ed the Rule of 
1756, and under the "continuous voyage" doctrine, the7 would no longer 
permit auch trade. Without any advance warning, and before the Essex 
decision had even been publicized, British cruiaers aeized acorea of 
American ahipa carrying French or Spanish goods, especially those found 
in the Caribbean. Consequently, American ports were practically block-
aded. 
With the defeat of the Spaniah and French fleets at Trafalgar, 
England's maritime supremacy waa established, making it possible to 
enforce even tighter control over neutral ahipping. On the same day, 
October 21, 1805, a pamphlet by Admiralty lawyer, James Stephen, enti-
tled ''War in Disguise; Or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags", appeared in 
London. Stephen argued that neutral shipping should be regulated and 
taxed for Britain's war effort. Allowing neutrals, especially the 
Americana, to trade unhampered with the enemy, helped to auatain French 
ambitions, and prolonged Europe's miseries. Scott further argued that 
England denied herself the advantages of her coamand of the seas. 
Since she, in effect, controlled the seas, neutrals had no rights. 
These were popular ideas with the British people and •ubaequent Orders 
in Council basically followed this argument. 
Within one month, however, Napoleon won the Battle of Austerlitz, 
and crushed the armies of Russia and Austria, destroying the third 
coalition against France and strengthening his mastery in Europe. 
Neither power, Great Britain nor France, could get at each other directly, 
but in the squabble which followed, neutral righta, for all practical 
purposes, disappeared, and the United Statee suffered greatly. 
In ita approach to the United Statee, Great Britain adopted a 
policy deaigned to protect British shipping and coamerce, seen aa the 
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source of British greatnese. These could be further encouraged by the 
use of traditional remedies of trade restriction, regulation, and the 
stifling of competition. The fact that Americana appeared as weak, 
uncouth, boasting, as well aa dependent upon Great Britain, greatly 
encouraged the British to pursue their policies. British policy toward 
the United State• combined about equal parts of monopolistic mercan-
8 tiliem, and a desire to strangle Napoleon. 
With the death of Prime Minister William Pitt on January 23, 1806, 
Charles James Fox was named Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of "All 
The Talents." Fox was pressured to devise a measure that would not 
only satisfy preaaurea within Great Britain, but because of hie sympathy 
for the Americana, would also aerve to mollify them. The result was the 
Order in Council of May 16, 1806. In aubatance, this order declared a 
blockade of the European coast from Brest to the Elbe, dividing that 
stretch into two zones. Between the Seine River and the port of Oatend, 
the order would be strictly enforced. In the remaining area, neutral 
ships would be allowed to trade in non-contraband goods, provided they 
did not come from a hostile port. Thia meant that ships which broke 
their voyage by neutralization at an American port, aa waa cOlllDOn 
before the Essex decision, might be allowed to bring cargoes into enemy 
porta like Rotterdam and Bremen in the outer zones, and to all non-
blockaded enemy porta, auch aa those south of Brest.9 
Although an understanding that the order would not be enforced 
17 
on this aection of the coast waa intended to mollify the Americana, the 
order, nonetheless, did not receive a favorable response in the United 
Statea. It waa attacked aa an illegal paper blockade, and the United 
Statee refused to repeal ita Non-Importation Act .. of April 23, 1806, 
' 10 
which had been passed aa a protest against the Essex decision. 
Since Great Britain had taken the first etep, the next was up to 
Napoleon, who was only too anxious to formally introduce the system 
he had been devising to defeat hie leading foe. 
Notes 
Chapter II 
1Richard Gloves, ''The French Fleet, 1807-1814: Britain'• Problem 
and Madison's Opportunity," Journal of Modern History, XXXIX (1967), 
233-252, sheds new light on this coamonly held assumption. The author 
concludes that the defeat of France at Trafalgar did not end any future 
threat of a French invasion of the British Isles. From 1807-1814, Bri-
tain had much to fear as Napoleon conscientiously engaged in a program 
to build up his navy ao as to challenge British supremacy of the seas. 
2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 
5th ed. (New York, 1965), 139. For an account of the antecedents of 
the Continental blockade covering the years 1660 to 1802, •ee Eli F. 
Heckacher, The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation (Oxford, 
1922), 13-74. Thia work is one of the most detailed and authoritative 
on the economic aspects of the Continental System. 
3 Heckacher, 30. 
4Ibid., 30-31. 
5 Ibid., 51. 
6 Archibald N. Stockder, ''The Legality of the Blockade Instituted 
by Napoleon'• Decrees, and the British Orders in Council, 1806-1813," 
American Journal of International Law, X (1916), 492-103, examines the 
legal aspects of these measures aa recognized by international law. 
7 The Rule of the War of 1756 declared that trade closed to nations 
19 
in time of peace could not be opened to them in time of war. 
8 Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United 
States1 1805-1812 (Berkeley, 1961), 5-22. By far the beet account of 
Anglo-American relations during this period. 
9c. J. Fox to Monroe, May 16, 1806, w. Lowrie and M. Clark, 
eds., American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 6 vols. (Washington, 
D.C., 1832-1859), III, 267, microcard copy; hereafter cited as ASPFR, 
followed by volume and page. 
10 Heckacher, 497; Bemis, History, 146. The Non-Importation Act 
was scheduled to go into effect on Nov. 1 against British goods unless 
a aettlement was reached in the meantime between the two countries. 
Because of Monroe's and Pinkney•s mission to conclude a new treaty, the 
act was postponed and did not go into effect. The treaty aigned on 
Dec. 31, 1806 was inadequate in meeting the requirement of the United 
States government--especially aa related to impressment andapoliationa. 
The treaty was rejected by Jefferson. For an examination of Ameri.c.an 
acta of non-importation, aee Herbert Heaton, "Non-Importation, 1806-
1812," Journal of Economic Hiatory, I (1941), 178-198. He contends 
that non-importation haa received far too little attention in contrast 
to the Embargo. Heaton concludes that non-importation waa mostly 
ineffective, despite the diligent efforts of such people aa Peter A. 
Schenck, Surveyor of Customs and Inspector of Revenue for the Port of 
New York, to enforce it. 
CHAPTER III 
INAUGURATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM: BERLIN DECREE 
The yeara 1803 to 1806 witnessed earth-shattering events, especi-
ally in military terms: Napoleon's preparation in 1804-1805 for a 
descent on England; the foundation of the French Empire (May-December, 
1804); the formation of the Third Coalition against France and ita 
defeat at Ulm and Austerlitz (October and December, 1805); as an inmedi-
ate sequel to thia, the Peace of Preasburg, with the extension of the 
"coaat system" to the eastern shore of the Adriatic, but also the 
defeat of the combined French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar (October 
21, 1805); and finally the formation of the Fourth Coalition and the 
defeat of Pruaaia at Jena and Auerstadt (October 14, 1806).1 
In the autumn of 1806, Napoleon'• victory on the Continent was as 
complete aa wae his def eat at aea. He could point to the Battle of 
Jena aa the natural antecedent to the Continental System, inasmuch aa 
that battle placed him in control of the Weser, Elbe, Trave, Oder, and 
all the coastline as far aa the Viatula. 2 On October 27, 1806, the 
victorious French troops made a triumphal entry into Berlin, the capi-
tal of the country which Napoleon had just thoroughly defeated. On the 
pretext of retaliation for Great Britain'• illegal blockade of May 16, 
1806, the Emperor, on November 21, 1806, signed what became famous aa 
3 hi• Berlin Decree. Thia aymbolized the formal inauguration of hia 
Continental Syatem. Napoleon aurmiaed that if England were prevented from 
21 
trading with Europe, she would soon be delivered a fatal blow. The 
Emperor saw the closing of all ports of the mainland to the British 
aa a necesaary precondition for peace with the Continental powers. 
Even before the decree 1 a actual promulgation, the Emperor demon-
atrated that he had, aom~ time beforehand, seen the necessity of a 
continental blockade. The Berlin Decree was a culmination of earlier 
thoughts and measures, but ita actual publication atill had the effect 
4 
of a bomb, thank.a to Napoleon's ability aa a atage manager. 
The preamble of the decree opened with the charge that England was 
disregarding the law of nationa. She made non-combatants prisoners of 
war, confiscated private property, blockaded unfortified harbors and 
mouths of rivers, and considered places as blockaded though she did not 
have a single ahip before them--even to the extent of blockading whole 
coasts and empires. According to the decree, the blatant abuse of the 
right of blockade had no other purpose than to destroy trade and indua-
try ao as to build up her own on the ruins of trade and industry on the 
Continent. France, therefore, had a natural right to use the same wea. 
pone and methods of warfare against her. Therefore, until England re-
cognized and corrected these violations of law, it was decreed that: 
(1) the British Isles were in a state of blockade; (2) all intercourse 
with them waa prohib1ted;·(3) every Englishman found within French 
authority was a prisoner of war; (4) all British property, private and 
public, waa prize of war; (5) all merchandise coming from England waa 
prize of war; (6) half the product of such confiscations should be em~ 
ployed to indemnify merchant• whose property had been captured by Bri-
tish cruisers; (7) no ahip coming from England or her colonies should 
be admitted into any port; and (8) every vessel trying to elude this 
s 
rule by means of f alae paper• would be conf iacated. 
In the meantime, General Armstrong had been observing military 
22 
and political movements, and assessing their consequences for the Uni-
ted States and its comnerce. As early as March, 1806, more than eight 
months before the publication of the Berlin Decree, Armstrong had sue-
pected that moves were then being made to exclude Great Britain from 
6 
all intercourae with Northern Europe. Armstrong observed that people 
in Paris were convinced that a change of ministry in England would not 
necessarily produce peace. The French professed to know Mr. Fox's 
true sentiments, thought to be more erroneous than those of Pitt. Thia 
belief had auppoeedly induced the Emperor to adopt and pursue, "with 
his characteristical vigor, the system of shutting the ports of Europe 
7 
against the commerce of England." England was to be insulated politi-
cally and commercially. The risk to neutrals in "the ardor of this 
experiment" were clearly recognized by the American minister. "Between 
the two principles the occlusion of the French and blockading of the 
8 British our comnerce will be in a pretty situation." 
On December S, 1806, the text of the Berlin Decree was published 
in the Moniteur. Almost simultaneously, news arrived that Hamburg, and 
almost the entire northern coast of Germany along the North Sea and the 
Baltic, had fallen to Napoleon--or were about to. After Armstrong had 
observed the aucceaa of French arms, and having received knowledge of 
the Berlin Decree, he might well have felt that he had finally dia-
covered--af ter numerous attempts--a concrete idea of what the Emperor 
had been scheming, partially explaining the problems that had plagued 
his diplomacy. 
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9 It at least gave him a vague idea of what waa to come. 
Armatrong quickly forwarded a copy of the decree to the Secretary 
of State, then directed hie efforts toward d11cerning the actual and 
intended meanings of the decree--eapecially aa related to American 
intereata.10 Not one to aide-step an iaaue, Armstrong demonetrai,ed the 
diligence with which he pursued hi• duties and forcefully demanded that 
Deer~•, French Miniater of Marine and Colonies, give him "the official 
explanation which may be given to the Imperial Decree of the 2lat of 
November, 1806, ao far aa that decree involve• the right• of neutral 
nationa.1111 More apecificallyt Armstrong wished to know whether 
"Britiah Islands", mentioned in Article I, waa to be understood as all 
ialanda in the possession of the King of England, or if the rule would 
extend the blockade to the continental possessions also. Additionally, 
Armstrong wished to know if the decree would operate from its date, and 
if seizures made under it, before notice was given, would be conaidered 
legal. Would American vesaels, navigating the high or narrow seas, be 
liable to seizure, on evidence only, that they were going to, or re-
turning from. a British port? Finally, he wanted to know whether 
Articles II and V would operate only as domestic regulations, or if 
their injunctions would extend to citizens of foreign or independent 
12 
nationa. 
Despite Armstrong's request for a rapid reply to hia inquiry, it 
was not until December 24, 1806, that Decree finally answered the 
question• posed, though not ae definitively aa Armstrong would have 
preferred. Decree opened by stating that he considered the decree of 
November 21, 1806, aa conveying no modification of the regulations then 
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being observed in France with regard to neutrals, nor of the Convention 
13 
of 1800 with the United State•• With this, the four questions which 
Armstrong had aaked were, according to Decree, resolved. In concluding, 
however, Decree qualified hi• remarks by stating that the anawera he had 
provided could not have aa much authority as they would if received 
from the Minister of Foreign lelationa. Armstrong ought to address 
himself to that minister for explanations, which Decrea had been happy 
to provide because Armstrong had requested them from him, but upon 
which Decrea did not posses• aa much information as the Prince of 
14 Benevento did. 
Decrea•anawerawere quickly despatched to .the Secretary of State 
15 in Armstrong's letter of December 24, 1806. The President then con-
16 
veyed them to Congress. General Turreau, French Minister to the 
United States also led Americans to believe that the United States had 
nothing to fear in the Berlin Decree. He had received a despatch from 
hia Court expressly declaring that the decree was not to affect the 
United States, and that the Emperor was determined to respect American 
interests and would observe the convention existing between the two 
17 
countries. The Administration waa not only concerned, however, 
about the Berlin Decree, but also about a Spanish decree modelled after 
the French one, whose terms were even more vague and broad. If it was 
not recalled or modified, it would undoubtedly produce more spoliations 
which had already begun in that region, and, of course, "thicken the 
cloud that hangs over the amity of the two nationa.1118 
Meanwhile, Armstrong became increasingly impatient as the Emperor 
remained away from Paria so long, winning one victory after another 
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which brought him closer to achieving control of the Continent. On 
February 8, 1807, Napoleon fought the Battle of Eylau. Following thia 
battle, Armatrong became so impatient to teat the promiae of the Bllper• 
or to help resolve America'• dispute with Spain, that in May, 1807, he 
requested passport• to proceed to Napoleon'• headquarters. Thia request 
waa denied.19 If Arm8trong had been allowed to go, he probably would 
have witneaaed the great Battle of Friedland, fought on June 14, and 
would have witneaaed the Peace of Tilait, aigned on July 7, which 
eliminated the laat obstacle to Napoleon'• achemea against Spain and 
20 the United States. After Tilait, Napoleon and Czar Alexander pri-
vately agreed that the remaining neutrals were left to Napoleon to be 
21 dealt with aa he pleased. 
Except for Denmark and Portugal, every country on the coast of 
Europe, from St. Petersburg to Trieste, was forced to recognize 
Napoleon's domination. England reaiated, and for the time being, could 
not be reached by aea. The next step in the Emperor'• system, then, was 
to effect England'• ruin by closing the whole world to her trade. The 
Emperor began with Portugal. From Dresden, on July 19, 1807, he 
iaaued orders that the Portugueae ports should be closed by September 1 
to English cOlllllerce, or the kingdom of Portugal would be occupied by a 
combined French and Spanish army. 
On July 29, Napoleon returned to Paris, and, on July 31, he 
ordered Talleyrand to warn the Prince Royal of Denmark that he muat 
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choose between war with England and war with France. The likelihood 
that Napoleon would move ahortly against the neutrality atatua of the 
United States muat have been in Armstrong'• thoughts when he related 
26 
incidents to the Secretary of State that had occurred at Court. Recog-
nizing that Napoleon had pretty much settled the buaineaa of the belli-
gerent1 to hi• liking--with the exception of England--he waa then at 
the point of aettling that of the neutrals in the same way. Armatrong 
reported that while at Court Napoleon had severely lectured the Portu-
gueae Miniater aa a result of the conduct of that minister'• court. 
Later, Mr. Dreyer, the Danish minister, took Armstrong aside and in• 
quired of him if any application had been made toward Armstrong about 
a projected union of coa.mercial atatea against Great Britain. Not 
having been approached as yet, no doubt Armatrong muat have felt a 
certain amount of trepidation for the future when Dreyer remarked: 
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''You are much favored, but it will not last." Thia waa after the 
Danish minister had been apoken to threateningly by Napoleon. To 
Armstrong, these incident• aeemed to confirm the whiapera which had 
begun to circulate that an army was organizing to the south for the 
purpoae of taking poaaeaaion of Portugal, and another army to the 
24 
north for a aimilar purpoae with regard to Denmark. Armatrong recog-
nized that he too vaa expected to benefit from the Emperor's outburats 
at Court. 
A• the Daniah Minister had predicted, the goodwill of Napoleon 
toward the Americana did not laat very long. Under ordera from Napo-
leon, the King of Holland and the King of Denmark were instructed to 
aeize neutral cOU111erce, and to cloae the Danish and Dutch porta. 
Imnediately the question aroae whether United States ahips and property 
were still exempt from the operation of the Berlin decree, in light of 
the Convention of 1800. The Emperor ruled against them. He stated: 
••• navigation offers all aorta of difficultiee. France 
cannot regard aa neutral flags which enjoy no conaidera-
tion. That of America, however exposed it may be to the 
inaulta of the English atill keep aome meaeure in regard 
to it, and it impoaea on them.. That of Pottugal and that 
of Denmark eziat no longer.25 
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Shortly thereafter, General Armstrong was informed that the Mini-
ater of Marine and the Council of Prizes were about to receive new 
order• in reference to the Berlin Decree. Armstrong waa informed in a 
note that there were to be no exceptions in the application of the 
Berlin Decree, aince the decree itself contained none. Armstrong 
quickly related this information to the Secretary of State, recognizing 
that it might be very important in light of the then-preaent crisis 
26 
with England. The American minister was not too optimiatic about 
this latest turn of events. He did not attempt to disguise the poten• 
tial seriousness of the situation aa it pertained to the United States. 
He told Madiaon that he could not flatter him with: 
••• the prospect of any change for the better, with re-
spect to it. It would appear that the two great rivals of 
Europe were atriving, not only which should do us the moat 
harm, but which should most injure itself, in the measures 
persued [sic] in relation to ua.2 7 
Armstrong wondered if the most appropriate action for the United 
States to take would not be to withdraw from cOlllDerce for the time 
being, until the current atorm had passed. To him, an embargo, 
earnestly observed, would, besides securing the present safety and 
future strength of the country, aet an example for friends and enemies 
alike. It would teach belligerents how important a regular coanerce 
waa to their wants, especially one that was honestly neutrai.28 Al-
though Armstrong was quick to reverse hie position on the efficacy of an 
28 
embargo when tried by the United Statea and •een a• a failure, Arm-
atrong•a auggestion to consider it at this time reflects his concern 
for the mounting difficultie1 confronting the United States as a 
neutral, and illustrates his efforts to find solutions to the predica-
ment. 
Armstrong did not have to wait long for greater clarification of 
the Berlin Decree with regard to the United S~atea. In a letter from 
29 Champagny, Talleyrand's successor as Minister of Foreign Relations, 
to Armstrong, the Foreign Minister further confirmed that, contrary to 
Decree• earlier profesaione, there were to be no exceptions to the 
enforcement of the Berlin Decree. The Emperor had determined that every 
vessel going from English ports with cargoes of English merchandise, 
30 
or of English origin, was lawfully aeizeable by French armed vessels. 
The fact that orders had been given to enforce the decree literally, 
was duly transmitted to Madison. Armstrong further acknowledged that 
the November decree had been devised expressly for the purpose of 
embroiling Great Britain with neutral nations. Since the United States 
remained the only country of that description, then it must be seen as 
the last means for rendering impracticable an amicable arrangement 
between Great Britain and the United States. Armatrong had no doubts 
as to Napoleon'• motive in this policy, or ita probable effects • 
••• the moment France pretend• to blockade England--England 
will in turn, pretend to blockade the whole continent of Eur-
ope, and thus our trade 1~ every direction, becomes liable to 
aeizure and confiscation. 1 
Lacking inatructiona aa to the course he should follow, Armstrong 
tried to at least minimize the effect• of the decree on American cc:xm-
29 
merce until relevant inatructiona were received. He offered arguments 
that he hoped would impress the Emperor. In responding to Champagny•s 
letter of October 7, 1807, Armstrong grasped the opportunity to a1k 
Champagny if a postponement of the execution of the decree until the 
issue of the pending negotiation between the United States and Great 
Britain was known might not indeed correepond with the Emperor's 
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wishes. Armstrong ahrewdly called attention to arguments which the 
Emperor had used as the pretezt for issuing the decree in the first 
place. When the Emperor recalled hi• motives, according to Armstrong, 
he would find among them one of compelling Great Britain to respect 
the rights of neutr.al comnerce. When, at the aame time, he aaw that 
the United States was on the brink of war with Great Britain in defense 
of those neutral rights, it would then be impossible that the Emperor--
with wisdom and a sense of justice--would not refrain from interposing 
and suspending the execution of a measure "which can have no ef f ec.t 
but to lesson, at once, the motives and the means of the United States, 
in the support of a cause, hitherto believed to be coumon to them, and 
33 to the French Empire." 
In Armstrong's observations of a diplomatic audience on October 
14, 1807, he reported that Napoleon had rebuked numerous foreign 
representatives. Napoleon threatened the ambassador from Portugal that 
the House of Braganza would reign no more. To the ambassador from 
Etruria, the Emperor accused the Queenof Etruria of having secret 
attachment• to Great Britain. The same accusation waa directed to 
deputiee from the Hanse towna. Napoleon boasted that he possessed the 
means of destroying Great Britain. He had 300,000 men devoted to that 
30 
object, aa well as 300,000 from Russia who were willing to support hi• 
effort to do ao. He further vowed that he would permit no nation to 
receive a minister from Great Britain until ahe had renounced her 
maritime tyranny. Napoleon urged the diplomats to convey thie 
to their respective sovereigns. Under the circumstances, Armstrong 
realistically calculated that the United States had little room to 
hope for any substantial relaxation of the blockading decrees, which, 
as far as they pertained to the United States, had remained unexecuted 
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ao far. Thia good luck was about to change. 
THE CASE OF THE HORIZON 
Although in October, 1807, Armstrong had investigated reports that 
the Berlin Decree was being applied to American shipping in such places 
as Bremen and Hamburg, it was in November, in the judgment against the 
American ship, Horizon, that the first actual "unfriendly" decision of 
the Council of Prizes under the Berlin Decree occurred.35 Thia decision 
prompted the first of Armstrong's innumerable protests and remonstrances 
to the French government regarding her hostile actions against American 
maritime rights. His reactions in this particular case are representa-
tive of the consistently firm approach which he employed in the defense 
of American rights--a f irmneaa which demonstrated his lack of intimida-
tion by French officials, including the Emperor himself. 
The Horizon had been shipwrecked on May 21, 1807, near Morlaix 
on the French coaat. The Council of Prizes judged that the amount of 
the sale legally made of the wreck, together with the cargo which was 
acknowledged not to have proceeded either from English manufactures or 
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from English territory, was, according to the 5th article of the Berlin 
36 Decree, to be confiscated for the uee of the atate. Armstrong'• 
'on,ern over the detiaion of the Council of Prizes vaa clear. He told 
Champagny that: 
The reasons, upon which this decision is founded, are at 
once ao new and so alarming to the present friendly relations 
of the two powers, that I cannot but ~iacuaa them with a free-
dom of their novelty and importance.3 
Armstrong argued that eince the neutrality of the ahip and cargo 
had been aufficiently established by the Council, the whole ought to 
be restored, agreeable to the provisions of the Convention of 1800. 
Armstrong pointed out that this was an open and unqualified admission 
that the ship waa indeed found within the rulea prescribed by the 
Convention of 1800, that according to these rules the cargo and the 
ship ought to have been restored, and that such would have been the 
38 fact, but for the operation of the Berlin Decree. 
One reason given by the Council of Prizea to justify its decision 
was that, though one of the principle agents of the Emperor (Decr~s) 
had given a contrary opinion--an opinion which the Council had not been 
involved with--that opinion was one of an individual and could not off-
set the Emperor'• formal declaration. If this opinion had apparently 
seemed to permit American trade, it still did not prevent the Council 
from conforming to the Berlin Decree.39 
Caustically, Armstrong stated to Champagny that: 
It would appear from thia paragraph, that, not finding it 
easy to untie the knot, the council had determined to cut it. 
Pressed by the fact, that an interpretation of the decree had 
been given by a minister of Hie Majesty, specially charged 
with its execution, they would now escape from thi1 fact, and 
from the conclusions to which it evidently leada.40 
Armstrong informed Champagny that he would submit to Champagny, 
hie letter of December 29, 1806, requesting from Deer~• an official 
interpretation of the decree, and hi• answer of D•cember 24, giving 
Armstrong the interpretation he had demanded. Armetrong further re-
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called to Champagny that, aa late as August 21, 1806, it was understood 
that Deer~• had been the natural organ of the Emperor's will, and it 
waa to him that Champagny himaelf had applied for information relating 
to the decree. Sensing the strength of his position, Armstrona re-
f erred to the allegations of the Council of Prizes, and the reasoning 
founded upon them, aa extraordinary. Armstrong felt justified in 
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requesting that the Emperor aet aaide the decision of the Council. 
The firmness with which Armstrong protested the actions of the 
Council of Prizes in this case certainly was not calculated to endear 
himself to French officialdom, nor to an Emperor more accustomed to 
kow-towing representatives of foreign countriea--especially representa-
tivea from neutrals. Armstrong had eatabli1hed himself quite early as 
a man not easily intimidated. Thie note of protest provoked the 
Emperor to respond, through Champagny. Following the instructions of 
the Emperor, Champagny, on November 24, 1807, wrote to General Arm. 
strong. Taking the position that it was the intention of the Emperor 
that every abuse should be repreaeed, the United States could not com-
plain about the measures taken under the Berlin Decree, especially 
while that country: 
••• allow that their veaaela may be visited by England, that 
she may drag them into her port•, and turn them from their dee-
tination; while they do not oblige England to respect their 
flag, and the merchandise which it covers; while they permit 
their power to apply to them the absurd rulea of blockade 
which it haa aet up with the view of injuring France; they 
bind themaelvea by that tolerance tovarda England to allow 
alao the application of the meaaurea of f!pri•al• which 
France la obliged to employ againat her. 
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Champagny further related to Armstrong that the Emperor regretted 
that he had to resort to auch meaaurea, while recognizing that the 
ccmmercial classes may suffer aa a result, but it waa to England, rather 
than to France, that protest• resulting from inconveniences to indivi-
duals should be addreaaed. In order to force England to renounce her 
actions, it had become neceaaary for the Baperor to confront that coun-
try with her own weapona. The unjust pretensions of England would be 
maintained as long aa thoae whoae right• ahe violated were silent. 
Armstrong was informed that the difficulties would be removed if only 
the government of the United States, after having complained in vain 
about the injustice of England, would join with the whole Continent in 
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opposing British violations. Armstrong must certainly have had 
difficulty in containing himself after reading this flimsy juatifica-
tion for French actiona toward the United States. 
ADVOCATE OF ACTION 
Having been in France over two years, Armstrong had had ample 
time to test Napoleon's aincerity and good faith. He knew from practi-
cal experience that the Emperor waa a man of expediency, and one who 
would resort to any means to accomplish his objectives, regardless of 
previous promiaea or commitmenta. In order to draw the United States 
into Napoleon'• system against Great Britain, the Emperor shrewdly 
dangled the prospect of the Floridaa--Jefferaon's overwhelming passion 
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and the principle object of Armatrong'• diplomacy up until this time~­
before the President. 44 The catch, of course, was that the United States 
muat join in the atruggle against England, and accept Napoleon's aeeur-
ances of a maritime peace between the United States and the Continent 
which would supposedly establish the principle of "free ships, free gooda." 
Armatrong waa skeptical about any scheme appearing to involve the 
United States for France's benefit.. Wf. th regard to the Flor idas, 
Armstrong suggested that ia waa wiaer to act alone, even in the event of 
war with England. France had done all that could be expected from her, 
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and her promises lately had become quite sparing. Typical of Arm-
strong'& suggestions throughout hia career, he advised firmer action by 
the United States in acquiring its.territorial objectives when diplomacy 
had failed, and as a means of upholding international respect for the 
country. Having previously advocated action to acquire the Floridaa, 
Armstrong posed possible action to American leadership, as he had done 
in 1805 when he had urged the seizure of Texaa. 46 Recognizing the menace 
confronting the United States from various corners, hequestioned if it 
might not be wise not only to launch an attack against Canada to the 
north, but also against the Floridaa to the south. The imposition of 
an embargo, plus the northern expedition would pass for measures ta.keri 
strictly against Great Britain. The attack on the Floridas would also 
be seen as a preventive measure againat Great Britain. Knowing that 
the Secretary of State might see objections to these auggeations that 
Armstrong did not, Ar1118trong nonetheless felt that they would greatly 
increase the respect for the United States that was lacking. He con-
eluded that: 
••• if executed with prompitude and spirit, they would do 
more to preserve inviolate your peace and happiness than all 
the parchment and diplomacy of both hemispheres put together. 
One other trial of atrength with an European power puts down 47 all the ridiculoua calculations of their projection• forever. 
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Not a war monger, General Armstrong did recognize that when dlplo-
macy failed, resorting to arms to acquire American objectives might be 
the only logical course. But aa in hie previous bid for firmer action--
as he would in the many instances to come--the Administration, with 
faith in peaceable coercion and an_ abhorrence for war, shied away from 
confrontation, regardleaa of the relatively small risk involved, and 
the prospects for aucceaa. Armstrong's frustrations mounted aa he waa 
forced to watch while American rights were violated by an insensitive 
48 Emperor, and American leadership continued to refuse stronger action. 
No one could know for sure what Napoleon's intentions for the 
United States actually were at this particular juncture, aa the Emperor 
left Paris on November 14, 1807, to engage in further military cam-
paigna. Armstrong clearly knew, however, that great changes were in 
store for Italy, Spain, and Portugal. He foresaw that Portugal was to 
be taken from the Braganzaa, and that the Bourbons of Spain were at last 
to make way for Lucien Bonaparte, who waa to marry the Queen Regent of 
49 Etruria. That Armstrong was so well informed about projects that 
were then ao carefully concealed, wa1 a credit to hie diplomacy. It was 
not until nearly a month later that Lucien, in his Italian banishment, 
received notice of the plan that waa intended for him.50 
With event• of auch magnitude about to take place (the Battle of 
Jena, the occupation of Spain and Portugal, among others) Napoleon 
really had very little time for American concern• regarding the Florida 
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negotiations or the enforcement of the Berlin Decree.51 Armstrong'• 
52 f eara for the royal houaea of Spain and Portugal were confirmed. By 
the time Napoleon reached Milan on December 15, 1807, Lisbon waa under 
the control of Junot, and French garri•ona held every atrategical 
point between Lisbon and Bayonne. The Prince Regent of Portugal, 
powerless to resiat Napoleon'• army, aailed for South America to found 
a new empire at Rio de Janeiro. Spain waa alao in Napoleon's hands. 
When he reached Milan, Napol.eon'• thought• were about Spain and her 
colonies, with which the questions of English and American trade were 
closely connected. Spencer Perceval'• Orders in Council had appeared 
in the London Gazette of November 14, and had also followed the Emperor 
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to Italy. A few weeks later, war was declared between England and 
Ruaala. No neutral then remained except Sweden, soon to be crushed by 
Ruaaia, and the United States, with which Napoleon would deal severely. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM ENFORCED 
On January 7, 1807, Great Britain had issued an Order in Council, 
nominally in retaliation for the Berlin Decree. Thie applied a new 
interpretation of the Rule of 1756 to the subject states of France. 
It prohibited neutral trade between all enemy ports, for example, be-
tween Spanish and French ports (such trade had been definitel7open 
before the outbreak of the war) and other ports from which Britiah 
goods had been excluded by the Berlin Decree. On November 11, 1807, 
another group of Orders in Council were i••ued. They, and other Par-
limentarye~ctmenta, declared that enemy countries and their coloniea 
were ·to be conaidered blockaded in the atricteat manner. All goods 
coming from those countries, aa well aa any vessel trading with them 
without a special British license--together with its cargo--waa to be 
fair prize. The effect of this order vaa to leave American trade with 
the West Indies unmolested, but to compel all exports from parts of 
the United States to Europe to be aubject to British control, license, 
and toll.1 These measures were considered justifiable because the 
neutral state• had acquiesced in the provisions of the Berlin Decree. 
2 Thie was erroneoua. In a letter of Nov. 27, 1807 from Pinkney in 
London to Madison, the Minister stated: 
The Britiah orders annihilate the whole public law of &urope 
relative to maritime prize, and substitute a sweeping system 
of condemnation and penalty in its place. The French decree 
produces no auch change at all in that law. The last was no 
more than a legitimate, though possibly an ungracious, exer-
ciae of the right of local sovereignty; while the former can 
be ref erred only to for!e, and look for the acene of their 
operation to the ocean. 
So long as the Berlin Decree was enforced only as a local or 
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municipal law, the United States did not really remonstrate against it 
becauae it had not adversely affected her trade. Prior to November, 
1807, there had been relatively little exhange of notes between France 
and the United States on the subject. Then word waa received that the 
4 decree would be actively enforced without exceptions. 
MILAN DECREE 
Knowledge of events which led to Napoleon'• decree from Milan, 
on December 17, 1807, is somewhat vague. It has been asserted that the 
retaliatory preamble of the decree was an after-thought, that there is 
evidence that the Milan Decree may not have been in Napoleon's original 
program, although it does seem consonant enough that he need not have 
s based it upon British action. It may very well be that the Emperor had 
not even learned of the exact wording or even the actual promulgation 
of the November 11 Order in Council before issuing his first decree of 
Milan on November 23. He certainly had clear enough information of 
ita likely character from various allusions in British newspapers, 
carefully excerpted by the Moniteur, and other French newspapers. On 
November 23, the very day of Napoleon's arrival at Milan, he issued 
6 hi• first decree of Milan. The fundamental measure in the new legi-
elation of the extended Continental System waa, however, Napoleon'• 
aecond decree of Milan, issued fromth•royal palace on December 17, 
43 
1807. Although thia decree waa ostensibly in response to the British 
Order in Council of November 11, 1807, it waa aa much directed toward 
7 
neutral• •• 1t wa1 toward the Driti1h. 
Like the Berlin Decree, the preamble of this second decree of 
Milan, was a justification for its issuance. The British Order• of 
November compelled the ahipa of neutral• and friends of England not 
only to submit to visits by British cruieere,but also to touch at Bri-
tiah port• and to pay a tax levied upon their cargoes. According to the 
Milan Decree, the Britieh Ordera would have the effect of denationaltz. 
ing the vessels of all nation• of Europe, affecting the sovereignty of 
the atatea themaelvea. All vessels which submitted to aearch or entered 
into British ports, became denationalized and, hence, were English pro-
perty and subject to capture. Vessels either going to or coming from 
English ports, colonies or any country in the possession of Engliah 
troops, were lawful prizes. The decree would not apply to such coun-
tries which forced England to reepect their flags, and the decree 
should, by the very nature of it, be void as aoon as the English 
8 Government would abide by the principle of the law of nations. 
Armstrong quickly forwarded a copy of this second extraordinary 
9 decree to the Secretary of State. Whether the decree was meant to 
stimulate Great Britain to comnit new outrages, or to encourage the 
United States to denounce those ahe had already committed, the policy 
waa so unwise that Arm8trong reported he did not know a person who 
approved of it. Nevertheleaa, Armstrong waa observant enough to know 
that it waa equally aa difficult to find a man who would dare hazard an 
objection to thia Napoleonic measure. Even Talleyrand, who had been 
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allowed to go farther than any other peraon, dared not give hie opinion 
of it. Bad aa he thought it vaa, he would not do more than to atate 
that lt would appear to require aome modifications. 10 
In the postscript to hi• despatch, Armatrong reported that he had 
aeen a letter from the Miniater of Marine, atating that the veaaela of 
friendly and allied powera, then in the port• of the Empire, would not 
be permitted to depart until given further ordera. Thia waa auppoaedly 
to prevent their falling into the handa of the enemy. Armstrong clearly 
recognized the real object of thia action--to induce the British to 
aeize auch veaaela of the United State• aa may be within their reach. 
"Thu• t~e tvo rivala are to go on endeavoring which can most outrage 
11 lava and juatice." 
Armstrong did not waste time in protesting this decree, which he 
realized posed obvious danger• to his country'• interests. At the same 
time, he saw an opportunity presented by Spain's impending doom to 
presa France for help in the settlement of the Florida issue. On 
December 23, Napoleon, in orders iaaued from Milan, ordered his Minister 
of War to concentrate armies to occupy the whole Iberian Peninsula, and 
to establish the magazine• for their support. He was almost ready to 
act against Spain, and his return to Paris on January 3, 1808, announced 
to those in on the secret, that the subjugation of Spain was about to 
12 begin. 
Armstrong was one of the most interested in Paris. He had longed 
since 1805 for the chance to challenge the Emperor by employing similar 
preHure tactica. Armstrong believed that Napoleon'• schemes to defeat Eng-
land required either control of or the acquiescence of North and South America 
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in his plana. This factor would give President Jefferson the ability 
to demand rather than receive, terms for Florida. Whatever these terms 
might be, Napoleon would have to agree to them, or yield the Americas 
to England's naval supremacy. As Armstrong saw it, the plan was both 
safe and sure. Napoleon made no secret of his wants. Whatever finesse 
he may have used in the earlier stages of his diplomacy was thrown 
13 
aside after his return to Paris on January 3. The Emperor wanted the 
14 United States to go to war against Great Britain. He did not hesitate 
to threaten, cajole, or bribe. In response to Armstrong's remonstrances 
against the Milan Decree, the Emperor ordered Champagny to take a 
commanding and declarative position. He instructed Champagny to answer 
that: 
••• I am ashamed to discuss points which the injustice is so 
evident; but that in the position which England has put the 
Continent, I do not doubt of the United States declaring war 
against her, especially on account of her decree of November 
11; that however great may be the evil resulting to America 
from war, every man of sense will prefer it to a recognition 
of the monatroua principles and of the anarchy which that 
Government wants to establish on the seas; that in my mind I 
regard war as declared between England and America from the 
day when England published her decrees; that, for the rest, 
I have ordered that the American vessels should remain se-
questered, to be disposed of as shall be necessary according 
to circumstances.15 
Champagny followed the instruction• of his master and wrote a 
note to Armstrong, dated January 15, 1807. He condemned the practices 
employed by Great Britain aa so contrary to the rules of nations that, 
therefore, it had become necessary to turn against her the arms which she 
made use of herself. If inconveniences resulted then it was to Eng-
land that the United States should direct complaints. The United 
States, more than any other power, had legitimate complaints against 
Great Britain.16 No doubt this waa correct. Believing that the 
United States was ready to associate with all other powers who had 
defended themselves against Great Britain, the Emperor had not taken 
any definitive measures against American ve11el1 which may have been 
brought into French ports. He had ordered that they should remain 
sequestered until a decision was made, according to the dispositions 
17 
expressed by the government of the United States. 
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Re•ponding to Champagny'• letter of January 15, 1808, Armstrong, 
in a note of January 27, 1808, concurred with the French assessment of 
Anglo-American relations. If these two powers were not in a state of 
open war, they were at least close to it. Armstrong further informed 
Champagny that he wae cognizant that England was strengthening herself 
in Canada, Nova Scotia, and her West India islands, and that she con-
templated the seizure of the two Florid••· Under the circumstances, 
Armstrong felt the Emperor should be apprized of the intentions of the 
British, and at the same time that the United States would not be in-
different to the two province• paaaing into the possession of a power 
on the point of becoming an enemy. The United States would repel 
every attempt made by Great Britain to possess these provinces. Arm-
strong reminded Champagny that in 1806 the United States had been on 
the point of settling ita differences with Spain by force, and was only 
restrained by the desire, repeatedly expressed by the Emperor, that a 
good understanding might be preserved between the two powers, and that 
the point• in the controveray between them would be amicably discussed 
and terminated. Armstrong stated that he waa for the last time in-
atructed to present the subject to the Emperor and to solicit his 
efforts at mediation in order to bring the parties into an iumediate 
negotiation. 18 Thia meaaure alone would prevent force. 
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Armstrong'• actions at this time were extremely ahrewd and adept. 
He was aware that the Emperor was, at that very moment, concentrating 
hie effort• on Spain. Napoleon, ever expedient, alao aought to achieve 
hia objective•, trying to lure the United States into hie scheme. On 
January 28, 1808, the Emperor gave the order to occupy Barcelona and 
the Spanish frontier aa far as the Ebro, and to march a division from 
Burgoa to Aranda on the direct road to Madrid. These orders were not 
disguised; they announced the annexation of Spain to France. A few 
daya later, Napoleon began to diapoae of Spanish territory aa if it 
were his own.19 
On February 2, 1808, the Emperor instructed Champagny to inform 
Armstrong that whenever war should be declared between the United States 
and England, and when, in consequence of thia war Americana should aend 
troops into the Florida• to repulse the English, the Emperor would 
approve. Champagny was also to inform Armstrong that, should the 
United State• enter into a treaty of alliance the Emperor would be 
willing to intervene with the Court of Spain to obtain the Floridas 
for the Americana.20 
On the following day, Champagny aent f~r Armstrong and gave him 
this verbal message, and the Emperor's offer to intercede to settle the 
western boundary of Louisiana, on condition that the United States 
enter into an alliance with France.21 
Armstrong deaervea credit for not merely accepting verbal aeaur-
ancea of the Emperor. Armstrong waa determined to make sure that the 
French government waa aware of what it needed to do to revive American 
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friendship. He alao wanted to place on record any official or unofficial 
overture• which had been made to him. Armatrong•s correspondence clear-
ly demonstrates that he waa not eaail7 duped by profeetion1 of Freneh 
friendship, and did not hesitate to impresa the French government with 
hie disgust and extreme displeasure for their paat actions. Armstrong 
was certainly not intimidated by French officialdom. He bluntly ac-
cuaed France of violating certain neutral rights, and comnented to 
Champagny that it was indeed difficult to differentiate between the 
hostile actions of Great Britain and those of France. His irritation 
was clearly evident in the following: 
I should little deserve, and still less reciprocate the 
frankness of this declaration, were I to withhold from your 
Excellency my belief, that the present conduct of France 
towards the comnerce of the u.s., so far from promoting the 
views of his Majesty, are directly calculated to contravene 
them. 
That the u.s. are at this moment on the eve of war with 
Great Britain on account of certain outrages conmitted against 
their rights as a neutral nation is a fact abundantly and even 
generally known. Another fact scarcely leaa known ia, that, 
under these circumstances, France also has proceeded, in 
many instances and by various means, to violate these very 
rights. In both cases all the injunctions of public law 
have been equally forgotten; but between the two, we cannot 
fail to remark a conspicuous difference: with Great Britain 
the U.S. could invoke no particular treaty providing rights 
supplementary to these injunctions.--But such was not their 
aituation with France: with her a. treaty did exist;--a 
treaty strengthened by time and confirmed by experience; a 
treaty stipulating the broad principle, that free ships make 
free goods;--a treaty sanctioned with the name and guaranteed 
by the promise of the Emperor himself "that all its obligations 
should be inviolably observed." 
I will not press the comparison farther, nor will I do more 
than auggeat, that an open and unprovoked violation of exis-
ting engagements, cannot, in itself, but operate as a strong 
diauaaive from new and more intimate connexiona.22 
Armstrong perspicaciously suggested further that the professed 
views of the Emperor would be moat certainly promoted were all 
American property captured and held contrary to the proviaiona of 
exiating treatiea releaaed, if any future outrage of theae proviaiona 
forbidden, and if meana for_ complying with the requeat made 1n hie 
23 letter of January 28, 1808 adopted. 
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The tone and language of General Armstrong's correspondence with 
Champagny were certainly not what the Emperor expected, nor what he 
cared to hear, another example of the firmness which Armstrong main-
tained, when necessary, in his effort• to adequately represent the 
beat interests of the United States. The Emperor responded in a simi-
lar fashion. He instructed Champagny to write to the American minister 
that the treaty with the United States was founded on the principle 
that the flag covers the goods. If the United States submitted to the 
British Order in Council of November, then she would have renounced 
the protection of her flag. However, if Americans regarded this act 
as one of hostility, the Emperor was ready to d~ justice in every 
respect. 24 
CHOICE OF ENEMIES 
The documents in this exchange between Armstrong and the French 
government were forwarded to the Secretary o! State. If American 
leaders were under any illusion• about Napoleon'• character, theae 
ahould have been ahattered when they read the despatches from Armstrong. 
He candidly expreaaed his opinion• of Napoleon and Champagny, and did 
not hide the frustration• he had felt for quite some time. He bluntly 
warned hie •uperiora to be cautious. Critically, but accurately, 
Armstrong described French actions: 
With one hand they offer ua the bleaainga of equal alliance 
against Great Britain; with the other they menace us with var 
if we do not accept this kindnesa; and with both they pick 
our pocket! with all imaginable diligence, dexterity, and 
lmpudcn,c. 5 
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Characteristic of Armstrong, he advised firmer action on the part 
of the United States. He encouraged the United States to make a choice 
between one enemy or the other--either France or England; "but in either 
case do not suspend a moment the seizure of the Floridaa.u26 The 
United States waa eventually to puraue this course of action, but not 
before many more cases of national abuse. In hie despatch of February 
17, 1808, Armstrong expressed the hope that American policy, while 
being more temperate, would nonetheless be firm. Thia followed hia 
explanation that the King of Holland had closed his ports to American 
commerce except during a storm, and that while the storm lasted, 
Americana were to be regarded aa priaonera of war. To a man of Arm-
27 
strong'• sense of pride and justice, this behavior was "outrageous." 
On February 22, 1808, Armstrong once again informed Madison about 
the enforcement of the French decrees against the United States. He 
believed that the two facts he mentioned would "sufficiently ahow the 
28 decided character of the Emperor's policy with regard to ua." First, 
Armstrong informed Madison that, in a Council of Administration meeting 
it was proposed to modify the operation of the decrees, a proposition 
aupported by the whole weight of the Council. The Emperor, however, 
"became highly indignant and declared that these decrees should suffer 
no change, and that the Americana should be compelled to take the posi-
tive character, either of alliea or of enemiee.n29 
Second, on January 27, 1808, twelve day• after Champagny'• 
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written ae1urancea that these decree• would not alter the 1tatua of any 
aequestered property until diecuasiona with England were brought to a 
close, and eeven da7• before he repeated to Armstrong these assurancea, 
the Emperor had, by a special decision, confiscated two American ahipa 
and their cargoes merely because they did not possess a document not 
required by any law or usage of the commerce in which they had been 
engaged. This was done on the basis of a report of aequestered cases, 
totalling up to 160. At the then current prices, that would amount to 
100 million francs, a sum whose magnitude alone made all attempts at 
saving it hopeless. The principle sufferers from such action, as 
Armstrong recognized, would be the Danes, Portuguese and the Americana. 
Although Armstrong once more advised that the United States stand its 
ground, Jefferson and Madison were preparing to respond more in line 
30 
with their desire to avoid unpleasant confrontation. 
EMBARGO ACT 
While events were rapidly transpiring in Europe, news arrived 
from the United States that Congress had passed the Embargo Act on 
31 December 22, 1807. Thie measure, along with simultaneous measures 
32 for defense which placed great reliance on gunboats, actually hindered 
Armstrong's diplomatic efforts. In hie instructions of February 8, 
1808, Armstrong was officially informed of the passage of the Embargo 
on American ships, a reeult of the illegal and hostile actions of 
France and Great Britain against American COIIIJlerce and navigation. The 
Administration sawtheEmbargo as the means beat suited for the crisis. 
It was thought to be effective •ecurity for American mercantile policy 
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and for mariners then at home, and those who were daily arriving. At 
the same time, it vaa not a measure of, nor a juat cause for war. Hav-
ing been informed of the paaaage of thi• •~t, Armstrong officially made 
it known to the French government. In describing the act, the Secre-
tary of State had written that it waa: 
••• strictly a measure of precaution required by the dangers 
incident to external coanerce, and being indiscriminate in 
its terms and operation toward all nations, can give no just 
offence to any. The duration of the act is not fixed by it-
self; its causes in a degree sufficient in the judgment of 
the Legislature to induce or forbid its repeal. It may be 
hoped that the inconveniences felt from it by the belliger-
ent nations may lead to a change of jhe conduct which imposed 
the inconveniences of it on itaelf.3 
For Jeff eraon and the Republicans the Embargo Act waa the alter-
native to war, indicative of their faith in the principle of peaceable 
economic coercion. Despising war and large standing armies and navies, 
advocates of peaceable coercion believed that they could achieve their 
objectives without the need to riak one's country in costly and bloody 
wars. 
The President resorted to the use of the Embargo as a last alter-
native when diplomacy appeared to have failed. The Chesapeake incident 
of June, 1807, the failure of the Monroe-Pinkney talks to resolve 
. 
serious matters of commerce, the Britieh announcement of their Order• 
in Council of November, 1806, and January, 1807, and other British 
outragea, plua news of France'• retaliatory decrees, forced the 
Administration to use means just ahort of war in hopes that the 
belligerent• could be encouraged to deaiat from their violations of 
international law. 
If Jefferson had wanted, he could have had a war against England, 
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as the country vae in an inflammatory mood. However, without an adequate 
navy, and with an exposed coastline, war seemed foolhardy to him, as well 
34 as contrary to his beliefe and general abhorrence for war. Instead, 
Jefferson tried to use the Chesapeake affair as a weapon of peaceable 
economic coercion. Jefferson thought the measures employed by the 
Adminiatration in the form of economic coercion would bring about the 
desired changes in Great Britain's conduct. On July 2, 1807, he had 
iasued a proclamation forbidding the British to uae American territorial 
35 
waters and ports for provisioning. On December 14, 1807, the previoua-
ly auapended Non-Importation Act vaa finally allowed to go into effect, 
36 although it was not strong enough to force concessions from the belligerents. 
Having received news of the British Orders in Council and of the 
French decrees, it waa necessary for the President to act. Jefferson 
honestly believed that the Embargo was, in itself, a form of reeiat~ 
37 
ance. Although considered an alternative to war, it entailed most of 
the miseries of war, without any of its compensations. 38 
39 The Embargo as a means of coercion obviously failed. Perhaps 
the most important consequence of the Embargo waa the divisive spirit 
1 t created in Americana. It gave rise to smuggling and produced out-
right condemnation from many of the country•a leading politicians--
especially those from New England where the effect was felt the 
40 hardest. The opposition toVarda the Embargo became increasingly loud, 
until the Embargo waa repealed in the final daya of the Jeff ereon 
Administration. 
In theory, the Embargo and itasubsequent Supplementary Acta 
were impartial, but in practice, it waa directed mainly toward• Great 
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Britain. Jefferson had always been euapicioua of British aims. De-
1pite the harm the French decrees caused Americans, Jefferaon never 
really believed the contest in Europe waa between tvo countries of equal 
strength, eapecially after Louisiana had been ceded to the United 
Statea, and after France had lost it• fleet at Trafalgar. After 
theae events, France appeared to Jefferson as much lea1 threatening 
than did Great Britain. After all, Great Britain had control of the 
seas, ahe had the means through her American bases to insult, plunder, 
or attack the United States, and she had the motive of revenge to . 
encourage her hostility. Jefferson'• suspicions of British motives 
should not, then, be underestimated. Her insolent behavior was an 
important factor in inducing Jefferson to choose a weapon that accODID0-
41 dated the war aims of Napoleon. Despite Jefferson's efforts to 
discount this, the Embargo Act was viewed as a pro-French measure by 
many in and out of Congrese. In the Embargo Message, the President 
tried to emphasize the new construction of the Berlin Decree as if the 
Embargowere intended to be directed against France. This was deliber-
42 
ately misleading. The President knew that one of the first eff ecta 
of the act would be to give some teeth to the Non-Importation Act which 
had gone into effect on December 14, 1807. The President believed that 
if Great Britain were deprived not only of food imports, but also of 
raw materials for industry, powerful British manufacturers would force 
the government to yield to American demand1. One of the President'• 
objective• waa to strike a blow at Britain without co11111itting the 
United States to war, and without acquiring the label of being a French 
agent.43 
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Jefferson, however, waa not succeaaful in hiding hia intentions 
from the Federalists. Many of them knew from the beginning the true 
significance of the Embargo. On the very day of its passage, Repre-
aentative Samuel Taggart expressed hia apprehensions about the effects 
of the Embargos 
Last night precisely at eleven o'clock we closed a session 
which had been held for three days in secret. Should I say 
that the die la cast, that my country la no longer independent; 
we have been legislating under an imperial decree of the Em-
peror of France and sanctioning a plan matured in Paris it 
would be saying no more than I fear will be realized.44 
Jefferson, then, was fully aware that the Embargo constituted a 
service to Napoleon, and aa much as admitted that it would not hurt 
France. The President reassured the French minister, Turreau, of the 
Embargo's effect. "The Embargo which appears to hit France and Britain 
equally," Jefferson said to Turreau, "is for a fact more prejudicial to 
the latter than the other by reason of a greater number of coloniea 
45 
which England possesses and their inferiority in local resources." 
Unlike Great Britain, France was reasonably self-sufficient and could 
get most of the supplies which she needed from her continental satel-
lites. 46 
Because Jefferson viewed France aa not posing an inmediate threat 
to American security, he saw the Embargo as an offensive as well as a 
47 defensive weapon. In his resistance to England, Jefferson undoubted-
ly hoped that Napoleon would favor .American ambitions to the south, 
48 
especially the Floridaa, a hope based on the Emperor's promise to 
General Armstrong that if the United States made an alliance with France 
against Great Britain, Jefferaon would be free to intervene in Spanish 
49 America. 
In this dangerous game of diplomacy, Jefferson was outplayed by 
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Napoleon. The Embargo Act, intended as a fair trade for the Floridaa, 
in effect made the United States an ally in the Continental System, 
without help in acquiring one square foot of Florida in return. The 
Emperor'• price for his cooperation kept rising, despite Jefferson's 
so 
objections to the treatment accorded him. 
Although the Embargo Act actually favored Napoleon's Continental 
System, this should not be interpreted to mean that Jefferson or the 
Administration cared for Napoleon. In fact, just the opposite waa true. 
Jeff eraon wrote of Napoleon: 
••• Bonaparte was a lion in the field only. In civil life 
a cold-blooded, calculated, unprincipled usurper, without a 
virtue: no statesman, knowing nothing of commerce, political 
economy, or civil government, and supplying ignorance by bold 
presumption. I had supposed him a great man until his entrance 
into the Aasembly •••• From that date, however, I set him down 
as a great 1coundre1.Sl 
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CHAPTER V 
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM INTENSIFIED 
While President Jefferson struggled with Congress over the 
Embargo Act and defense measure•, Napoleon occupied himself with 
dismantling Spain.1 Lacking specific instructions as to the course 
he should follow, Armstrong persisted in his protests to Champagny by 
using the argument that the decree• themselves were being violated. 
In a note of March 1, 1808, he protested the violation of articles 
76, 79, and 80, in the case of the brig, Mercury, captured by a French 
privateer. Hie firmness cannot be missed in hi• notes to the French 
Minister of Foreign Relations. He boldly warned Champagny: 
I cannot close this detail without the moat serious remon-
strance• againat abuses so revolting--ao multiplied and 10 in-
jurious to the rights of American commerce ••• their perpetra-
tion and continuance cannot fail to interrupt that good under-
standing which haa •o long subsisted between the two powers 
which has been productive of nothing but advantage to both and 
which of course would be moat unw~aely exchanged for the 
pillage of a few trading vessels. 
Arm•trong'a diligence in the pursuit of American interests is 
demonstrated by the fact that, prior to his receipt of official in-
atructiona, dated February 8, 1808, ordering him to formally protest 
3 the Berlin and Milan Decrees, Armstrong had already written at least 
twenty notes of protest and inquiry pertaining to cases which had 
ariaen under the Berlin and Milan Decree•• After receiving hia 
inatructlona, Armstrong further denounced these decrees as violation• 
4 
of the treaty exiating between the United Statea and France. He did 
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not waate time in preaenting a note to the French government which he 
hoped would obtain either a recall of the illegal meaaurea, or at least 
leave in force the ri5hta which accrued to tho Unlttd St&te11 HI did 
not inmediately receive an answer to .this note, nor did he expect one, 
as the Emperor had left for Spain. At no time before his departure 
had Napoleon indicated any change in the views which had originally 
s produced the Berlin and Milan Decrees. Armstrong understood all too 
well that with Napoleon'• activities in Spain, as well aa his apparent 
success throughout the Continent, the United States must necessarily 
be brought more strictly into Napoleon'• fold. Armstrong did not have 
much optimism at this point in his efforts to alter Napoleon's decrees 
as they affected American commerce. General Armstrong's protests and 
effectiveness were further undermined by the American Embargo Act. It 
was difficult to protest the capture of American ships when they were 
not legally in French waters in the first place. Thia predicament was 
exploited by Napoleon as he calculated hie next move. 
BAYONNE DECREE 
During the two or three months following the abdication·of 
Spain'• Charles IV, Napoleon was at the summit of his ambitions. The 
Emperor waa further engaged in gradiose plans that he hoped would 
secure England's destruction and achieve hia world empire. The English 
navy and English comnerce were to be driven from the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Indian Ocean, and American vatera. Order• were quickly 
iHued for the ncon•uuction of the naviea of France, Spain, and 
Portugal. Great expedition• were to occupy Ceuta, Egypt, Syria, 
6 Buenos Airea, and the Iale de France. 
To obtain these objectives, the Empire needed not only the sub-
m111ion of Spain, but also the support of Spanish America and the 
64 
United States. Napoleon saw hie opportunity to use the American 
E:mbargo as a means to accomplish hie own purpoaes. 7 On April 17, 1808, 
he issued an order that all American vessels entering the ports of 
France, Italy, and the Hanae towns, be seized. Thia order was known 
as the Bayonne Decree. The ostensible reason for its issuance was that 
because of the American Embargo Act, ships that violated this law were, 
in reality, English ships that pretended to be American. Even Armstrong 
8 termed Napoleon's reasoning as "very ingenious." His protests against 
9 this type of reasoning were futile. After a glimmer of hope that the 
system with regard to the United States might be ameliorated, 
Armstrong's despatch of June 6, 1808, announced to Madison that several 
10 American ships had been condemned by the French Council of Prizes. 
Despite the rapid pace of events in Europe, it was not until 
May 2, 1808, that Madison finally sent instructions to Armstrong that 
were intended to guide him through the dangers of Napoleonic diplo-
11 
macy. Madison informed Armstrong that the Administration did not 
appreciate Napoleon's efforts to coerce the United States into joining 
France in a coumon effort. He stated that the notion that France had 
presumed to declare war against Great Britain for the United States 
had created quite a stir. He further added that: 
To present to the United States the alternative of bending 
to the views of France against her enemy, or of incurring a 
confiscation of all the property of their citizens carried 
into French prize courts, implied that they were susceptible 
Of impression• by which no independent and honorable nation 
can be guided; and to prejudice and pronounce for them the 
effect which the conduct of another nation ought to have on 
their Councils and coura' ot proceeding, had the air at least 
of an aasumed authority, not leas irritating to the public 
feelings.12 
Madison replied that the United States, while acknowledging the 
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inducement offered by France in the event of war with Great Britain to 
interpose with Spain to obtain the Floridaa, had chosen, nonetheless, 
to pursue a policy of neutrality. However, in what waa obviously 
designed to appease the Emperor, the Secretary of State atated that, 
in the event such a crisis demanded that the United States take a 
precautionary occupation of the Florida& against the hostile designs 
of Great Britain, "it will be recollected with satisfaction that the 
measure had been contemplated with appro~ation by His Imperial 
Majesty.n13 
Included in the despatch of May 2, 1808--received in Paris on 
June 8--was information relating the passage of the act which gave the 
President the authority to suspend, whole or part of the Embargo 
14 laws. The conditions on which the auspending authority was given 
to the President claimedArmatrong•aparticular attention. The 
American government waa appealing equally to the justice and the policy 
of both belligerents. Madison informed Armstrong that the President 
counted upon him to apply his beat ef forta to make this appeal ae 
impressive to the French government aa posaible.15 According to the 
Administration, it was only aound policy for France to rescind at 
least that part of her decrees which violated neutral rights, and to 
be the first one of the two belligerents to take that atep. It was 
also reasonable to expect that this atep would be iDlnediately taken, 
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although the total repeal of her decree• waa to be more reasonably 
expected, especially if Great Britain repealed or vaa likely to repeal 
heri.16 The Administration continued to believe that Napoleon could he 
brought to reason. Thia vaa an error Jefferson and Madison consistently 
made. 
The Emperor and Champagny were atill in Bayonne when Armstrong 
received a note from the latter, dated June 13, 1808, from which 
Armstrong inf erred that the Emperor had taken the American refusal of 
an alliance with relatively good humor, further evidenced by an order 
to the Council of Prizes to suspend their proceedings against American 
17 
caaea. Being somewhat encouraged by this, and at the same time seeing: 
an opportunity to press American objectives with regards to Florida and 
the western boundary, Armstrong took the occasion to address a letter 
to Pierre de Cevallos, Joseph Bonaparte's Minister of Foreign Rela-
18 tions. In ao doing, Armstrong pursued an avenue which had previously 
been closed by the obstinancy of Godoy and the former king, Charles IV. 
Thia was a shrewd move on the part of the American minister, who also 
forwarded a copy of his full authority to negotiate with Spain.19 
In the short time following Champagny•a letter of June 18, 1808, 
however, Napoleon appears to have had a change of heart, having had time 
to reflect more carefully on coming eventa--which looked rosier now 
that his brother, Joseph, was on the throne of Spain. There no longer 
appeared to be a reason to appeaae the United States. The Emperor, 
therefore, instructed Champagny to inform Armstrong that: 
••• you do not know what he means about the occupation of 
the Floridas; and that the Americana, being at peace with 
the Spaniards, cannot occupy the Floridaa without the per-
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mission or the request of the King of Spain.20 
Champagny, obligingly, wrote a note to Armstrong, dated June 22, 
1808, reflecting a marked change in temper from his previoue note gf 
June 18.21 That Armstrong was somewhat dumbfounded by such a denial, 
ia stating it mildly, although Armstrong had experienced Napoleon'• 
duplicity before. No wonder Armstrong had demanded that official or 
unofficial overtures from the Emperor be put ln writing. He had 
wisely prepared for this possibility. The letter of June 22 not only 
retracted the promise of approving the cautionary occupation of the 
Floridas by the United States, but it alao asserted that the Emperor's 
22 
message of February 3, 1808, had been misunderstood. 
Champagny found himself in an embarrassing situation not unlike 
23 that of his predecessor. Armstrong immediately reminded Champagny 
of the written explanation Champagny had given himself on this very 
subject, in which the only stipulated condition for auch an occupation 
was an attack or demonstration of attack by Great Britain. There 
was not a single syllable mentioned about either the privity or the 
24 consent of the King of Spain, both of which were now deemed necessary. 
The general would have been completely justified in calling both 
Champagny and the Emperor liars, and he must surely have held this 
opinion of them. Armstrong's perspicaciousness in analyzing the effects 
of military and political events on French policy with regard to the 
United States was clearly evident when he ascertained that the ideas 
expressed by Champagny had no doubt resulted from the new relationship 
which the Florida• represented to the-French government. The abdica-
tion of Charles IV and the assumption of the throne by the Emperor's 
25 brother, Joseph, clearly had changed the situation. 
On July 4, 1808, General Armstrong, as instructed, again pro-
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teated the position in which the Emperor had placed the United States. 
Choosing between an acquiescence to the views of France against Great 
Britain, and a confiscation of all American property sequestered by 
26 
order of the Emperor, was equally offensive to both governments. 
The Bayonne Decree was, in effect, a declaration of war against American 
commerce. It increased seizures of American vessels, and contributed 
to other outrageous behavior, such as actually burning American ships, 
27 
which Armstrong protested vehemently. 
Writing to the Secretary of S~ate on July 26, 1808, Armstrong 
informed Madison that his orders of May 2, 1808, with regard to the 
Emperor's propositionof February 3, and the other related in Champagny's 
letter of January 15, had been executed. Although it would have given 
him the greatest pleasure to have received from the French government 
explanations on the subject of the differences between them that would 
have satisfied the viewa of the United States, he could not report that 
this had occurred • 
••• I owe it as well to you as to myself to declare that 
every attampt for that purpose, hitherto made, has failed, 
and under circwnstances which by no mean! indicate any 
change, in this respect, for the better. 8 
The same spirit was reflected in a letter to President Jefferson 
two days later, in which Armstrong stressed again that France did not 
seem disposed to change her system. Indeed, Armstrong correctly 
assessed that she was much attached to it. Calling French logic 
''madness," Armstrong reported that the Emperor had decided to identify 
29 American coumerce with that of England. 
RETREAT TO BOURBON d' ARCHAMBAULT 
General Armatrong was pessimiatic that any satlafactoryreaponse 
from the French government would be forthcoming. Hi• fruatration waa 
further compounded by the fact that the .American government had con-
aistently disregarded his advice to employ firmer action to acquire 
American territorial objective• or to uphold American honor. Once 
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again, Armstrong called for more forceful measures in light of conti-
nued French and Spanish abuses. If the time had not yet come to seize 
Cuba, aa the President had once advocated, then it would never come. 
A set of circumstances so favorable to that object were not likely to 
30 
occur again. In this assessment, Armstrong waa no doubt correct. 
Frustrated that hia advice was not followed, and poaaessing 
little hope for a change in the Emperor's ayatem,· Armatrong, suffering 
with a bad case of rheumatism, decided to leave Paris for the baths of 
Bourbon d' Archambault, 150 miles from Paris, where he stayed until 
fall. 31 The Court had left Bayonne on July 20 and 21. The Emperor was 
expected at Nantes on August 7 and at Rambouillet on August 13, and it 
was doubtful he would even touch at Paris. If he should, then Armstrong 
would endeavor to draw from himananswer to the remonstrances which he 
had made at various times since November, 1807. He then retired to 
await further lnatructions from Madison.32 
As Armstrong left Paris for Bourbon d' Archambault, he left notes 
with his secretary for Champagny, in which he desperately tried to 
impress upon the French the many disadvantages of bad relations between 
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the United States and France. Armstrong instructed hia secretary to 
express Armstrong'• regrets to Champagny that Franco-American relations 
were far leas than what they should be. He believed that the ~peror 
certainly had a right to make any municipal regulations he deemed 
proper. For example, it was within his right to deny entry into the 
ports of France to American ships which had touched in England, or 
were destined for that country, and he could either sequester or con-
fiscate such vessels of the United States as should infract those laws, 
after due promulgation and notice. Beyond this, however, the United 
33 States hoped and believed that the Emperor would not go. 
While Armstrong was at Bourbon d' Archambault, he received 
34 Madison's instructions of July 21, 1808. In this set of instructions 
Madison: referred to the caaea of the burned American vessels which 
Armstrong had reported in his letter to Champagny of April 2, 1808. 
According to theSecretary of State, if ample reparation should not 
have been made, the President thought it proper that Armstrong should 
remonstrate "in terms which may awaken the French government to the 
35 
nature of the injury and the demands of justice." Armstrong had 
already addressed this question and had failed to receive a aatisf actory 
response. Armstrong exercized his independence as a Minister Plenipo-
tentiary, and declined to press the French government further on this 
point by going to Paris to renew discussions with Champagny as sug-
36 geated by Madison in his instructions. In not fulfilling this 
portion of his ·1natructions, Armstrong was completely justified. It 
would have been useless and possibly even injurious to the American 
37 position. 
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Armstrong also informed the Secretary of State that the!!:. 
Michael had returned from England and brought with her account• which 
left no confidence in a change in the system on that aide of the 
Channel either. To keep this fact a secret from the French government 
was an impossibility. Knowledge that England and the United States 
were at odds almost excluded the possibility of an adjustment between 
France and the United States, since this fact would tend to cause the 
38 French to extend their policy. 
Although Armstrong had earlier thought that an Embargo might have 
been appropriate against the belligerents, ·by the end of summer he 
clearly recognized that the Embargo was a failure, as it had not 
achieved its objectives in Europe. Thia assessment must have been 
unsettling to Jefferson and Madison who were experiencing rapidly 
increasing domestic opposition to it, and were burdened with the 
problems of trying to enforce a measure so blatantly ignored by 
American shippers, despite the risks of capture, forfeiture, and even 
burnings. Armstrong stated: 
We have somewhat over-rated our means of coercing the two 
great belligerents to a course of justice. The embargo is a 
measure calculated, above any other, to keep us whole and 
keep us in peace--but beyond this you must not count upon it. 
Here it is not felt, and in England [in the midst of the more 
recent & interesting events of the day] it is forgotten. By 
the way--the Emperor would prefer it, a war on our part with 
G.B.; but woul~9prefer it, to any state of things, except that of a war. 
Armstrong recognized that the Emperor--although hostile to the 
~bargo originally--had concluded that it was indeed a hostile act 
40 toward Great Britain which aided his Continental System, in spite of 
the fact that the Embargo did 'adversely effect some French colonial 
trade, especially in the West Indiea.41 In the Fall of 1808, the 
Emperor gave his approval to the Embargo. He waa, in fact, upset when 
the Embargo was eventually repealed at the end of the Jefferson 
Adm1niatration. The official report, largely in the Emperor'• worda, 
atated: 
The Americana, a people who owe their fortune, prosperity, 
and almost their existence to commerce, have given the example 
of a great and coui:ageoua sacrifice. They have forbidden ••• 
all cotrtnerce ••• rather than shamefully submit to the tribute 
which the En!~iah attempt to impoae upon the navigators of 
all nations. 
Armstrong once again urged the United States to take firmer 
action. Unless France did the United States justice, the Embargo 
ahould be raised and coumercial vessels ahould be armed. His remarks 
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were almost pleaa for action, if only to show the world that the United 
States would not allow itself to be pushed around without at least 
making a symbolic gesture of resistance. He further argued that: 
Should she adhere to her wicked & foolish measures, we 
ought to content ourselves with doing this. There is much, 
very much besides, that we can do, and we ought not to omit 
doing all we can;--because it is believed here, that we cannot 
do much, and even, that we will not do, what ve have the 
power of doing. For God'• sake let your meaauree be auch, aa 
will correct 3hia erroneous estimate of both your power and 
your spirit. Z. .. 
The Administration again shied away from taking a firm stand, 
convinced the arming of merchant ships would inevitably lead to var 
with one belligerent or the other.44 Despite rapidly growing domestic 
opposition in the United States to the Embargo, the Administration, 
lacking what it saw aa alternatives, clung to the Embargo. The only 
other alternative appeared to be war, and Madison abhorred the 
45 thought. 
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Having spent almost four years in France by this time, Armstrong 
had experienced the difficulties of conducting diplomacy with Napoleon's 
government, and his poai tion wa1 ma.de even le11 desirable by the 
Administration's refusal to accept his advice. Additionally, Armstrong 
learned that many of his confidential letters to Madison had been 
published by Congress, This damaged his position, since the French 
government was allowed to know his confidential opinions regarding 
Franco-American relations. Some of his French sources, fearful of being 
exposed, dried up, thereby depriving Armstrong of valuable inside 
46 information. Failing to see a prospect for change in France's 
conduct, and becoming increasingly disillusioned with his mission, 
General Armstrong began to believe there was no reason to continue 
keeping a minister in France. His despatches more frequently ex-
pressed his desire to return to the United States, at the President's 
approval--delayed on several occasions in order to pursue some new 
47 possible break-through. 
At the time he wrote his despatch to Madison of August 30, 1808, 
stating that the United States had over-rated its ability to pressure 
France to alter her policies, Armstrong was not aware that his last 
note to Champagny, plus certain effects of the Embargo, actually 
helped to produce a reconsideration of French policy.48 On September 
11, 1808, Collins de Suasy, the Director General of the Customs, pre-
aented a report to Napoleon on the neutral situation, especially that 
of the Americans. In this report Collins held that: (1) it would be 
useful to hold in French ports the American vessels which arrive in 
ballast, then load with goods useful to England, and (2) it was desirable 
• 
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to cause the arrest of all Americana who navigated in Europe. Direct 
evidence ia lacking as to the· preciee circumstances which produced this 
letter, but it1 connections with the Bordeaux petition and Armstrong's 
49 
note of early August are obvious. 
On September 15, 1808, Napoleon referred this report to Decree 
for his opinions. Deer~• took ieaue with Colline for reasons which are 
an interesting application of Armstrong's views. He stated that there 
was no doubt the Americans arrived in France only under a license of 
the King of England. It was a requirement of the Order in Council of 
November, 1807, which could not be evaded by the Americana unless the 
Order was a dead letter. That they were still in force was shown by 
the strictness of the blockade and by the arrival, on September 13, of 
the ship, Junot, with a British license. Decree recognized possible 
advantages to the state. Since the said vessels came in ballast, France 
received payment for her goods without any French money being paid out 
in return--certainly the most advantageous arrangement a commercial 
state could desire. He urged ignoring the actions toward the neutrals 
who came in ballast into French ports. It waa only necessary to 
enforce measures on those who should be convicted for violating the 
decree of blockade by trading in English goods. However, it would be 
important to authorize not only the Americans, but all those who wished, 
to export French surplus of wines, grains, brandy, and the products of 
manufacturing. The dignity of the decree would, therefore, not be 
violated in the least, since it would be executed in all its forms. 
Not only would there be more money brought into France, but French 
50 farmers and producera would also benefit • 
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Decr~s also disagreed with Collins that Congress would thank 
Napoleon for the "competition" in enforcing the American Embargo. He 
believed that it waa not in the interests of the Emperor to seize 
Americana on the open seas. He further argued against the new rigors 
of the blockade which would deprive the allies of the Empire of the 
only outlet for their products, and the only source for their supplies. 
Yet he did hold that just reciprocity demanded the application of the 
Berlin and Milan Decrees to those neutrals who went to the ports 
of the enemy or the enemy's allies. On this last point, which Decres 
was inclined to adopt, Napoleon aaked for a further report, which 
appears not to have been presented when he departed for Germany on 
51 September 22. 
Armstrong, in a private letter of October 20, 1808, wrote to 
Madison that Napoleon seemed to be seriously re-considering Franco-
American relations. "His Majesty was disposed to remove all difficul-
ties between the U.S. and France but that time was wanting at the 
52 
moment to enter upon the business." However, when Napoleon returned 
from Erfurt, it was when he waa deeply involved with the business of 
Spain, and establishing greater vigilence in enforcing the Continental 
System toward neutrals. Yet, like all the other quickly abandoned 
experiments of 1808 by which Napoleon sought to alleviate the perni-
cioua eff ecte of the strict interpretation of his system in France, 
the freer trade policy urged by Decr~e marked the certain trend toward 
a eyatem 9f exceptions--a trade by special licenaea.53 There is evi-
dence that Napoleon had not achieved his alms. He had failed to secure 
effectual co-operation in enforcing hie interpretation of the system.54 
Shifting to the license trade was an undeniable break with the 
SS Continental System. Armstrong, therefore, had come closer to 
achieving greater aucceaa than even he had imagined. Had it not been 
for the peculiar military circumstances of the moment, it is quite 
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possible that the position of American commerce might have appreciably 
56 improved. 
THE COUNT ROMANZOFF INITIATIVE 
Although discouraged by his apparent lack of diplomatic success, 
Armstrong tried alternative measures, even if they were long shota. One 
of his initiatives was to seek the support and aid of the Russian 
Foreign Minister, Count Romanzoff, who was in Paris to arrange with 
Champagny the details of joint Russian and French diplomacy. There had 
previously been a diaposi~ion on the part of the.Russians to promote and 
maintain the rights of commerce generally. Russia was more than likely 
encouraged by Denmark, Prussia, and the smaller Baltic powers ''who are 
literally starving under the rigid prosecution of the present anti-
57 
commercial system." This fact was another reason to believe that the 
modification of the Continental System was indeed being contemplated. 
Since Napoleon's allies and those powers which he controlled were balk-
ing at their predicaments, the Emperor could not have been totally deaf 
to their plight. 
Armstrong speculated that Count Romanzoff just might possibly 
influence the French Cabinet to mitigate ita position with regard to 
American commerce. Though doubtful, Armstrong figured that the experi-
ment was at least worth a try, since Napoleon was away in Spain. 
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Armstrong recognized that it would be supported by American complaints, 
as well aa by those of the whole manufacturing interests of France and 
58 her dependencies. 
In November, 1808, William Short had arrived in Paris. He had 
been appointed American Minister to Russia, although he still awaited 
Senate confimation. The fact that an American minister would soon be 
going to St. Petersburg seemed to please Romanzoff, and he promised to 
replace Andre Daschoff, the charge at Washington, with a full mini~ 
59 
ster. The Russian minister told Armstrong that ever since he had 
come into office, he had been desirous of producing this effect. For 
in dissolving their comnercial connections with Great Britain, it had 
become necessary to seek some other power as a substitute, and the 
60 United States would do nicely. 
Encouraged, Armstrong sought to use the Count to get the Emperor 
to alter his position with the United States and return to France's 
previous position with regard to rights of neutral commerce. Unfortun-
ately, Armstrong's initiative proved hopeless. The Count had already 
tried approaching the Emperor for the Danes, who wanted compensation 
61 for their plundered co1111terce. The Emperor's response was to tell the 
Danes that he would examine the claim, however, he had no intention of 
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making good on it. 
Once more, the prospects for any sort of relief in the Emperor's 
system were shattered. On January 2, 1809, Armstrong reported to 
Madison that no change was to be expected, as he had received no 
encouragement from the Russians. In fact, far from being mollified, 
the French system was being even more greatly enforced. Armstrong 
confirmed that: 
••• their anti-neutral system is more rigidly observed; 
the embargo on ships of the United State• found here (before 
the Imperial Decrees were issued) 11 continued; every ship of 
ours coming into a port of France, or of her allies, is irmne-
diately seized and sequestered; cargoes, regularly admitted 
to entry by the custom houses, are witheld from their owners; 
ships most obviously exceptions to the operations of the de-
crees, have been recently condemned, and, what in my view of 
the subject does not admit aggravatlon;--the burning of the 
ship Brutus on the high seas, ao far from being disavowed, 
is substantially justified.63 
Armstrong had already predicted this renewed hostility against 
American commerce when he judged that the failure of the French peace 
78 
initiative with England would only newly irritate the Emperor, resulting 
64 in a greater adherence to his decrees. 
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Napol•on had sent agents to England with proposals for the establish-
ment of peace. The British Cabinet, with little hesitation, rejected 
the terms aa unsatisfactory. 
CHAPTER VI 
MOUNTING FRUSTRATIONS 
From the end of 1808, until hia return to the Uniteq.Statea in the 
Fall of 1810, Armstrong became increaaingly frustrated with his diplo-
matic position, understanding that the chance• of accomplishing his ob-
jectiveswereslight in light of Napoleon'• actions and attitudes toward 
American comnerce. As his frustrations increased, so did his temper. 
He did not fail to express hie anger to his superior• in Washington, nor 
did he fail to offer them very candid assessments of his position as 
it pertained to Franco-American relations. No doubt such honesty was 
received with mixed feelings aa the Administration reluctantly became 
aware of the failure of peaceable coercion in which they had placed so 
much stake. 
Armstrong' a temper, bad in the winter of 1808-1809, became worse 
1 in the spring. Hia anger waa certainly justified by the French atti-
tude toward the United States, as epitomized in Champagny•s instructions 
to Turreau. The French Minister of Foreign Relations informed Turreau 
that he should not hesitate to stress the legitimate grievances the 
Americans had against England. This approach was certainly not de-
signed to lessen Madison's irritation. Champagny further remarked 
to Turreau that: 
The Americans would like France to make them commercial 
privileges which no nation at present enjoys ••• But ••• hitherto 
it has not seemed proper, in the execution of general measures, 
to introduce exceptions which would have really destroyed 
their effect. If the rules adopted against English conmerce 
had not been made conmon, that commerce would preserve the same 
resources as before for supporting the war. A system of ex-
ception for one people would turn the rule into an injustice 
toward all others; all would have right to complain of a pri-
vilege Aranted to the Federal government which themselves 
would not enjoy.2 
It would have behooved Napoleon to have at least softened the 
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harshness of his conmercial policy toward the United States by offering 
the President some compensation elsewhere, such as Florida. Such a 
move would have had the effect of concentrating American hostility 
toward Great Britain, thereby favoring France. In December, 1808, 
Napoleon could not have retained the hope of controlling the Spanish 
colonies by force, yet he ordered the American government to leave them 
alone, aa he ordered it to adopt the French system of commercial 
restraint. Thus the President found himself, because of Napoleon's 
attitude, in an extremely difficult and precarious position, especially 
3 
as to why he should not go to war with France as well aa with England. 
Turreau'a attitude, coupled with the information contained in 
Armstrong'• despatches, should have convinced Jefferson and Madison 
to believe sooner than they did that neither favor nor justice could 
be expected from Napoleon. Thia suspicion should have been supported 
further by many private reports and observations received from France 
during the winter of 1808-1809. Although American attitudes may have 
been growing more hostile toward France, subsequent bulletins of the 
Emperor'• successes in Spain were influential with the refusal of 
Congress to declare a double war.4 
On January 22, 1809, Napoleon returned suddenly to Paris from 
Spain, ostensibly for the purpose of preparing for the impending 
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5 
clash between France and Austria. Although Napoleon was able to 
dipose of Austria, there were many signs of growing discontent among 
his allies and satellite countries, as well as increasing domestic pres-
sure of cormnercial and agricultural interests, over the enforcement of 
6 the Continental System. Sensing that there was a definite need to 
alter his Continental System, Napoleon decided on the license system, 
7 
a ay~tem borrowed from the British, on February 14, 1809. In so 
doing, he offered, on February 16, to release American vessels from 
the embargo. This was in the form of a decree issued simultaneously 
8 
with· the decision in favor of licenses. Although evils were inherent 
in it, Napoleon knew it to be a relatively effective system which would 
9 
serve simply as a temporary expedient to relieve pressure. 
Armstrong informed the Secretary of State about Napoleon's offer 
to release American vessels. Armstrong, however, perceived that there 
was no real change in the disposition of either belligerent toward the 
United States. Armstrong was skeptical of Napoleon's promise that 
embargoed American ships in French ports and those of her dependencies 
would be released, on condition of their direct return to the United 
10 States. 
Proving Armstrong'• skepticism justified, afev days after Febru-
ary 16, 1809, Napoleon attached various conditions to the release of 
the American ships, conditions which Armstrong strongly opposed. To 
him, these conditions r~presented open discrimination against the 
United States, the equivalent to issuing French licenses for American 
11 
ships to even sail the high aeaa. The moat probabl' reason 
influencing Napoleon to attach conditions was the news from the United 
State• of the probable adoption of a non-intercourse act affecting 
12 trade with England and France. 
Armstrong's belief that the.Embargo had failed m11erably to 
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accomplish its objective• was confirmed. He foresaw no good reason to 
continue it in force, and as he was accustomed, bluntly said so to his 
superiors. It had obviously not produced the desired political effect 
abroad, and it had produced some effects at home less desirable that 
they could have wished. The American minister called for throwing open 
commerce to all but France and England, and to let those who still 
wished to trade with those two countries, despite the risks, suffer the 
consequences if need be.13 
Armstrong, as uaual, forcefully expressed his disapproval of the 
conditions being imposed by the Emperor in his decree of February 25, 
1809, in addition to the terms atated in Champagny's letter of February 
20. Having received this letter, Armstrong iamediately ordered that 
the owners and consignees of the American ahipa being held in French 
ports, should, after securing bond, proceed to the United States. They 
should avoid touching at any port or place which would ezpoae them to 
future detention by either belligerent. Believing that this rule ful-
filled all the intentions of the two governments, Armstrong was sur-
prised to learn fromtheAmerican consul at Marseilles that a new regu-
lation on this subject had been imposed, and that bonds were required 
by the Imperial custom house which amounted to twice the value of the 
ship and cargoes. They were conditional for the direct return of the 
ahipa to the United States. In lodging his complaints over this re-
quirement, Armstrong referred to it aa a "discriminating and unfavorable 
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policy with regard to the flag of the ·uni.tad Statea.1114 
Thoroughly disgusted with this latest action of the French govern• 
ment, and angered by the difficult position in which both Great Britain 
and France had placed the United States, Armstrong once more advised 
the United States to take a firmer stand, this time against both Great 
Britain and France. Armstrong knew that war was unavoidable. Even 
Madison ultimately had to accept the same conclusion, though he pro-
crastinated until the United States was aeriouely divided and England was 
on the verge of defeating Napoleon, thus being able to direct greater atten-
tion to the United State• than she would have been able to do if the Admini-
stration had accepted Armetrong 'a advice for war sooner. Al though the 
Administration felt that war against one belligerent, let alone both, 
was unthinkable, Armstrong believed that unity of purpose wae the most 
important factor to conai~er. He argued that a war with only one of _ 
the belligerents would paralyze half of the American effort. He reasoned: 
••• whereas a war with both, will put into motion every drop 
of American blood, and will be followed by many other useful 
consequences, among which I consider as most important, the 
giving to our people some new views of interest, and some 
new principles of action; and the turning from a perilous for-
eign commerce (which cannot be maintained but by a navy and 
which is, besides, always touching and tainting your politics) 
into the leas profitable, but more secure and independent 
channels of useful manufacture. 
It is true there may be something appalllngin the idea of 
waging war with the two great champions of the universe, at 
the same time and single handed, and it may even require condi-
derable firmness to get over the apprehension arising from the 
possible union of their forces against us, but besides their 
mutual hatred and discord, our guarantee, on this head, will be 
found in the obvious circumstance, that the war with France, 
would but be nominal (a mere war of words and paper) while with 
England, it would take a character of most seriousness and ac-
tivity. To illustrate thia distinction by an example--As 
things are going in the Spanish colonies, France can feel no 
great interest in saving the Floridaa, and would (no doubt) 
be more gratified at seeing the British army routed from Canada 
and Nova Scotia, than mortified at learning that i§nsacola, 
Mobile, and St. Augustine were in our possession. 
EMBARGO llEPEALED, NON-INTERCOURSE, A NEW AIJ1INISTRATION 
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Recognizing that, aa a measure of peaceable coercion, the Embargo 
had clearly failed to force Great Britain and France to rescind their 
illegal measures, Armstrong urged that it be repealed. After much 
resistance, the Administration waa forced to reach the same conclusion. 
The repeal of the Embargo Act coincided with the expiration of Jeffer-
son's second term aa president. Although the Embargo may have delayed 
the outbreak of war, Jefferson's moat ambitious foreign policy initia-
tive only had the effect of delaying the war until a less favorable 
time in 1812.16 The difficulty waa not neceaaarily in the Embargo's 
composition or in its general purpose, but in the special reasons 
Jefferson had for adopting it. He overestimated America's coercive 
power. Designed in part as a means to punish Britain, the Embargo's 
failure led directly to the War of 1812, and pointed up the flaws in 
17 Jefferson's understanding of the balance of power in Europe. 
At the end of February, 1809, the Non-Intercourse Act was passed, 
not because it was popular, but because it contained the repeal of the 
Embargo. Although not wanting to go to war, some Congressmen at least 
wanted to appear to be making a sacrifice in light of the abuses of 
national honor, therefore, compromise occurred. The new act contained 
"scraps" of various plans.18 Besidea repealing the Embargo laws, this 
act excluded ahipa from French and British porta, and closed American 
ports to both countriea after May 20, 1809. It forbade, under the 
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threat of severe penalties, the importation of British or French goods, 
and it gave the President authority to reopen by proclamation the trade 
with France or England in case either of the1e countries should ceaae 
19 to violate neutral rights. In effect the law did three things. It 
invited concessions from England and France while continuing pressure 
on them. It allowed trade with the few remaining neutrals. And thus 
20 it gave a backdoor entry to belligerent marketa. 
If the Embargo did not convince Great Britain or France to alter 
their systems, no one seriously believed thia act would be able to do 
so either. Although intended to be impartial, the act, unlike the 
Embargo, actually favored Britain over France. The French had fewer 
alternatives for export markets or points of shelter for their ships. 
Champagny complained to Hauterive that this decision was: 
••• unfavorable to France against which the United States 
can have no complaint that ahe has attempted to invade their 
sovereignty nor to have committed acts of violence against 
their coasts and their veseels.21 
The Royal Navy would make sure that relatively few American ships 
slipped into enemy ports, whereas the French could hope to intercept 
only a small proportion of those ships that chose to violate the law 
by sailing to England. David M. Erskine, British minister to the 
United States, was indeed pleaaed about the passage of the Non-Inter-
course Act, which he recognized would benefit England. He expressed 
this viewpoint in a letter to British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, 
22 
on February 10, 1809. 
When the final atruggle took place in Congress over the repeal 
of the Embargo, no small share of the Administration's willingness to 
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pass the repeal was due to their realization that doing ao would relieve 
them of appearing to obey the dictates of the Emperor. No doubt the 
pessimistic letters from Armstrong and Turreau'a attitude had aleo 
convinced them that a favorable alteration in the Emperor's system 
could not be expected. Turreau recognized the significance of the Embargo 
repeal, and was irritated to see his influence decline. Men who had 
given him pledges that the Embargo would be withdrawn only when war 
against England should be declared, could offer no better excuse for 
failing to honor their promise than that Napoleon had forfeited hie 
23 
claim to their support. On March 19, 1809, two weeks after Congress 
adjourned, Turreau wrote to Champagny from Baltimore: 
You will have judged from my last despatches that the Em-
bargo Law would be repealed. It has been so, in fact, despite 
my efforts to maintain it, and notwithstanding the promise of 
quite a large number of influential Representatives, especially 
among the aenatora who had guaranteed to me its continuance 
till the next Congreee, and who have voted against their poli-
tical conscience. I had informed your Excellency of the dis-
avowed opposition to the continuance of the embargo, and their 
threats to resist its execution, terrified Congress to such 
a degree that the dominant party became divided, and the 
Feebleness (faiblesse) of Mr. Jefferson sanctioned the last and 
the most shamefur act of his Administration •••• !say it with 
regret,--and perhaps I have said it too late1--I am convinced 
there is nothing to hope from these people.2~ 
On March 4, 1809, Madison assumed the office of President and 
Jefferson retired to Monticello. Out of office for only two days, 
Jefferson wrote a friendly letter to Armstrong in Paris, dated March 6, 
1809, in which the former president explained the reasons for the repeal 
of the Embargo. He etated that if the decrees and orders were not re-
voked before the next meeting of Congreee in May, war would eurely follow. 
Referring to Armstrong's advice to seize the Floridas, Jefferson told 
Armstrong that they would indeed become America's the first moment that 
any war waa forced upon the United States, or when the Floridas were 
25 threatened by any other power. Out of office, Jefferson seems to 
have reached a point at which he was more willing to accede to the 
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advice which he had previously tried to avoid. Although Jefferson and 
Armstrong were not the closest of friends, their correspondence indi-
cates that they possessed respect for each other. 
Like his predecessor, Madison was an advocate of peaceable 
coercion, and shied away from confrontation and war. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that he, too, as president, preferred to avoid 
Armstrong's advice whenever he called upon the Administration to take 
a firmer stand in defense of neutral rights or in support of national 
honor. Like his predecessor, Madieon sought alternatives to war to 
achieve his objectives. 
In Armstrong's first set of instructions from the new Secretary 
of State, Robert Smith, dated March 15, 1809, he was officially in-
formed of the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act prohibiting commercial 
trade of the United States with Great Britain and France. Although 
this measure was not intended as a hostile act, it waa, nonetheless, a 
determination not to merely acquiesce to the edicts of the belligerents. 
At the same time, it was clear that the Administration had deemed it 
expedient to repress any desire for use of force to preserve American 
rights. Nevertheless, when Congress was to meet again on May 4, 1809, 
had the belligerents still not demonstrated a similar conciliatory 
spirit other measures would doubtless be adopted as the.honor of the 
United States might require. Secretary Smith informed Armstrong that 
the latter was authorized to state that if the edicts of either of the 
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belligerents were entirely revoked, or even modified so as not to 
infract American neutral rights, it was the opinion of the President 
that Congress would, at the ensuing special session, authorize acta of 
hostility against the other belligerent. Armstrong waa instructed to 
refer to this opinion in conversation, but not to state it in writing 
because of the peculiar delicacy of its character, unless he received 
satisfactory assurances that its intended purpose would be fully 
26 
accomplished. 
In urging revocation of the French decrees Armstrong was to stress 
the equitableness of American claims, and was to be guided by the 
arguments that: (1) they violated maritime rights, which the United 
States, as a neutral power, claimed under the law of nations; (2) they 
violated American rights under the existing Treaty of 1800; and (3) they 
created a pretext for the British continuing their Orders in Council in 
force, extensively affecting the commercial relations of the United 
27 States. 
Meanwhile, the Emperor had left Paris on April 13, 1809, for the 
Danube to fight Austria once again. On April 19, he crossed the Inn and 
28 began the war. During the next three months, his hands were full. 
The time was not ideally suited for diplomatic business pertaining to 
American af f aira aa Armstrong had been ordered, especially as Napoleon 
had left Paris a few days after Smith'• ~natructions were received in 
Paris. However, in acknowledging receipt of these instructions, 
Armstrong indicated that he would make another attempt to obtain the 
repeal or modification of the Emperor'• decrees. Armstrong recognized, 
however, that there wa1 little hope of success, especially since the 
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Emperor wa1 preoccupied with military mattera. Armstrong correctly 
estimated that this latest military adventure would engage the Emperor 
for two or three months. 29 
Obeying his instructions, though, Armstrong went to see Champagny, 
only to discover that the latter had joined the Emperor in Germany. To 
pursue him there was not permissable, as the Emperor did not see mini-
aters of foreign countries during a campaign. Armstrong, therefore, 
wrote a letter to Champagny, enclosing a copy of the Non-Intercourse 
30 Act, and a general assurance of the act's pacific character. He also 
informed Champagny that: 
••• the undersigned is instructed to add, that any interpre-
tation of the Imperial decrees of the 21 Nov. 1806, and 17 Dec. 
1807 which shall have the effect of leaving unimpaired the mari-
time rights of the Union, will be instantaneously followed by a 
revocation of the present act, and a re-establishment of th! 
ordinary commercial intercourse between the two countries.3 
Armstrong debated whether he should wait until he could personally 
meet with Champagny before informing him of the other part of Armstrong's 
instructions. He soon decided that he would relate that portion of the 
Secretary's message to Champagny in writing after all. The letter to 
Champagny stated that if France were to exempt American ships from 
future vexation and capture, and if Great Britain would not do the same, 
then the President would advise an immediate rupture with the latter.32 
Just how the Emperor would view this proposition was uncertain. Arm-
strong speculated that, since the proposition made to England was 
exactly the aame ae the one made to France, the Emperor would probably 
postpone hla decision until he aaw what England was likely to do. If, 
for any reaaon, England did modify her policy according to American 
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Yi•hes, the Emperor would then probably follow auit in order to preserve 
some degree of consistency between hia practices and his preaching, and 
to prevent England from having the benefit of American arms and coamerce 
at once. If, on the other hand, England continued in her tenacious 
manner toward the United States, Napoleon would no doubt peraevere in 
hia. 33 Champagny, from Augsburg, merely acknowledged receipt of 
Amrstrong's letter of April 28, 1809, containing notice of the passage 
of the Non-Intercourse Act, without making any further coumentsor 
34 
observations. In fact, mere acknowledgement was all that Armstrong 
had received from the French Minister in response to any correspondence 
35 
since Champagny had left Paris to join the Emperor. Wishing to 
receive more definitive answers from Champagny, Armstrong, sincerely 
desirous of returning to the United States, tried to use this as a 
meana of prompting a greater response from the French government. The 
General informed Champagny that he wished to return to the United 
States for a few months in order to deal with private business matters. 
Since the American ship, Mentor, was nearby at L'Orient, he wished to 
take advantage of it. He therefore requested passports for himself 
and hia family. In preparing to depart, Armstrong decided to leave 
Mr. Ridgway, Consul for the port and district of Antwerp, in charge of 
the legation at Paris until hia return. Armstrong told Champagny how 
much he wished to aee friendship restored between the two countries. 
He atated: ''The satisfaction that such an arrangement would give to my 
Government would be second only to the regret it would feel, were the 
. 36 
aubaiatlng differences either to continue or to increase." 
Armstrong informed Champagny that he did not want to return to the 
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United States without first receiving the consent of the Emperor. It 
was entirely with the view of obtaining that consent that hia applica-
tion~for paaaporta waa made in writing and forwarded to the Emperor'• 
37 headquarters. Although serious about returning to the United Statea, 
Armstrong nonetheleaaalao uaed thia as a ploy designed to prompt a 
positive response from the Emperor. 
NEWS FROM ENGLAND 
Compounding Armstrong's already difficult diplomatic position was 
hie lack of official correspondence from Pinkney, American minister in 
London. An examination of Armatrong'•diplomatic correspondence clearly 
reveals that he was i~ritated by Pinkney'• failure to keep him posted 
aa to what was transpiring in Great Britain that might have a direct 
effect on Armstrong's poaition with the French government. Since 
Pinkney had instructions similar to Armstrong's, he was to communicate 
to Armstrong any British advances made toward the adjustment of. Anglo-
38 American differences. Armstrong became all the more anxious when 
journal reports started to appear in France which suggested that the 
United States and Great Britain had settled several points of contro-
versy. The British government supposedly rescinded certain parts of 
its Orders in Council that had imposed a tribute on American commerce. 
No doubt Armstrong tried to exploit these rumors to his advantage, 
while playing coy by stating that any such rumors were not to be 
credited aa official since he had not heard from the .American minister 
in London. The possibility of an adjustment in London allowed Armstrong 
to preea the French government for an adjustment of Franco-American 
39 differences on equitable terms reapecting American rights. 
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Still not having heard anything official, Armstrong received 
accounts from England which indicated that the British Orders in Coun-
cil had indeed been revoked, and that the United States had also re-
voked.its Non-Intercourse Act. Recognizing that these revelations were 
at variance with hie letter to Champagny of May 26, 1809, Armstrong was 
compelled to protect his official position, and honestly disavowed 
having any official knowledge of arrangements which may have transpired; 
he reiterated once more that Pinkney still had not informed him of any 
40 
changes. 
In the meantime, French abuses continued and Armstrong directed 
his energies toward protesting them. On June 4, 1809, Armstrong wrote 
a letter of protest to Champagny concerning the American ship, Jefferson, 
which had fallen into the .hands of French ships of war on April 25. 
After the ship had been visited and the crew removed, the vessel was 
burned. As Armstrong emphatically pointed out, this waa the seventh 
instance in which such an outrage had been cOU1Ditted on American 
vessels by the Emperor'• ships of war--outrages which had no parallel 
in the history of modern abuaea. Armstrong demonstrated his disgust and 
extreme concern to Champagny& "It la accordingly within the letter of 
my instructions to say, that unless full and iJI111ediate reparation be 
made, the United States cannot but regard thia new outrage as one of 
premeditated host1lity.n41 
Not having heard anything aignif icant from the French government, 
Armstrong, in light of the above-mentioned incident, wrote to Secretary 
Smith on June 6, 1809 that such a delay under the circumstances might 
99 
very well be interpreted as a refusal to the American proposition, and 
aa such, a justification for a rupture between the two countries. 
Armstrong ascertained, however, that the Battle of Easling had tempora-
rily placed the Emperor in a most critical position, conmanding the 
Emperor's attention. Armstrong recognized that Napoleon was propably 
not fighting for glory or empire at that moment, but more likely for 
existence itself. Armstrong offered three possible explanations or 
outcomes. (l)That nothing of a nature merely political had yet been 
submitted to the Emperor, and that nothing of that character would be 
submitted until the fate of the campaign had been decided. (2)That if· 
defeated and driven from Germany, Napoleon's policy, with respect to 
the United States andothera.,would necessarily undergo great changes. 
(3)!£ successful, the consideration that the United States had not 
chosen that moment to put themselves on the list of his enemies might 
render a reconciliation eaeier. Whether or not theee considerations 
justified deferring until the next session of Congress, the adoption 
of any new measure with regard to France was a question, according to 
42 Armstrong, that Congress itself had to decide. 
Having waited for months for official confirmation of changes 
in Great Britain's relationship to the United States, Armstrong finally 
was informed by Pinkney of the British Order in Council of April 26, 
1809, and of the Erskine Agreement, reached between that minister and 
the United States. The consequence of that agreement had been a procla-
mation by President Madison on April 19, 1809, which renewed American 
trade with Great Britain on June 10, the date the British Orders in 
Council were to be withdrawn.43 
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The instructions from Secretary Smith, dated April 21, 1809, 
included printed copies of the correapondence between Smith and Erskine 
over the Chesapeake affair, the revocation of the British Orders in 
Council, the British proposal to aend a special envoy to conclude a 
treaty, and a copy of the President'• proclamation. Armstrong was 
urged to seek the earliest opportunity to assure the French government 
that there was not, in this adjustment with Great Britain, nor would 
there be in the proposed treaty, anything to any degree inconsistent 
with the friendly adjuatment of American differences with France. On 
the contrary, there waa a reasonable expectation that the revocation 
of the British Orders in Council would remove every motive for the 
~ 
continuance of the illegal parts of the French decrees. A week later, 
bolstered by his apparent diplomatic victory, reflecting the Adminiatra-
tion'a newly-acquired confidence, the Secretary of State wrote that, as 
no pretext remained for the peraeverence of the French government in its 
decrees, Armstrong waa to: 
••• let it be understood that their immediate revocation is 
confidently expected, and the more eo, aa the President indulges 
the persuasion that the Emperor ia sincerely disposed to re-
establish the suspended relations between the two countriea.45 
If the Emperor was disposed to withdraw his decrees, he was, it 
was presumed, aware of the propriety of doing it so aa to take effect 
i11111ediately. In thi• case, Armstrong waa authorized to assure the 
French government that the President would not fail to issue his pro-
clamation in accordance with the eleventh aection of the act of Con-
greaa, as aoon aa the revocation of the decree• waa known to him.46 
Thia set of inatructiona did not reach Armstrong until the night 
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of June 11. Just when it appeared the American miniat~ had acquired 
additional diplomatic leverage, thia advantage waa eraaed. He became 
increaaingly aware ~hat the Erakine Agreement waa apparently disavowed 
by the British Government. Armstrong waa placed in a difficult poai-
tion, aeeing iDlllediately that the French would be able to use the 
disavowal to their advantage. Armstrong knew that the French would aay 
that only when Great Britain had actually sanctioned the Erskine Agree-
ment would the appeal to the Emperor be made. To escape the embarrass-
ment that such an answer might have produced, Armstrong decided to 
barely mention the arrangement, and referred to it as a new proof that 
there was no disposition on the part of the American government to 
enter into engagements which would not preserve inviolate all the rights 
47 
of American maritime independence. In his note to Champagny of June 
12, 1809, Armstrong quickly moved to lessen the effects of a possible 
disavowal of the Erskine Agreement, by stating that, although the 
British king might indeed eventually refuse to sanction the arrangement, 
he could neither combat the justness, nor diminish the force of the 
48 
conclusion. 
Soon thereafter, Armstrong received official word from Pinkney 
confirming his suspicions as to the reason for that minister's si~ 
49 lence. In a letter dated June 3, 1809, Pinkney enclosed copies of 
British newspapers which showed exactly what had transpired in Great 
Britain aa related to American affairs, and what was likely to happen. 
Pinkney expressed hia apprehension, aa he did not know how news of the 
diaavoval of the·Erakine Agreement would be received in the United 
States. Pinkney further informed Armstrong of the latest Order in 
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Council, which waa undoubtedly a measure to conciliate the United 
States, although he, Pinkney, had not chosen to be a party to it. It 
vaa to be considered a Britiah measure, binding the United State• to 
nothing, and looking for no atep to be taken on the part of America. 
Finally, Armstrong waa told that a vessel had sailed to America with 
Erskine'• recall. Ria aucceesor, Francia Jackson, would proceed on his 
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mission in two or three weeks. Madison and Smith's diplomatic vie-
tory had been short-lived1 and Armstrong had no doubts as to the con-
sequences for his position with Napoleon and Champagny. 
INTERVIEWS WITH HAUTERIVE 
Having received no correspondence from Champagny in many weeks, 
other than brief acknowledgements of hie letters, Armstrong reasoned 
that the Emperor had been too preoccupied with military matters to 
contemplate American affairs. However, Napoleon had been paying far 
more attention to American affairs than the General could have known.51 
Never in hia career had the Emperor been busier than when Armstrong had 
written his note to Champagny of April 29, 1809, but it caught Napoleon's 
attention at once. He had fought battle after battle, and on May 10, 
1809, he entered Vienna and took up headquarters at Schonbrunn, the 
favorite palace of the Austrian emperor. He waa still in an extremely 
precarious military position when he learned, through despatches from 
Paris, that the United States, on March 1, had repealed the Embargo 
Act, and that the British Ordera in Council of November, 1807, had 
been withdrawn on April 26, 1809, leaving only a blockade of Holland, 
France, and Italy. The effect of theae two events was greatly magni-
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fied because of their simultaneous nature. 52 
Napoleon, at first, aaw no reason to alter his direction. After 
reading Arm1trong'1 letter. he dictated a reply that was almost the 
same as the Milan Decree itself. Ships were floating colonies of a 
nation. When American vessels were violated by British searches and 
taxes, they could only be considered as denationalized and, therefore, 
b . i 53 su Ject to se zure. Napoleon sent these remarks to Champagny, and 
four days later, on May 22, 1809, Napoleon fought the Battle of Essling, 
and sustained a loss of 15,000-20,000 men--a serious setback which 
temporarily at least, opened the Emperor's mind to a possible reconsi-
54 deration of his position regarding the United States. On May 26, 
1809, Champagny made a report to the Emperor about American affairs. 
After recalling the history of the various orders, decrees, blockades, 
embargoes, and non-intercourse measures, Champagny urged the Emperor 
to recognize the value of American trade to a country impoverished by 
the British blockade. He stated as candidly as was possible to the 
Emperor: 
The fact cannot be disguised; the interruption of neutral 
commerce which has done much harm to England has been also 
a cause of loss to France. The staple products of our terri-
tory have ceased to be sold. Those that were formerly exported 
are lost or are stored away, leaving impoverished both the 
owner who produced them and the dealer who put them on the mar-
ket. One of our chief sources of prosperity is dried up. Our 
interest therefore leads us toward America, whose conmerce 
would bring us either materials of prime necessity for our 
manufactures, or produce the use of which has become almost ~5 necessity, and which we would rather not owe to our enemies. 
Champagny advised Napoleon to cease punishing America. He ad-
viaed Hauterive; the acting Minister of Foreign Relations at Paris, to 
discuss with General Armstrong the details for an arrangement between 
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the two countries. Thia move waa supported by the argument that 
England had made advances to America and, in April, had revoked her 
Ordera in Council of November, 1807. Thia move waa further supported 
when news of the Erskine Agreement settling the commercial dispute 
56 between Great Britain and the United States reached the Emperor. 
Consequently, Napoleon drew up the draft for a new decree, which pro-
claimed that the United States, by it• firm resistance, had brought 
about the revocation of the British Orders of 1807. The Eblperor was, 
therefore, exempting the United Statea from the Milan Decree and leaving 
only the Berlin Decree (a blockade of the British Ialea) to off set 
57 England's modified blockade of French-occupied Europe. On June 13, 
1809, Champagny forwarded instructions to Hauterive, directing him to 
58 begin negotiations with Armstrong. Consistent with the train of 
American fortune, knowledge of the disavowal of the Erskine Agreement 
reached the Emperor at about the same time that Hauterive•s instructions 
were drawn up. Although allowed to continue his talks, Hauterive was 
informed that the extreme uncertainty of the situation prevented a 
decision.59 
In writing to Smith on June 30, 1809, Armstrong was at last able 
to report that he had received, aince June 12, two notes from Champagny, 
one of June 7, and the other of June 13. With the latter note, Haute-
rive also delivered a verbal message, stating.that he had been instruct-
ed to acquaint himself with American business generally, to discuss 
with Armstrong the subjects of hia late notes, and to report from time 
60 to time to the Emperor. 
Although Hauterlve requested an interview with Armstrong, the 
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American minister was confined to bed for two weeka, and it was not 
until June 30 that he met with Hauterive in Armstrong'• apartment. The 
Counsellor apologized for Champagny'• 1ilence, from May 12 until June 7, 
assuring Armetrong that the Emperor'• occupations between those dates 
had prevented him from attending to anything foreign or political. 
Hauterive then referred to the measures about which Armstrong had so 
of ten complained. He declared that, as they had been forced upon the 
Emperor by the abuse of Great Britain, so they would be i.IIlnediately 
renounced by him, on evidence that Great Britain had adopted a system 
61 
more liberal and just. 
Hauterive then inquired of Armstrong what, after all the recent 
activity between the United States and Great Britain, was the actual 
standing of the United States with that country, and what were the 
modifications of the decrees that Armstrong desired. Armstrong told 
1 
Hauterive what he had already written to Champagny. With the exception 
of a single letter juet received from Pinkney, Armstrong could honestly 
state that that was all he knew of what had tranapiredbetween Great 
Britain and the United Statee. Pinkney'• letter clearly established 
that, as late as June 3, nothing had been done in England of a charac-. 
ter that authorized or required Pinkney 1 s participation, and that the 
only act mentioned by Pinkney at all, was that of the British Council of 
April 26, 1809. As to Hauterive 1 a second question, Armstrong reminded 
him that the demands of the United States government had long since 
been before the Emperor in the form of the Non-lntercouree Act, and in 
Armstrong'• diplomatic correspondence. Somewhat aarcaatically, 
Armstrong stated that if there·wereanything difficult to understand in 
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either, Armstrong would be pleased to explain it. The difficulty, 
replied Hauterlve, was in finding what •ort of modification of the 
decrees would ••tiafy Armstrong •• well a1 the Emperor. He posed the 
questions: Should they be made municipal only, and how far should the~ 
go? Should they forbid the entry of a ship coming from England? Should 
they forbid the entry of a ship which had submitted to a British visit? 
Armstrong replied: 
••• any exercise of authority within their own ports, in open-
ing or shutting these to neutral commerce would be an act 
against which we could not reaaonably object; that between the 
two cases he had stated, there waa some distinction; that to 
exclude a ship because ahe had traded with England, would be 
to punish her for her own act--but to exclude her because she 
had been viaited--would be to puniah her because her force 
waa inferior to that of the visiting vessel. After all, it 
was a question for them, rather than for us to decide, whe• 
ther this distinction was or was not of sufficient clearness 
and magnitude, to make any change in their general policy.62 
In closing the conversation with Armstrong, Hauterive spoke of the 
advantages to both parties that would result from a better understand-
ing. He strongly and repeatedly declared the, general good will of the 
63 Emperor toward the people and government of the United States. 
Armstrong, of course, had heard those same affections expressed numerous 
times. 
In assessing this interview with Hauterive, Armstrong, although 
cautious, vaa neverthele•• somewhat encouraged. He recognized from the 
temper and character of thia interview that an important change in the 
Emperor'• attitude toward the United States had taken place, although 
Armstrong waa unaware of the order which Napoleon had issued earlier 
similar to the wording in the Milan Decree. If Armstrong'• impreaaiona 
were correct, that change waa the result of pressures which had for some 
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time been trying to influence the Emperor, then there could be no doubt 
about ita durability; it would at leaat laat long enough to produce the 
experimentwhichHauterive hinted at in hie closing remarks. If, how-
ever, thia change waa meant only to tranquilize the United States for 
the moment and to take its ultimate form from the fortunes of the mili-
tary campaign, then leas was to be expected from it. Armstrong'• 
suggestion to the Secretary of State was, remarkably, that in any case, 
the event warranted a little more patience on the part of the United 
64 States. 
In subsequent converaations with Hauterive, he implied that, in 
the present state of Spain, the Emperor might be willing to give the 
United States advantages in the co111Derce of its colonies. Armstrong 
reported that Hauterive repeated the idea several times, and although 
he felt Hauterive probably expected aome aort of answer, Armstrong 
believed that the ground waa "thorny," and he avoided dealing with 
such a probing question, especially one that had long interested the 
65 United States. 
Although Armstrong had expressed a certain amount of optimism 
over the interviews with Hauterive, he was, nevertheless, a realist. 
He had negotiated with Napoleon far too long to simply swallow any 
bait which he might dangle. Believing that the French government 
would convey ita answer fairlyaoon, Armstrong prepared for a possible 
negative response. Anticipating the poaaibility of a rupture, 
Armstrong suggested to the Secretary of State that some competent 
individual ought to be in Paria to take charge of American business, 
juat in caae it would be proper for Armstrong to leave, without having 
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to take with him all traces of the legation. Quite matter of factly, 
Armstrong informed Smith that qualified ruptures occurred quite often, 
and they were no doubt better than more ab1olute onea: they left the 
two nations both having made displays of disagreement, but were still 
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adequate for leading to reconciliation. 
Aa Armstrong had learned from experience in dealing with Napoleon, 
military victories would have an effect on America's relations with the 
Emperor, to the disadvantage of the United States. On July 6, 1809, 
Napoleon fought the Battle of Wagram, and on July 12, Austria was 
forced into submiaaion. The Battle of Wagram, in Napoleon 1 a way of think-
ing, placed him in a much stronger position, and made him leas inclined to 
tolerate American resistance to his Continental System. This victory, 
following shortly the knowledge of the British government's repudiation 
of the Erskine Agreement, coupled with Napoleon's discovery from a 
decree of the King of Holland that the Non-Intercourse Act seemed to 
discriminate against France in favor of the rest of the Continent, 
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compelled him to order the Hauterive negotiations stopped. 
Armstrong instinctively knew that, for better or for worse, the 
state created by Napoleon'• victory over Austria furnished an opportune 
moment for discovering the aentiments of the atiperor with regard to 
American commerce. Armstrong, therefore, sought another interview with 
Hauterive. No doubt Armatrong appreciated Hauterive•a frankness, though 
he probably was not permitted to relate that a change had taken place 
in the Emperor'• views and in particular that a decree which would have 
been a positive step towards accoanodation, prepared by Napoleon'• 
orders as a •ubstitute for those of Berlin and Milan had been laid 
aside. Armstrong related that Hauterive atated that the Emperor: 
••• will not recede from his present ayatem, until he be 
aaaured, what is your actual standing with England ? with· what 
temper your government haa received the modified order of the 
British council and the rejection of the arrangement entered 
into at Waahington ? and above all, whether your views and feel-
ings, with regard to the British doctrines of search and block-
ade, have auf f ered any change ?68 
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Armstrong had absolutely no doubts as to Napoleon's intentions. 
If there had been any doubts, they were done away with in thats (l)capturee 
of American vessels by Franch cruisers continued to be made on the 
coasts of France, Holland, Italy, and Naples; {2)American cotton, 
imported through whatever channel, and all cargoes brought by American 
vessels into the ports of Holland, were excluded by name from the 
markets of France; (3)American commerce with Holland was subject to a 
great deal of embarrassment; and (4)in the ports of Naples and Spain, 
American ships and cargoes were, aa in France itself, actually aeques-
tered. The renewed vigor of French actions against American commerce 
gave Armstrong aerioua doubts as to whether his letter would even make 
69 it to Axnerica. 
Writing two days later, Armstrong further assessed the intentions 
of the Emperor. He ascertained that when Hauterive's answers in a 
conversation with Armstrong were translated into plain English, they 
meant that unless the United States resisted the British doctrines of 
search and blockade, America was not to expect any relaxation on the 
part of the Emperor. The Emperor did promiae--for what it was worth--
that until he knew the President'• intentions on theae points, he 
would take no step to make matters worse between the two countries than 
they already were. Armstrong put little stock in these promises. 
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The recent change in the Emperor'• language in regard to American 
commerce waa a change in language only. Clrcumatancea preacribed it 
for the moment, but when those came to an end, Napoleon came out with 
the intent of adhering to hia old of fenaive ayatem, qualified only by 
a promise of changing condition• to which he knew the United State• 
could not, or would not, conaent. It was probable, Armstrong stated, 
that if pressed on this matter, attempts would be made to cover up the 
real motives, by suggesting doubts about the present American standing 
with Great Britain, and offering aa evidence for these, Canning's letter 
of instructions to Mr. Erakine. 70 
SECRET VIENNA DECREE 
Armstrong'• persistent lack of confidence in the Emperor's pro-
mises was certainly justified. Quick to yield before evident disaster, 
Napoleon waa just aa quick to exhaust the fruits of an evident victory 
and the advantage he had obtained over the United States waa just as 
decided, if not as extensive, as that which he had gained over Auatria. 
The United States would pay for her defiance by the usual means of 
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seizing her coIImerce. 
This can be best illustrated in the case of an American vessel 
loaded with a cargo of colonial produce which had arrived at San 
Sebastian on May 20 after the Non-Intercourse Act had opened trade to 
Spanish ports. On June 7, 1809, while the Emperor was still hesitating, 
possibly leaning toward concesaion with the United States, Decrls asked 
the Emperor what ahould be done about this and other such ahips. This 
was a particularly difficult case. The French decree had denationalized 
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every vessel that had gone to England, wished to go there, been visited 
by an Engliah cruiser, violated the laws of the United States, or had 
been suspe~ted of fraud. The achooner in question, however, was not 
under suspicion of fraud; she had not been to England, nor had she ever 
thought of going there; she had not been stopped by a British cruiser; 
ahe was in a Spanish port, nominally outside French jurisdiction, and 
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she was authorized to go there by United States law. 
Decrls' letter reached Vienna about June 13, 1809. The subject 
was referred to the Minister of Finance, but no decision appears to 
have been reached until August. Maret, the Secretary of State in 
personal attendance to the Emperor gave Champagny, on April 4, the 
draft of a new decree. Although this decree was never published, it 
offers a clue to moat of the Emperor's detailed movements for the 
13 following year. In consideration of the American Congress's act of 
March 1, 1809, forbidding entry of all French vessels into its ports 
under penalty of confiscation of both ships and cargoes, Napoleon had, 
on the report of the Minister of Finance, decreed that: 
Art. 1. The American schooner loaded with colonial produce 
and entered at San Sebastian the 20th May, 1809, will be seized 
and conf iecated. 
Art. 2. The Merchandise composing the cargo of the vessel 
will be conveyed to Bayonne, there to be sold, and the produce 
of the eale paid into the caisse de l'amortisaement (sinking 
fund). · 
Art. 3. Every American ship which shall enter the ports of 
France, Spain, or Italy will be equally seized and conf isca-
ted, aa long aa the same measure ahall continue to be execu-
ted in regard to French vesaela in the harbors of the United 
Statea.74 
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CHAPTER VII 
DIPLOMATIC GAMBLES 
JOURNEY TO HOLLAND 
Napoleon, while giving the appearance he intended to alter his 
system, had only reverted to hla old policies toward American cOlllllerce, 
and pursued them with a renewed vigor that made the American position 
increasingly desperate. Almost at his wits' end, Armstrong sought any 
means that would off er hope to relieve the statue of American commerce. 
Clearly demonatrating his knowledge and awareness of European events and 
personalities, Armstrong devised a plan that would hopefully enlist the 
support of the Emperor's own brother in seeking the relaxation of Napo-
leon's decrees. In a bold diplomatic gamble, Armstrong decided to pro-
ceed to Holland and confer with Louis, the king of that country. 
Holland waa nominally independent, and its trade was an object 
of interest. While England shaped her policy to favor the licensed or 
smuggled trade with Dutch porta, the United States risked relations 
with England and France by treating Holland as an independent neutral. 
The nominal independence of Holland was due only to the circwnstancea 
which had made Louis her king, as Joseph had been made King of Spain. 
Of all Napoleon's brothers, Louia was the one who offended the Emperor 
the moat. From the very moment he went to Holland, Louis assumed the 
position of an independent monarch, and devoted himself to winning the 
popularity of his subjects. He did not execute the Berlin Decree until 
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Napoleon actually threatened war; he connived to evade it and he issued 
licenaea and admitted cargoea juat aa he pleased. He did the•e things 
with euch ~on1ciou1 disregard of the Emperor'• wishes, that Napoleon 
became angry.1 Obviously aware of the independent role that Louis was 
pursuing, knowing that the old aystem waa about to be rigorously en-
2 forced against the United States, and having been advised by several 
commercial houses in that country that his personal application to the 
King just might produce eome useful effect, Armstrong decided to aet 
3 
out for Holland to pursue this avenue. 
On August 15, 1809, Armstrong arrived in Amsterdam. On August 18, 
during an interview with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Relations, 
Armstrong firmly remonstrated against the frequent and lawless depreda-
tions of French cruisers along the coast• of Holland, and particularly 
against French seizures of American vesaela within the baya and harbors 
of the King of Holland. In reply, the Dutch Foreign Minister informed 
Armstrong that the French government had established the doctrine of 
"common sovereignty" between allied nations in each other's bays and 
harbors. It waa a doctrine, however, that the Dutch Foreign Minister 
could not subscribe to in terma of its reasonableness and authority. 
The Minister further informed Armstrong that the King, after returning 
to Amsterdam and being informed that Armstrong was in the city, would 
probably wish to aee him. In that case, Armstrong was urged to bring 
4 
up the aubject to the King peraonally. 
On August 19, having dined with the Foreign Minister, Armstrong 
received a note informing him that the King would aee him at 7:00 p.m. 
that evening. Armstrong waa admitted into the King'• private apartment 
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and found him alone, except for a chamberlain. Armstrong reported that 
a long and free conversation enaued. The King expreaaed hia diaappro-
val of the comnercial policies of the Continental System, calling them 
injustice•, and cited hia efforts, along with other nations, to oppose 
Napoleon'• ayatem. Louis conveyed hia deep concern for the current 
state of commerce. He called the United States and Holland both 
great commercial states, yet weak in naval force in a world that waa 
governed by force. The King gave assurances of hia most friendly 
dispositions toward the American government and people, pledged to 
Armstrong that, in any event, even war, American citizens and their 
property within his kingdom, would be safe. According to Louis, his 
relationship to the ~peror could not induce him to forget the pro-
tection which he owed to those who engaged in a regular and fair 
5 
commerce. 
Armstrong used thia pledge to introduce the aubject of reports 
that American ahipa had been aeized by French cruieer1 within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the King. Louis' response was that the 
shipa had been retaken after the cruisers were beaten off by Dutch 
gunboats, and the American ahipa were then returned to their owners or 
their conaigneea. On this point, the King had quarreled with the 
6 Emperor himself. Louis referred to the system aa "bad--so bad that 
it cannot last--but in the meantime we are the sufferera."7 
In responding to Armatrong•a remark that the King had placed an 
embargo on the vessels in hie ports, the King replied it had been done 
8 
merely on account of the Britiah invaeion of Walcheren. When Armatrong 
requeated a relaxation of the rule to enable him to aend despatches to 
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his government, the King vaa extremely agreeable and indicated that one 
of the American veaaela could aail innediately for the United States, 
9 if Armstrong ao wiahed. 
In writing to President Madison on August 20, 1809, Armstrong 
informed him that among the facts not mentioned in hia public despatch 
of the same day to the Secretary of State, there was one that the Presi-
dent should know about in particular--King Louie would instruct his 
ambassador in Paris to join with Armstrong in denouncing the current 
depradationa, and in endeavoring to bring about a change in Napoleon'• 
conduct. 
Armstrong left Amsterdam for Paris on the following day, and when 
he arrived there he was going to attempt a private audience with the 
Emperor. This suggestion had come from a minister, much in his confi-
dence, who had called upon Armstrong the night before he had left Paris 
to suggest an experiment, and had offered his services to bring it 
about. Since the move for a private audience had to come from the 
Emperor himaelf--and as he vae not always disposed to grant such indul-
gences--the plan was to convince his own counsellors of its usefulness. 
The demand for Armstrong~• passports would be the means most likely to 
10 produce the desired effect, and Armstrong would try this. 
On September 6, 1809, Armstrong returned to Paris. Alghough King 
Louis had been aincere in promoting friendehip and trade with the 
United States, plana that were contrary to the Emperor's desires did not 
have much chance for aucce••· Sub•equent event• and the peculiar 
nature of Napoleonic Europe, guaranteed that Armstrong'• diplomatic 
11 gamble would fail to produce the aought-af ter ef f ecta. Despite the 
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outcome, Armatrong deaervea credit for exploring additional avenues in 
the intereata of hie country. 
THE ALTENBURG LETTER 
TWo letter• from Champagny awaited Armatrong on hia return to 
Paris. One, known aa the Altenburg letter, was poorly designed to 
appeal to Armstrong. In eaaence, the Altenburg letter was nothing more 
than a definitive statement of the principles which had and would con-
tinue to govern, the Emperor'• conduct toward neutral commerce. To 
thia letter, offered aa an answer to the American propositions, _ 
Armstrong believed that any reply before receiving further instruction• 
12 from the President, would have been premature. Although France ad-
mitted the principle that the flag covera the merchandise in the letter, 
other demand• were imposaible for neutrals to accept. It waa only 
because of the arbitrary acts of the British government that France 
13 
waa forced to adopt measures of reprisal, though very reluctantly. 
The note alao presented the facade that France was willing to come to 
terma with Great Britain. However, Napoleon had no thought of making 
demands that England would accept. He had been, after all, in pursuit 
of the destruction of English naval power since 1805. As an answer to 
the American Non-Intercourse Act, Cbampagny•a letter of August 22, 
1809, waa final. It closed by stating that the port• of Holland, the 
Elbe and the Weser, Italy, and Spain, would not be allowed to enjoy 
privilege• of which French ports were deprived. Whenever England 
revoked her blockades and Orders in Council, France would revoke her 
retaliatory decreea.14 
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The other despatch from Champagny expressed a civil hope, hardly 
felt by the lm.peror, that Armstrong would not for the present carry out 
hia plans for returning to the United States. No doubt Champagny 
wanted to placate the American minister aa much aa possible, in light 
of the Emperor's hostile actions toward American co111I1erce, as well aa 
fear about the possible consequences of the accredited American minister 
to France leaving with negative impressions. In agreeing to stay until 
the next spring, Armstrong had to consider his honor, as well as that 
of his country, especially in light of the Altenburg letter's offensive 
tone. His conduct on this occasion was certainly not governed by 
personal motives. He clearly realized his departure might have in-
creased the danger of exposing a great amount of American property in 
15 France, Holland, Italy and Naples. He opted to try once more "to 
open and to smooth the road between the two powers to an amicable 
adjustment of their differences."16 Considering the years of frustra-
tion he had already experienced, Armstrong'• commitment to his duty was 
truly commendable. 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION 
Shortly after Armstrong responded to the Altenburg letter, he 
received official word from the Secretary fo State that the recently-
concluded Erskine Agreement had been disavowed by the British government, 
and the Preeident had signed, on Auguat 9, 1809, a proclamation reviving 
the Non-Intercourse Act against Great Britain.17 Enclosed in the 
Secretary'• despatches waa a ~opy of the pro~lamation, which Armstrong 
could present to the French government aa another example of the 
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United States' determination to observe the principles of neutrality, 
ao long aa she should conaider it proper to be neutral. Smith informed 
Arm1trong he was not hopeful that any adjustments between Great Britain 
and the United S~atee would take place, especially as a result of the 
British government'• conditions specified in the published letter of 
instructions from Canning to Erskine, or of the pretensions as avowed 
to Pinkney and subsequently communicated by him to the United States, 
or as a result of the diecusaione with the new British minister, Jack-
18 
son. 
Armstrong comnunicated this to Champagny in a note of September 
16, 1809. He confirmed that the President'• proclamation of August 9, 
1809, was a consequence of official information that the Britiah Orders 
in Council of January and November, 1808, had not been repealed in 
compliance to the agreement entered into by the United States and 
Erskine. Armstrong stated that he was authorized to assure Champagny 
that if--aa there waa reason to believe--the British government would 
adhere to the conditions specified in a letter from Canning to Erskine 
of January, 1807, no amicable adjustment of the differences then 
existing between the two powers would take place. Further, the 
conversations ascribed by the letter to the Secretary in Washington 
and to Pinkney in London, had been either much mistaken, or grossly 
misrepresented. Armstrong concluded that he hoped the Emperor would 
now find reaaon to believe that one of two effect• might be produced. 
Either the United States would be made a party to the war against 
Great Britain, or Great Britain would be compelled to respect the 
right• of neutral coamerce.19 -
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Having written to Champagny according to hi• in•tructiona, 
Armstrong proceeded to air hie fruatrationa in lettera to both 
Jeff eraon and Madiaon. He waa none too optimi1tlc, and did not expect 
any aignificant modification or relief in Napoleon's system. Fresh 
from new victories, Armstrong understood that thia would have an effect 
on Napoleon'• thinking and hence on the United States. From-all past 
experiences he felt the effecta would not be "propitious." He clearly 
saw that the "danger is that an adherence to the present system will 
be both quickened and increased by an additional power to enforce it."20 
Armstrong once more aav that taking a firmer posture against both 
Great Britain and France waa the only practical alternative left. As 
usual, though, hia cry for firmer action vent unheeded. He expressed 
his frustration and views to Jefferson by stating: 
If we submit much longer, we shall aettle this controversy, 
but we shall certainly not be gainers by doing ao ••• Before you 
left the presidency, I anticipated this state of things, and 
offered it as my humble opinion, that you should declare war 
against France and England. Every hour assures me of it'• [sic] 
correctnesa ••• With thia country you will have reconciliation 
and redress, the moment you take this step. I feel as cer-
tain of it as I do of my existence. And if England will go to 
the Devil, whI should we prevent it? She has no claim on our 
benevolence.2 
The principle of the Vienna Decree had required confiscating 
American connerce in retaliation for penalties imposed on French ships 
that knowingly violated the Non-Intercourae Act. Although this rule 
and the Bayonne Decree aeemed to cover all ordinary objects of confia-
cation, the Emperor adopted a supplementary rule that American merchan-
diae waa really Engli•h property in disguise. In writing to Secretary 
Smith on November 18, 1809, Armatrong related the incident of a cotton 
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apinner near Paria and the head of a very large establishment who 
petitioned the Emperor for leave to introduce about 600 bales of 
American cotton. The petition vaa rejected and the following words 
were written upon it: "Rejected, aa the cotton belongs to American 
comnerce." Armstrong, not disguising his anger, stated that this 
severity toward American coamerce waa all the more extraordinary as it 
was a well known fact that Portuguese cotton--which was none other 
than English property--was allowed into France with little difficulty. 
As American cotton waa banished from the market, both the sale and the 
22 price of cotton belonging to England were increased proportionately. 
Having decided to seize all American property that arrived in 
'France on private account, and having taken into his own hands the 
business of selling this property, as well as of achnitting other 
merchandise through licensee, Napoleon protected his own interests by 
closing the door to competition. To his credit, Armstrong was able to 
23 discern a bit of this strategy before it had taken its final form. 
He realized that what he had feared with regard to American cormnerce, 
had taken place in the North. He predicted that something similar 
would take place in Spain. He was privately informed that General 
Lotson had left Paris, charged with the purpose of seizing British 
property, or property suspected of being British, in the ports of 
Bilbao, St. Sebaatian, Passages, among others. The ramifications were 
quite clear to Armstrong: 
The latter part of the rule is no doubt expressly intended 
to reach American property. With the General goes a mercantile 
man, who will be known in the market ae hi• friend and prot€gt, 
and who, of course, will be the excluaive purchaser of the mer-
chandise which shall be aeized and aold as British. This ia a 
specimen at once of the violence and corruption which enter 
into the present ayatem--and of a piece with this, is the whole 
business of licenses, to which (I am sor24 to add) our country-
men lend themselves with great facility. 
Caught between Great Britain and France, American coamerce waa 
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violated mercilessly. One prohibition crowded upon another. Through-
out the rest of the year, Armstrong'• correspondence was replete with 
instances of French seizures and blatant violations of American neutral 
rights. American consuls and private businessmen throughout Europe 
frequently requested his intervention, as Napoleon forced his satel-
lites throughout the Empire to implement his system. 
Having done all that he could, Armstrong felt he had exhausted all 
possibilities. for peaceably resolving American complaints against 
France. Hia call for firmer action, even if it had involved war, would 
have been the most logical step in forcing the Eiqperor to make conces• 
aions. American leadership, with Madison as President, still avoided 
that inevitable course, and in so doing, subjected America's diplomats 
to additional abuse and humiliation. The firmest measure of resistance 
on the part of the United States was simply what Armstrong was able to 
convey in his persistent protest&. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CABINET REBELLION 
The latter part of 1809 and the early part of 1810 produced pres-
eures within France due to the difficulties associated with commercial 
restriction--particularly a shortage of revenue, as well as the sheer 
difficulties in the enforcement of the Continental System. Threatened 
by financial difficulties, Napoleon also found himself confronted with 
what amounted to Cabinet opposition. As was his habit, he temporarily 
yielded to the advice he disliked, and promised to do something for 
French industry. 
, 
The three principle ministers were Champagny, Fouche, 
and Montalivet--newly appointed Minister of the Interior. These three 
lost no opportunity to advise the Emperor to encourage neutral trade. 
This advise found further support from Mollien, Minister of the Trea-
~ 1 
sury and from Decree. That Armstrong was aware of a struggle among 
the Cabinet to alter the Continental System, is evident in his corres-
pondence. In a despatch to Secretary Smith of December 22, 1809, 
Armstrong revealed he had been privy to the fact that on the previous 
, 
day Fouche had declared to the Governor of the Bank that the Imperial 
Decrees with regard to the United States were on the verge of modifi-
cation. Armstrong was careful to caution the Secretary of State not to 
raise hia hopes too much, as past experience had been that encouraging 
2 
signs were deceiving. Nevertheleae, by January 6, 1810, Armstrong 
-
could report to hia auperior: 
The veil, which for aome weeks past covered the proceedings 
of the Cabinet with regard to neutral comnerce, ie now so far 
withdrawn, as to enable ua to see with sufficient distinctness, 
both the actors and the acting. The Ministers of Police and 
Interior (Fouch' and Montalivet) have come out openly and vi-
gorously against the present anti-commercial system, and have 
denounced it as "one originating in error and productive only 
of evil, and particularly calculated to impoverish France and 
enrich her enemy." While they have held this language in 
the Cabinet, they have held one of nearly the same tenor out 
of it, and have added (we may suppose on sufficient authority)· 
the most solemn assurances that the Emperor never meant "to 
do more than prevent the commerce of the United States from 
becoming tributary to Great Britain; that a new decision 
would soon be taken by him, on this subject, and that from 
this, the happiest results were to be expected."3 
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Exactly what change• would take place Armstrong could not say for 
sure, although he had aome ideas. He was forever cautious, recognizing 
that any new propositions might be considered too liberal by some 
French officials and would, therefore, receive serious opposition. 
Armstrong was encouraged, however, by the fact that events in Holland 
and the needs of Naples might combine to demand at least a modification 
of the present system. Even at that, Armstrong recognized that he 
might easily have over-rated the influence of these circumstances: 
The ~peror sees things in a way almost peculiar to himself, 
and it may be that he is at this moment determined on a course 
which will have the effect of converting a nation of friends 
into one of enemies;--of expelling from Holland her money, her 
industry and4intell1gence, and of dethroning a brother of his 
own raising. 
Once again, Armstrong tried to dampen any unfounded or over-an-
xioua optimism produced by knowledge of Cabinet opposition to Napoleon'• 
enforcement of hie system. Having received Smith's despatches of Decem-
ber 1, 1809, informing Armstrong of the rupture with the new British 
s 
minister, Jackson, Armstrong knew that to those who did not understand 
the tortuous policy of France of the time, the rupture with Jackson 
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might appear to favor the prospects of American business in France. 
However, Armstrong clearly realized that the exact opposite was more 
likely. A• long aa France thought the United States and Great Britain 
might reach an agreement with each other, France apoke of altering her 
system, and even issued public and ministerial declarations supporting 
this proposal. However, on December 18, 1809, the day the news of the 
rupture reached Paris, military orders were given to seize and confia-
cate all American vessels and their cargoes which had arrived, or which 
would arrive, in the ports of Spain. The King of Naples also ordered 
that all American property captured and brought into his territories 
should be sold. Armstrong demanded from Champagny the grounds on which 
this new outrage was baaed. Armstrong reported that a person in high 
office had stated this latest outrage was largely political. Looking 
beyond this explanation, Armstrong deduced that the deficit of over 
fifteen million francs in revenue the previous year had to be compen-
sated. The obvious course of action, then, was to sap the Americana. 
Since the United States continued to be at odds with Great Britain, 
the French could do this with impunity. 6 
In the mean time, the renewed confiscation of American ships was 
, 
contrary to the promise received by Montalivet and Fouche from Napoleon 
to alter his system ao aa to aid their objectives in improving France's 
commercial poaition. At a loss to invent a theory in which neutrals 
could be plundered and encouraged at the aame time, the Emperor referred 
the subject to Champagny on January 10. Napoleon requested a complete 
history of French relations with the United States since the Treaty of 
Mortefontaine, and otdered the recall of General Turreau, in whom he had 
little confidence, and who he felt should be replaced by a more adept 
7 
representative. He remarked to Champagny: 
All the measures I have taken, as I have said several times, 
are only measures of reprisal ••• It was only to the new extension 
given to the right of blockade that I opposed the Decree of 
Berlin; and even the Decree of Berlin ought to be considered 
as a Continental, not as a maritime blockade, for it had been 
carried out in that form. I regard it, in some sort, only as 
a protest, and a violence opposed to a violence ••• Down to this 
point there was little harm. Neutrals still entered our ports; 
but the British Orders in Council necessitated my Milan Decree, 
and from that time there were no neutrals •••• ! am now assured 
that the English have given way; that they no longer levy taxes 
on ships. Let me know if there ia an authentic act which an-
nounces it, and if there is none, let me know if the fact is 
true; for once I shall be assured that a tax on navigation will 
not be established by England, I shall be able to give way 
on many points.a 
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As Adams observes, Napoleon's ministers must have been aware that 
the Emperor's remarks and the assertions of hia commercial policy were 
invented only for momentary expediency. The Einperor himself had often 
declared, and caused his ministers to declare, that the Continental 
System, established by the Berlin Decree, had a broad military purpose 
quite independent of retaliation--that it was aimed at the destruction 
of England's commerce and resources. Regarding Napoleon's profession 
of ignorance that England had abandoned her transit duties on neutral 
merchandise, every minister had to have been aware that only six months 
earlier, the Emperor had discussed with them measures to be taken in 
consequence of that abandonment. He had sent them the draft of a new 
decree founded upon it. And he had finally decided to do nothing only 
because England had again quarrelled with America over Erskine's arrange-
ment. These pretexts certainly could not have been accepted by any of 
Napoleon's miniaters.9 
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THE ''MOROSE" MINISTER 
In keeping with the Emperor'• pretext, Champagny--recently created 
Duke of Cadore--requested from Armstrong the information regarding the 
history of Franco-American relations. M. Petry called upon Armstrong 
with a message from Cadore stating that the order which had been sent 
to Spain to seize American ships was not intended to do anything more 
than to put them in sequestration, that he had declined answering any 
letter on the subject because he had hoped that means might have been 
found to adjust all the points in the controversy between the two 
countries, that the Emperor was sincerely disposed to be on friendly 
terms with the United States, and that he (Cadore) wished to know 
whether Armstrong was, or was not, authorized to conclude a treaty. 
Armstrong informed Petry that in addition to his plenipotentiary powers, 
he also had the authority to conditionally revive the Treaty of 1800. 
When asked on what grounds Armstrong would act under this authority, 
the American minister responded in his candid manner by stressing, in 
writing, the need to restore any sequestered American property. He did 
agree that any ship which had paid tribute to a foreign power should be 
liable to confiscation, but aside from this exception, colllllerce should 
10 be free. 
Thia note was carried to Cadore who forwarded it to the Emperor. 
Within a few hours, the Emperor responded, clearly illustrating his 
irritation with the American minister's latest display of firmness, and 
his failure to be intimidated. Since Armstrong had written the note in 
French, the Emperor took the opportunity to attack Armstrong's writing 
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ability, condemning his lack of proficiency in French. Napoleon in-
formed Cadore that he preferred Armstrong to write in English, "but 
11 fully in a manner that we can understand." Furthermore, Cadore was 
instructed to send, by special courier, a cipher despatch to the United 
States requesting General Armstrong's recall. The American government 
was to be informed that it: 
••• is not represented here; that its minister does not know 
French; i• a morose man with whom one cannot treat; that all 
obstacles wo~ld be raised if they had here an envoy to be 
talked with. 
No doubt this latest display of Napoleon's anger was the result 
of his growing irritation with theAmericanminister who was not easily 
intimidated by the Emperor or his Court. During the latter part of 
Armstrong's tenure in France, he became increasingly unpopular with 
. . . 
the Emperor and the French Court. The reasons are obvious. As French 
outrages toward American commerce became more frequent and more vicious, 
General Armstrong's protests were correspondingly frequent and forceful. 
Although the vast majority of foreign representatives were easily inti-
midated by the power and presence of the Emperor, Armstrong was not 
noticeably impressed by the pomp and circumstance surrounding the 
Emperor. Thia lack of deference became quite evident to those who 
13 
attended Court. Having been unsuccessful in forcing the Emperor to 
~lter his system for the benefit of American commerce, having often 
experienced the Bnperor'a failure to keep hia promises, and being cog-
nizant of the Bnperor'a way of responding to the exigencies of the 
moment, Armstrong saw little to be gained by partaking of the frivolities 
of Court--a routine which he did not particularly enjoy anyway. Arm-
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strong was, after all, like Jefferson, the product of American republic• 
anism, and, in some ways, not naturally well-suited to engage in Court 
etiquette. Of Armstrong, William Lee atated: 
Hia conversation ia instructive and entertaining; his pen 
unequalled; and with all this, he has a rudeness of charac-
ter, a stiff republican frankness about him that ia not 
agreeable to st;angers, and ia the worst cot11llodity a man can 
bring to Paris.14 
Many around Napoleon interpreted Armstrong'• increasing absence 
from Court appearances as an affront to the Emperor--which it certainly 
was. It was one way that Armstrong, having exhausted all normal diplo-
matic channels, demonstrated his contempt for the French violations of 
American neutral rights. Though in French society attention to detail 
and etiquette were extremely important, Armstrong was not much inclined 
15 to indulge in the "little attentions which please •••• " Napoleon was 
not at all accustomed to such bold protests, especially from a represen-
tative of a mere republic. Finally, Napoleon 'reached his limit and 
explo.ded, using Armstrong's "moroseness" and inadequacy as pretexts to 
rid himself of such an independent and persistent minister who refused 
to demonstrate the desired deference. In order to try to expedite 
Armstrong's recall, the aid of John Quincy Adams, American minister to 
Russia, was sought. 
In the August 17, 1810 entry in his memoirs, Adams recorded a 
conversation with a Mr. Six. Six had hinted to Adams that he could 
state with certainty that much of the difficulty in American relationa 
with France was due to the French government's dis like of General 
Armstrong. Six believed Adams was the only one who could communicate 
this information to the United States government. Although the French 
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government did not doubt Armstrong'• character, they did feel that he 
16 
was ''morose, captious, and petulant." Adams, possessing no love for 
Armstrong, did, nonetheless, understand and sympathize with him. Adams 
stated: 
Now, I am afraid that under the circumstances in which the 
General has been there, the last three years, they would have 
had quite as much reason to be disastisfied on such ground with 
me as they can have with him. And I am sure I should think it 
very ill treatment from him if, upon such vague and loose pre-
tences, he should transmit to the Government a complaint that 
I was thought morose, captious, or petulant, with suggestions 
that he himself was the fittest man to take my place. I do not 
suspect Mr. Six of any ill design in this affair, for I believe 
him sincerely and cordially my friend and that of America. Nei-
ther do I incline to suspect the Ambassador. I suppose him to 
be indifferent on the subject, and rather to have fallen in 
with Mr. Six's opinions than to have spoken from any particular 
instructions from himself. My own course upon this occasion is 
plain--to be silent.17 
While attending Court some time later, the French Ambassador to 
Russia re-affirmed that relations between France and the United States 
might be settled were someone other than General Armstrong in the 
18 American diplomatic post. During the following month, Adams, having 
dined at the French Ambassador's country home, was once more encouraged 
to approach the American government with the complaints regarding 
Armstrong. The French Ambassador, in referring to the complaints, 
assured Adams they were nothing that would injure Armstrong's credit at 
home. He was being criticized because he scarcely ever saw Cadore, 
never went to Court, and when anything was done by the French govern-
ment of which he disapproved, he presented "testy" notes, which necessi-
tated answering in similar style. Adams wrote thatz " ••• I now see the 
whole front of Armstrong's offence is omitting to go to Court, and 
presenting notes too full of truth and energy for the taste of the 
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Emperor." 19 
Under normal circumstances, a representative of a foreign country 
who was not well liked by the host government, would be a handicap to 
his country's interests. That the United States was a weak maritime 
power subjected to the unscrupulous actions of the EuWeror of France 
justified Armstrong's conduct. Standard diplomatic protocol had no 
chance of success. In presenting "testy" notes to the Emperor, and in 
refusing to attend Court as often as was deemed appropriate, General 
Armstrong was def ending the interests and the honor of the United 
States by the only means available to him. That the &mperor resented 
Armstrong's forcefulness and requested his recall, may be taken as a 
distinct compliment to Armstrong's effectiveness under very difficult 
circumstances. 
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CHAPTER IX 
NAPOLEON REJECTS CABINET ADVICE: ABUSES CONTINUE 
On January 25, 1810, Armstrong received an invitation to meet 
with Cadore. The two discussed three subjects: (1) the means for 
amicably adjusting the differences between the two countries; (2) the 
motives for the seizure of American vessels and cargoes in Spain; and 
(3) the condition on which (as offered in Cadore's letter of August 22, 
1 1809) the Emperor would consent to repeal his Berlin Decree. 
With regard to the first topic, Armstrong observed that the points 
which most engaged Cadore's attention were abuses to which an irmnediate 
repeal of the decrees might expose France and the measures first calcu-
lated to correct these. As to admitting colonial produce, Cadore 
informed Armstrong that the Emperor had determined nothing. Armstrong 
used this occasion to mention that the United States produced one of 
the articles under that general category in great quantity (cotton), 
and that they had also begun to produce another (sugar). That many 
articles not calculated for the markets of Europe--the products of the 
middle and northern states--were carried to the West Indies and exchanged 
for sugar, coffee, rum, and molaases--waa a trade of basics. The 
cheapness with which it enabled the United States to supply these arti-
cles, should, on the grounds of economy alone, give Americana preference 
over British emugglers, who would supply them if the United States did 
not. 2 Cadore responded that the question was no doubt worth considering. 
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On the second point, Cadore remarked that the orders which had 
been given with regard to American ships in Spain were a regular con-
sequenceof the ayatem declared in the letter of August 22, 1809. He 
stated it was obvious the Emperor could not permit to her allies a 
commerce which he had denied to France. This would def eat his system 
and oppress his subjects by demanding from them great and useless 
sacrifices. If the system were not strictly enforced everywhere, it 
would not produce the desired effects. Cadore reminded Armstrong that 
the property seized had only been sequestered, and as such, was a eub-
j ect of the current negotiation. As American remonstrances had already 
been sufficiently frequent, and as this meeting was intended for con-
ciliation only, Armstrong thought it more prudent to suppress the 
obvious answer which he might have given on this point. 3 
Under the third topic, and in conformity to Armstrong's instruc-
tions of December 1, 1809, Armstrong asked if the :Emperor would revoke 
the Berlin Decree if Great Britain revoked her blockades. Cadore 
replied that the only condition required for the revocation would be a 
previous revocation by the British government of her blockade of France--
or part of France--such as from the Elbe to Brest. If the British 
government would then recall the Orders in Council which had occasioned 
the Milan Decree, that decree would also be annulled.4 
The proposed Vienna Decree, the draft of which was sent to Paris 
in August, 1809, confiscating all American ships in reprisal for the 
seizure of French ships supposedly threatened by the enforcement of the 
American Non-IntercouraeAct1 was not even alluded to during the dis-
cuaaions with Armstrong, or in discussions among Cabinet ministers. 
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It waa not until January 25, after Cadore•s interview with Armstrong had 
been reported to the Emperor, that Napoleon at laat resorted to the 
ideaa contained in the Vienna Decree. Thia long period of hesitation 
demonstrated how unfounded Napoleon's plea of retaliation was. How-
ever, no other explanation was made for this measure which Napoleon 
insisted upon implementing, and which Cadore had no alternative but to 
5 
obey. The Emperor dictated the draft of a note in which the principles 
of confiscation were laid down: 
If American ships have been sequestered in France, France 
only imitates the example given her by the American govern-
ment; and the undersigned recalls to Mr. Armstrong the Act of 
Congress of March 1, 1809, which orders in certain cases the 
sequestration and confiscation of French ships, excludes them 
from American ports, and interdicts France to the . .Americana. 
It is in reprisal of this last provision that the American 
ships have been seized in Spain and Naples. The league against 
England, which has the cause of neutrals for its object, em-
braces now all the Continental peoples, and permits none of 
them to enjoy commercial advantages of which France is de-
prived. France will permit it in no place where her influ-
ence extends; but she is ready to grant every favor to the 
ships of a neutral power which shall have subjected themselves 
to a tribute, and shall recognize only the laws of their own 
country, not those of a foreign government •••• !£ the Minister 
of the United States has the power to conclude a convention 
proper to attain the object indicated, the undersigned is 
ordered to give all his care to it, and to occupy himself upon 
it without interruptions.6 
This note was quite remarkable. The proposed Vienna Decree 
confiscated American ships because French ships were forbidden under 
threat of confiscation to enter America.n ports. The note of January 25 
suggested a variation from this idea. American ships were to be con-
f iaca ted in France because they were forbidden to leave America. 7 
Despite the almost united preaaure within Napoleon's Cabinet to 
relax restrictions against American commerce, Napoleon clung to the 
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objectives of his Continental System. Having tactfully resisted the 
Emperor's will and reasoning regarding American commerce as long as 
possible, on February 14, 1810, Cadore finally sent a note to Armstrong 
8 
as had been ordered by the Emperor. Aware and fearful of Armstrong'• 
responses to the note, Cadore took it upon himself to deviate from the 
Emperor's precise instructions, and proceeded to alter the text of the 
note somewhat. In part, Cadore stated: 
His Majesty could place no reliance on the proceedings of 
the United States, who, having no ground of complaint against 
France, comprised her in their acts of exclusion, and, since 
the month of May, have forbidden the entrance of their ports 
to French vessels, under the penalty of confiscation. As soon 
as Hia Majesty was informed of this measure, he considered 
himself bound to order reprisals on American vessels, not only 
in his territory, but likewise in the countries which are un-
der his influence. In the ports of Holland, of Spain, of 
Italy, and of Naples, American vessels have been seized, be-
cause the Americana have seized French vessels. The Americans 
cannot hesitate as to the part which they are to take; they 
ought either to tear to pieces the act of their independence, 
and to become again, aa before the revolution, the subjects 
of England, or to take such measures as that their commerce 
and industry should not be tariffed (tarlf,s) by the English, 
which renders them more dependent than Jamaica •••• 9 
Adams states that Napoleon had become noticeably reckless when 
he allowed Cadore to send this note. Every line was either an error, 
or a misstatement of the truth. Apart from these obvious faults, the 
note tried to cover too large an area of complaint against the United 
States. In the projected Vienna Decree, Napoleon had ordered retalia-
tion everywhere for the confiscation threatened by the American Non-
Intercourse Act. Realizing the impossibility of maintaining that 
position, he continued to confiscate American ships in France under the 
old Bayonne Decree, and ordered the aequeatration of American ships 
throughout Europe on the baaie that other countriea should not enjoy 
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the conmerce that waa denied to France. Cadore'• note abandoned this 
position again, in order to return to the doctrine of the projected 
Vienna Decree. In order to make 1t appear rea1onable, he claimed that 
10 Americana had seized French vessels. 
Neither the errors nor misstatements nor their purposes escaped 
General Armstrong. His first inclination was to overlook the obvious 
discrepancies, and enter at once into a discussion for renewing the 
Convention of 1800. Armstrong believed this approach would test the 
sincerity of the overtures being made to him, and perhaps have the 
effect of drawing from Cadore the precise terms on which the Emperor 
11 
would acquiesce to American demands. In a note to Cadore of February 
18, 1810, Armstrong presented a plan for renewing the Convention of 
1800. He assured Cadore, however, that the United States was then no 
more disposed to part with her rights than she had been at the time of 
the Revolution. 12 
Armstrong was called on by Petry on behalf of Cadore, and was 
informed that Champagny had prepared a contre proj~t for renewing the 
Convention of 1800 and submitted it to the Emperor. It would be com-
municated to Armstrong in a few days. Without placing more optimism 
upon this declaration than he should, Armstrong took the opportunity to 
reaffirm the American position to Petry. Any treaty, in any form, 
which did not provide reparation for the past, as well aa security for 
the future, would neither be accepted by Armstrong, nor ratified by the 
Preaident or the Senate.13 
However, on March 10, 1810, whatever hesitancy Armstrong may have 
had about illuminating the obvioua error• and miaatatement• in Cadore•a 
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note vanished. Armstrong resorted to speaking in the "moroae" manner 
which the Emperor had resented and about which he had complained. The 
most reasonable explanat1on for this 1udden change in approach was 
probably contained in a verbal answer to Armstrong's note of February 
21. He was informed that the Emperor had decided to sell the American 
14 property seized in Spain. This information came almost simultaneous-
ly with a report from the American consul in Copenhagen, who complained 
about the sorry state of American conmerce, and who was greatly alarmed 
by the approach of a large French force, as well aa a royal order 
announcing that privateering would immediately comnence. The consul 
had stated: "This may be termed the funeral eulogy of our rights in 
hi .. is t s country--•••• 
Armstrong, in true form, again responded to Cadore's note of 
February 14. He assailed the many errors and misstatements that related 
to the history of American relations with France. Armstrong did not 
deny that since May 20, 1809, the United States had forbidden entry of 
French vessels into her harbors, nor that confiscation was the penalty 
attached to violation of this law. He did question, however, why this 
should offend France. He argued that the right to exclude foreign 
commerce was a right common to all nations. Could this, then, be re-
garded as a legitimate excuse for reprisal by a power who argued that 
the first duty of nations was to defend their sovereignty, and who even 
denationalized ships of those countries who would not subscribe to that 
16 
opinion? 
Cadore had maintained in hia letter of February 14, that the 
United States had nothing to complain about to France. On this point, 
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Armstrong was additionally contentious. He posed the following ques-
tions to Cadore: Waa the capture and condemnation of a ship driven on 
the shores of FrAn'e be,1uae of bad weather, nothing? Wai the eeizure 
and sequestration of many cargoes brought to France in ships violating 
no law and admitted to the imperial custom houses nothing? Waa the 
violation of American maritime rights according to existing treaty 
nothing? There was no mistaking Armstrong's meaning when he stated: 
In a word, was it nothing that our ships were burnt on the 
high seas without other offence than that of belonging to the 
United States, or other apology than was to be found in the 
enhanced safety of the perpetrator? Surely, if it be the duty 
of the United States to resent the theoretical usurpations of 
the British orders of Hovember, 1807, it cannot be less their 
duty to complain of the daily and practical outrages on th~ 
part of France.17 
Armstrong clearly left the impression that the United States 
did have legitimate complaints against France, especially since ther~ 
were no less than 100 American ships within the Emperor's possessions, 
or those of his allies.18 
Armstrong systematically refuted the assertion that it was only 
after the Emperor had been informed of the passage of the American Non-
Intercourse Act that Napoleon felt it necessary to retaliate on Ameri-
can vessels, not only within his own territories, but also within the 
countries he controlled. Accurately, Armstrong informed Cadore that no 
French vessels had actually been seized by American ships. The law was 
only a defensive measure and was restricted to the territory of the 
United States. A measure of reprisal could not possibly be justified 
by such a law.19 Armstrong related that when the Non-Intercourse Act 
was first cormnunicated to the Emperor in June or July, 1809, it did 
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not excite any unfriendly· feeling toward the United States. Far from 
it, this waa immediately followed by overtures of accommodation, which, 
although they did not produce any poaitive results, did not make mat-
20 ters worse. 
In his final remarks to Cadore, Armstrong coyly professed not to 
know what circumstances had arisen that had prompted the Emperor to 
change his opinion. In a cynical manner designed to embarrass Cadore, 
Armstrong ended by stating that the " ••• confidence I feel in the open 
and loyal policy of his majesty, altogether excludes the idea, that the 
rule was merely found for the occasion, and made to justify seizures, 
21 
not otherwise justifiable." 
In March, 1810, Napoleon had not only convinced himself that the 
Non-Intercourse Act had just come to his knowledge, producing an out-
burst in defense of French national spirit, but he also forced Cadore--
who knew otherwise--to vouch for the accuracy of the Emperor's memory 
22 by his signature. 
The other logical explanation for the E)nperor'a conduct could very 
well have been his need for money. Napoleon's financial needs made him 
open to every source which might have helped relieve them. 23 
Having firmly lectured Cadore in his note, Armstrong was more 
convinced than ever that hia mission to France could no longer be use-
ful. Intending to return to the United States during the spring, and 
not having received as yet a firm promise of a ship from the President, 
Armstrong applied to the Emperor for one to carry his family home. Were 
thia request granted, he wished to leave France around the first part 
of June. By that time, he would have, hopefully, heard from the Secre-
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tary of State, and, though doubtful, have reached a conclusion of some 
kind to the long and protracted business in France. The Secretary of 
State must have been none too encouraged when Armstrong concluded a 
letter to him stating that there was "no hole or corner of Europe under 
French influence, whither the Emperor'• confiscating orders have not 
reached. 1124 Before he could return to the United States, Armstrong 
would still have to confront several more turns in the· Emperor's policy 
toward the United States. 
IWIBOUILLET DECREE 
On March 23, 1810, Napoleon signed his name to what became known 
aa the Rambouillet Decree. Thia decree was a paraphrase of the pro-
jected Vienna Decree of August 4, 1809. It demonstrated the tenacity 
with which the Emperor, while seeming to yield to the opposition within 
his Cabinet, held to his purpose. In order to produce the effect of the 
Vienna Decree in the Rambouillet Decree, Napoleon had not only to expel 
his brother, Louis, from Holland, and to annex that country to France, 
but he had also to force Fouch~, his ablest minister, fr~ the Cabi-
25 
net. The Rambouillet Decree was ostensibly a response to the Ameri-
can Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809. It stated that, since May 20, 
1809, vessels navigating under the flag of the United States, or owned 
in whole or in part, by any citizen of that power, which had or would 
enter the ports of the Empire, or of French colonies, or of the coun-
tries occupied by French arms, would be seized, and the money received 
from their sale would be deposited in the Emperor's surplus fund 
(caisae d'amotisaement). Vessels charged with despatches or with com-
missions of the government of the Unites States, which did not have 
26 
either cargoes or merchandise aboard would be excepted. 
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Following the 1igning of thi1 decree, not published until May 14, 
1810, and after Louis had been forced into the treaty of March 16, 1810, 
any business not directly related to Napoleon'• second marriage prepa-
rations came to a halt. During this interlude, Armstrong informed 
Secretary Smith on April 7, 1810, that he had been promised a ship from 
the Emperor to transport himself and his family to the United States. 
Cadore, however, recommended that Armstrong not pin down his departure 
28 to any particular day. 
Although the ports of Prussia were supposedly opened to American 
commerce, Armstrong advised Smith to avoid ports of Prussia and Denmark 
29 
until further assurances had been given. On April 16, 1810, Armstrong 
warned Smith of the Rambouillet Decree by informing the Secretary of 
State that the Emperor had directed the sale of American vessels taken 
.in ports of Spain. The money arising fromthem was to be placed in the 
Emperor's caisse priv~e. The Emperor had also refused to give up the 
ship, ~' and ordered that it be brought before the Council of Prizes, 
30 
where the ship's condemnation was almost assured. The current pre-
carious state of American commerce, compounded by King Louis' position, 
were reported to Armstrong by Mr. Bourne, the American consul in Amster-
dam, in a letter of April 27, 1810. In a private interview Bourne had 
had with King Louis on April 26, the King informed him that he deeply 
regretted the measures he had been forced to adopt, relative to American 
merchandise in the public stores, due to the recent treaty of March 16, 
1810. King Louis had resisted until this was no longer possible, and 
hoped to assure the American government of his cordial friendship. 
Nothing could have given Louis greater satisfaction than to have had 
the opportunity of cultivating amity and 'ommerce which had for so 
long exiatedbetween the two countries. Louis assured Bourne that he 
was using every means within his power to obtain the release of the 
31 Hero's cargo. 
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For all practical effects, Napoleon treated the United States as 
if he were at war with her. Thia antipathy was confirmed when the 
Ra.mbouillet Decree was published in the·official journals of ?-larch 14, 
1!10, though the law had been in effect since it had been signed by the 
Emperor. Armstrong made the official promulgation of the decree known 
to Smith in a despatch of Hay 24, 1810. He informed Smith that four 
commissioners had been sent to Amsterdam with orders to take possession 
of American property found there, in accordance with Article 10 of the 
treaty between Holland and France. Further illustrating the futility 
of the American position, Armstrong reported that several American 
ships and cargoes for which compromise had been previously worked out 
under the sanction of the Council of Prizes were again seized to satis-
32 fy the provisions of the new decree. 
THE NON-INTERCOURSE ACT REPEALED, AND MACON'S BILL NO. 2 PASSED 
News of Napoleon'• most recent seizures and confiscations greatly 
upset Madison and the American government. In a letter to Jeff eraon of 
May 25, 1810, the President expressed his feelings about this: "The 
late confiscation by Bonaparte comprise robbery, theft, and breach of 
trust, and exceed in turpitude any of hia enormities not wasting human 
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33 blood." The Non-Intercourae Act, like the Embargo Act, had obviously 
failed to bring about the desired response from either France or Great 
Britain. Like the Embargo, Non-Intercourse had placed a great strain on 
American commerce. As it was scheduled to expire naturally on May 1, 
1810, the eleventh Congress allowed it to do so, replacing it with 
Macon'• Bill No. 2.34 
Macon'• Bill No. 2 was the last Congressional measure intended to 
counteract, through coimnercial interest, the encroachments of France 
and Great Britain. The first had been the Non-Importation Act of April, 
1806. The second was the Embargo Act with ita aupplementa dating from 
December, 1807. The third waa the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809. 
The fourth was Macon's Bill No. 2. Each year had witnessed a new ex--
periment in peaceable coercion, as the philosophy of Jefferson and 
Madison was put into effect. After the climax of the Embargo Act, 
however, each subsequent act merely represented a weakening faith in 
the policy, until Macon's Bill No. 2 marked the last atep toward the 
35 
admitted failure of commercial restrictions aa a substitute for war. 
This latest law re-opened American trade with all the world, 
though it excluded French and British warships from American waters. 
The moat important feature of the bill, however, atated that if either 
England or France agreed to reapect American rights, either by revoking 
or by modifying their edicts before March 3, 1811, the Preaident could 
again apply Non-Intercourae to the nation that had not revoked it• 
edicts. Thia would be done after an interval of three months had 
elapsed, allowing the violating nation an opportunity to follow the 
36 
example aet by its rival. 
153 
Armstrong was informed of the passage of the new law and in• 
atructed to tell the French government that the Non-Intercourse Act, 
the pretext given for the seizing and confiacating of so many American 
vessels and cargoes, no longer existed. The Administration hoped that 
its prospects might be improved with this repeal, and felt that France 
might be encouraged by the President's willingness to revive Non-Inter-
course against Great Britain if France would only revoke her offending 
37 decrees. 
Following this set of instructions, another set was drafted 
telling Armstrong that 1£ Pinkney' a efforts in London to secure the 
revocation of the British blockades should fail, Armstrong was to 
formally relate to the Duke of Cadore that the Non-Intercourse Act no 
longer existed. If, as Cadore had stated in his letter of February 14, 
1810, France was ready to do justice to the United States in exchange 
for a pledge on the part of the United States not to submit to the 
British edicts, then the President was ready to revive the Non-Inter-
course Act against Great Britain. However, it would not be enough for 
France to agree only to atop molesting American commerce. Repeal of 
the French edicts would have to coincide with "a satisfactory provision 
38 for restoring the property lately aurpriaed and seized." 
The likelihood of Armstrong effecting revocation of the French 
decrees was extremely slim. Even more unlikely was the possibility 
of securing reparations for past injuries. Thia was wishful thinking 
on the part of the Administration. 
When the text of the Rambouillet Decree arrived in the United 
States in mid-July, a week after the last set of instructions had been 
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aent to Armstrong, criea for war were h~ard from numerous American 
citizens. It was probably a lack of adequate military and naval prepa-
ration that restrained the government from taking this step.39 (Eng-
land had not offered any reasons to endear herself to the United States 
either.) 
This last measure of peaceable coercion passed by Congress was 
also the weakest of all the measures. Ironically, it was the only 
piece of American economic legislation which really had any effect on 
40 Napoleon. Although theoretically impartial, Napoleon saw Macon's Bill 
No. 2 as a virtual surrender to British maritime policy. Since the 
British Navy dominated the seas, whatever trade the new law allowed 
would in fact be aubjecttoBritish controi.41 It threw open to British 
trade a market in the United States which alone would compensate England 
for her loss of trade with France and Holland. Macon's Act made the 
42 Milan Decree useless. The evidence indicates that Napoleon did not 
decide upon a radical reconstruction of his Continental System until 
his hand had been forced by this unexpected turn in American policy. 
The reconstruction first entailed "permits" for American ships, and then 
43 
a conditional repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees. 
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CHAPTER X 
DECREES "REPEALED" 
Napoleon, recognizing his Continental System was in need of 
change, created a Council of Commerce and Manufactures on June 6, 
1810.1 Through this council, orders and decrees designed to meet the 
needs in the license system were issued in an effort to bolster the 
French economic position. Oftentimes these decrees were duplicated, 
and the meaning of a public decree was often affected by some secret 
2 decree or order, contributing to civil confusion. When the Council 
was created, further tariff revision had already been contemplated, 
either as a corrective measure for the high prices of colonial goods 
and raw material, or as a safe-guard for French industry, with, of 
course, an incidental revenue objective. The first definite step 
toward such a purpose, however, seems to have been instructions to 
Montalivet on June 181 1810, to prepare a report on the tariff, and to 
include certain trade atatistics.3 
In attempting to meet the needs of France as he saw them, and 
desiring to prevent the United States from becoming an ally of Great 
Britain, Napoleon hit on a plan he thought would accomplish his object-
ives. He pretended to make satisfaction for the United States, at the 
same time maintaining his system in order to hurt Great Britain. The 
actual reasone Napoleon instituted changes in his Continental System 
at this particular time are debateable. Quite possibly the Emperor was 
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alarmed by the reports of increasing anti-French sentiment in the 
4 United States. Additionally, he may have aeen an opportunity to em-
broil the United States with Great Britain by relaxing his decrees. He 
alao recognized that the European economy required goods which only 
5 
Americana could provide. However, the Emperor was aware that American 
ships which did co~e to France would risk being sequestered, because 
all of them would either have been visited by English ships, or would 
have touched in England. Napoleon realized it was probable that few 
American ships would venture into French ports without knowing for sure 
6 
what France meant to do with them. 
Napoleon recognized that he could do one of three things: (1) 
maintain his decrees, (2) expressly revoke them, or (3) appear to re-
voke them while in fact maintaining them. Characteristically, the 
Emperor opted for the third course of action. 
Since Napoleon'• primary motive at the time was conmercial, the 
Emperor devised a plan to withdraw hia decrees as they affected 
American commerce. Deviously, Napoleon proposed to replace them with 
customs regulations that would effectively prevent the importing of 
goods which he did not want or need, or which were primarily the pro-
ducts of British colonies. The repeal, then, would be nominal and, in 
essence, allow the system to remain intact while appearing to have been 
changed or dropped. Napoleon further explained his projected scheme: 
Thia situation will have no influence on the customs legis-
lation, which will always regulate arbitrarily duties and pro-
hibitions. The Americana will be able to bring sugar and coffee 
into our porta,--the privateer• will not atop them becauae the 
flag covers the goods; but when they come into a port of France, 
they will find the customs legislation, by which we shall be 
able to say that we do not want the sugar and coffee brought by 
the Americans because they are English merchandise; that we 
do not want tobacco, etc.; that we do not want such or such 
goods, which we can as we please class among prohibited 
goods. Thu' it is evident that we should commit ourselves 
to nothing. 
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The Emperor issued a decree, passed on July 5, but not then pro-
mulgated, recognizing neutral rights by issuing licenses under the 
name of "permits" for thirty American vessels. The legal thirty vessels 
carrying cargoes consisting of cotton, potash, codfish, indigo, or log-
wood, would come from one of two ports--New Yor~ or Charleston--and 
8 
would bring with them certificates of origin. The ahips could only 
enter at one or two designated French ports, and would be required to 
take, in return, wines, cognac, silks, and other French goods equiva-
9 lent to the value of the incoming cargo. 
When Armstrong became aware of this decree, he was upset with 
it and with Napoleon's scheming. Armstrong was further suspicious of 
Napoleon's motives and more certain of the Emperor's lack of good faith 
when told that it was not a convenient time for Armstrong to· press for 
the fulfillment of the Emperor's earlier promise to provide a ship for 
the Minister's return to the United States. Armstrong stated: 11Such 
10 
was the fact--but what are promises now a days?" 
Napoleon's new system apparently was founded upon the decrees of 
July 3, 5, and 25, 1810. These three decrees may be regarded as the 
comp0nent acts for the reconstruction of the French navigation system 
upon the license trade. The f irat decree blocked out the general plan 
and worked out the importation features except for neutral countries 
supplying their own goods. The decree of July 5 on American permits 
I 
remedied this omission, for both imports and exports from neutrals. 
The decree of July 25 filled out the scheme by bringing all French 
export trade under uniform regulationa.11 This third decree forbade 
ships to leave a French port for a foreign port without a license, 
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which, in the Emperor's eyes, gave that ship the character of being 
12 French. In other words, the Eoperor's scheme was founded on and left 
intact his Berlin and Milan Decrees, except for the license feature. 
The licenses themselves were classified in thirty different aeries: 
for the ocean, the Mediterranean, England, and so on. They designated 
the cargoes to be carried inward and outward. They made no distinction 
between neutrals and enemies. The license that authorized a voyage 
from London was the same, except for its aeries, as that which covered 
a cargo of cotton from Charleaton. Any distinction was limited to 
imposing on the neutral additional trouble to prove that his goods were 
not English. In theory, the importation of such English merchandise as 
would have relieved England's distress was forbidden, and the exporta-
tion of French merchandise was encouraged, not only in order to assist 
French industry, but also in order to drain England's specie. Sugar, 
coffee, and cotton from the colonies were especially prohibited, but 
when captured by privateers or confiscated on land, colonial produce 
was first admitted to the custom-house at a duty of fifty per cent, and 
13 then sold for the benefit of the Imperial treasury. 
Napoleon ~mpoaed this system and tariff on all countries under 
his control, including Switzerland, Naples, Hamburg, and the Ranae 
Towns, while he exerted all his influence to force the same policy on 
Prussia and Russia. As far aa it concerned the United States, the only 
neutral left, the system classified American ships either as English 
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when unlicensed, or as French when licensed. Thia new system, another 
form of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, was in some respects more 
14 
offensive than the original. 
THE CADORE LETTER A."'il> TRIANON TARIFF OF AUGUST 5, 1810 
Although news arrived in Paris that the American Non-Intercourse 
Act had been repealed and Macon'• Bill No. 2 had taken its place, 
Armstrong himself failed to receive official notice of these events 
from his government. However, through an American who had recently 
been in London, Armstrong received despatches from Pinkney, which 
included a copy of the Act of May 1, 1810. Around July 9, Armstrong 
communicated the passage of Macon's Bill No. 2 to Cadore as reported in 
a newspaper. Cadore responded that such an unofficial form could not 
be made the basis for any governmental proceedings, but he, neverthe-
15 less, forwarded the newspaper to the Emperor. For three weeks 
Napoleon made no decision on the subject of the American act, probably 
due to his pre-occupation with the annexation of Holland, and formula-
tion of his tariff system. Then, on July 31, 1810, the Emperor dis-
regarded Cadore's sense of proper form and, ostensibly as a result of 
Macon's Bill No. 2, decided that his Berlin and Milan Decrees would be 
repealed as of November 1, 1810. In a note to Cadore, the Emperor made 
known his decision, and instructed Cadore accordingly: 
After having much reflected on the affair• of America, I 
have thought that to repeal my Decrees of Berlin and Milan 
would have no effect; that it would be better for you to make 
a note to Mr. Armstrong by which you should let him know that 
you have put under my eyes the details contained in the Amer-
ican newspaper; that I should have liked to have a more official 
comnunication, we may regard this aa official,--he can consi-
der that my Decrees of Berlin and Milan will have no effect, 
dating from November 1; such Act of the American Congress, 
on condition that (I condition que) if the British ·council 
does not withdraw its Orders of 1807, the United States Con-
gress ahall fulfil the engagement it haa taken to re•eata• 
blish its prohibition• on Britiah coamerce. This appears 
to me more suitable than a decree which would cause shock 
(qui ferait secouaae) and would not fulfil my object. This 
method appears to me more conformable to my dignity and to 
the aeriousneas of the affair.16 
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On August 2, 1810, the Emperor himself dictated the letter that 
was sent to Armstrong on August 5. He made numerous changes in its 
text during the three day interval, but at last it was signed and sent 
17 to the American Embassy. On August 5, 1810, Cadore delivered what 
became known as the Cadore letter. It has generated a great deal of 
historical debate, and has had a significant effect upon the subsequent 
course of American relations with both France and Great Britain. 
The letter essentially reiterated what Napoleon had written to 
Cadore on July 31. Cadore informed Armstrong that he had placed the 
newspaper containing the Act of Congress of May 1 before the Emperor, 
and that the Emperor had expressed the hope that this act, as well as 
all other acts of the United States government which interested France 
would always be made known officially to him. According to Cadore, the 
Emperor had remarked that, in general, he only had knowledge of Ameri-
can acts indirectly, and then only after a long interval which was 
18 quite inconvenient, an obvious gross misstatement of fact. 
Cadore wrote that the Emperor had applauded the Embargo laid by 
the United States, although it had the effect of hurtingFrance, and 
caused her to lose the colonies of Martinique, Guadaloupe, and Cayenne. 
Despite these adverse effects, the Emperor did not complain. He made 
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this aacrif ice to the principle which had caused the Americans to lay 
the Embargo, inspiring them to restrict themselves rather than submit 
to the law1 Qf GfCAt Britain who 1ought to make herself the tyrant of 
19 the oceans. 
Cadore further stated incorrectly that the Emperor had not known 
about the passage of the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809 until 
very recently. He referred to it as most injurious to the interests of 
France, interdicting to American vessels the commerce of France, while 
at the same time authorizing that to Spain, Naples, and Holland. It 
also announced confiscation against all French vessels which would 
enter the ports of America. Reprisal for confiscation against French 
vessels was, therefore, a right, demanded by the dignity of France, 
20 
a circumstance on which it was impossible to compromise. 
Seeming to have presented a defense of past French actions, the 
Emperor, through Cadore, stated that the United States had in fact 
retraced her hostile steps by revoking the Act of March 1, thus opening 
the ports of the United States to French cOfilt\erce. In short, Congress 
had engaged itself to oppose the belligerent which continued to refuse 
to acknowledge the rights of neutrals. Responding to the new circum-
stances, Cadore informed General Armstrong that he was authorized to 
declare that: 
••• the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that 
after the lat of November they will cease to have effect; it 
being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the 
English shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the 
new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish; 
or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just 
COIIlllunicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the 
English. 
It is with the most particular satisfaction, air, that I 
make known to you this determination of the Emperor. His 
majesty loves the Americans. Their prosperity and their 
commerce are within the scope of his policy. 
The independence of America is one of the principle titles 
of glory to France. Since that epoch, the emperor 11 pleased 
in aggrandizing the United States, and, under all circum-
stances, that which can contribute to the independence, to the 
prosperity, and the liberty of the Americans, the Ernperor2ytll consider as conformable with the interests of his empire. 
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Armstrong must have found these professions of love almost comi-
cal. How could a man who had seized and even burned American vessels, 
confiscated the cargoes, and imprisoned the crews profess to actually 
love Americans? No doubt this was merely another scheme designed to 
camouflage his true intentions. Napoleon's true affections toward 
Americans is better illustrated by the fact that, on the very day of 
the Cadore Letter, the Emperor put into effect his secret Trianon 
Tariff, which established customs regulations effectively halting im-
22 ports. Napoleon's objective was to diminish the duties rather than 
to augment them, yet to maintain the colonial products at the price 
which they were in France so that goods from America could enter into 
competition with them. 23 The Trianon Tariff of August 5 was actually 
evidence that the old Continental System of rigid exclusion, of a 
commercial crusade against England, had failed. While it had nominally 
been abandoned, it had really only given way to a new system of regula-
tion, to navigation acts, and to a continental protective system aimed 
24 at England and her colonial products. 
Simultaneous to the introduction of the secret tariff, Napoleon, 
in a secret decree of the same date and name, ordered the sale of 
sequestered American ahipa in French ports which had arrived between 
May 20, 1809 and May 1, 1810. From August 5 to November 1, 1810, 
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American ships would be allowed to enter French port•, but they had to 
25 
obtain a license before they could discharge their cargoes. Thia 
decree was never publiahed, not was Armstrong ever informed of its 
existence. Albert Gallatin accidentally discovered a copy of the 
decree some ten years later when he was Minister to Paris, and realized 
what effect the knowledge of this decree might have had on the course 
of American affairs if it had been known at the time: 
••• no one can suppose that if it had been communicated or 
published at the same time [as Cadore's lettetl, the United 
States would, with respect to the promised revocation of the 
Berlin and Milan-decrees, have taken that ground which ulti-
mately led to war with Great Britain. It is indeed unneces-
sary to cormnent on such a glaring act of combined injustice, 
bad faith, and mean~~ss as the enacting and concealment of that 
decree exhibits •••• 
Napoleon, as usual, had no intention of actually alleviating the 
American position, though he tried to appear to do so. Armstrong 
quickly informed the secretary of State of the contents of Cadore's 
letter of August S. 27 On the same day, Armstrong also wrote to 
President Madison, further explaining Cadore's letter as he saw it. 
He noted that, on July 27, advices had been received from England 
stating that Congress had been called into special session. The object 
of this special session was thought to be a declaration of war against 
France. Although Armstrong may have overrated the influence produced 
by this report, he felt that •uch a report, if credited at all, would 
not fail to produce considerable interest. Armstrong informed the 
President that repeated inquiries had been senttohim, wanting to know 
what he knew and what he believed. Armstrong disguised nothing. 
Sensing a possible position of strength, he tried to make the moat of 
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his position by being as completely honest to the inquirers as possible. 
He told Madison that he knew the inquirers to be respectable men and 
likely, frCllltheir connections with the United States, to have been well 
informed. Armstrong told them that he had seen the letters, that he 
believed a special session was indeed likely, and that if it did take 
place, it could only be for the purpose of declaring war as had been 
suggested, since the Preaident•e powers were competent for any course 
of action short of a declaration of war. M. Petry was also of the same 
opinion. According to Armstrong, the revocation of the decrees, as 
stated in Cadore 1 s letter, proved two things: (1) although France had 
no objection to frightening the United States, she had no desire to 
actually fight her. France, whose ambition, gigantic and terrible as 
it was, would find herself fully occupied for twenty years to come in 
establishing her dominion over Europe; and (2) tired of expedients in 
which ahe had lost character and money, and under which her people were 
fast becoming impoverished, France was again returning to a certain 
degree of justice, moderation, and good sense. 28 
Armstrong further informed the President about the new Trianon 
Tariff which amounted to nothing less than fifty per cent of the marked 
price of articles. It made no difference to French officials if Arm-
strong told them that this would be self-def eating by keeping the arti-
cles enumerated out of the market, or even worse, by smuggling them 
into it. Armstrong had no doubts that the rrew tariff would be adopted. 
In concluding hie letter to the President, Armstrong once more in-
dicated hie intention tO aall for the United Statea, thla time by 
29 October 1 from Bordeaux. 
REACTION IN AMERICA 
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News of the Cadore Letter first reached Washington, D.C. on 
September 25, 1810, in unofficial form from Pinkney in London, in a 
30 
newspaper statement reporting the letter from Cadore to Armstrong. 
Exactly what transpired within the Cabinet is unknown. If ~allatin 
was consulted, he left no trace of his opinions. Robert Smith within a 
year would attack Madison publicly for the course that was pursued, and 
would give the impression that it was a result of Madison's judgment 
31 
alone. One may ask what . the reasons were for Madison issuing his 
proclamation of November 2, 1810. 
One plausible explanation was that, in order to make use of 
the provisions contained in Macon's Bill No. 2, Madison had to proclaim 
that France had indeed revoked or modified her decrees so that they 
ceased to violate the commerce of the United States. At the time, all 
Madison had was an unofficial copy of Cadore's letter. He certainly 
was not justified in making any sort of decision based upon the sup-
posed revocation of the decrees. It was certainly not correct to say 
that the decrees were revoked when their effect was not to cease until 
November 1, and thenonly if one of the two conditionswerefulfilled. 32 
In a legal sense, the decrees, which had been promulgated as fundamental 
laws of the land, could not be repealed simply by a note from the Mini-
ster of Foreign Relations to the diplomatic representative of a foreign 
33 power. 
Subsequent event• have clearly demonstrated that Napoleon had no 
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intention of actually repealing his decrees, although he wanted Madison 
to believe that they had been. In accepting Napoleon'• deception, 
34 Madison walked into the trap and took Congress with him. Napoleon 
"promptly bamboozled" Madison with falae declarations of the revocation 
35 
of his decrees. What then induced Madison to act so impulsively and 
proclaim on November 2, 1810, that the Cadore letter was enough to 
satisfy the criteria that the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been 
revoked? 
Perkins, somewhat sarcastically, states with confidence that 
Madison's actions were similar to those that had: 
••• characterized fish from time immemorial, President Madison 
believed it possible to feed on the bait without swallowing 
the visible hook. Delay would encourage Napoleon to pull his 
line from the stream, whereas immediate acceptance might 
cause Greal Britain to cast even more appetizing food upon 
the water. 6 
By grasping at this opportunity, Madison hoped to be able to force 
Great Britain into repealing her decrees, especially as it had been 
two years since he had told Erskine that the United States would be 
fully justified in having recourse to hostilities with either belliger-
ent, and that ahe only hesitated to do so from the difficulty of con-
37 tending with both. From approximately the end of 1807 until 1810, 
the aim of the American government had been to divide the belligerents 
by inducing one or the other to revoke its edicts, so that the example 
would lead to a revocation by the other, or the contest would at least 
38 be limited to a single one. Thia may be seen in a letter from Smith 
to Pinkney of October 18, 1810, in which the Secretary stated: 
It ought not to be doubted that this step of the French 
Government will be followed by a repeal on the part of the 
British Government of its orders in Council. And if a termina-
tion of the crisee between Great Britain and the United States 
be really intended, the repeal ought to include the system of 
paper blockades, which differ in name only from the retalia-
tory ayatem comprized in the orders in Council.39 
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Although no official correspondence had yet been received from 
Armstrong, Smith did nonetheless state that, when it was received, and 
if it corresponded with the printed matter contained in Pinkney'& 
despatch, then Pinkney was to let the British Government understand 
that, on November l, the President would issue his proclamation in 
conformance with the Act of Congress, and Non-Intercourse would be 
40 
revived against Great Britain. On October 31, 1810, Smith sent for 
Turreau and informed him of the decision that had been reached by the 
President and the Cabinet. He stated that the Executive was: 
••• determined not to suffer England longer to tranmel the 
commerce of the United States, and he hopes to be sustained 
by Congress. If, then, England does not renounce her system 
of paper-blockades and the other vexations resulting from it, 
arrangement with that Power is to be expected; and consequent-
ly you will see, in two days, the President's proclamation 
appear, founded on the provisions of the law requiring the 
non-intercourse to be enforced against either nation which 
should fail to revoke its edicts after the other belligerent 
had done so •••• Although we have received nothing directly 
from Mr. Armstrong on this subject, which is doubtless very 
extraordinary, we consider as sufficient for the Government's 
purposes the communication he made to Mr. Pinkney, which the 
latter had transmitted to us.41 
On the very same day this interview with Turreau occurred, New 
York newspapers announced the arrival of the despatch schooner, Spencer, 
with despatches from General Armstrong. Released from sequestration at 
Armstrong's request, the ship had taken seven weeks to disentangle 
herself from French bureaucratic red tape, and to make the crossing 
from Bayonne, having left on September 29. Disembarking at New York, 
172 
the despatch carrier travelled almost 250 miles overland in two days in 
order to reach Washington before the President's proclamation was is-
42 
sued. Upon examining the despatches, Madison and the Cabinet found 
two letters of July from Armstrong to Smith, confirming press reports 
that American trade would be limited to 30 vessels carrying French 
licenses; Cadore'a letter of August S, with a short cover note to 
Secretary Smith, and a private letter to President Madison concerned 
with it; a printed copy of the August 5 tariff; and letters dated as 
late as August 24 on various other subjects.43 
President Madison certainly hadgroundato justify withholding the 
proclamation. In spite of the questionable evidence that the French 
decrees had actually been revoked, the President accepted that evidence 
and issued his proclamation on the basis of the revocation of the 
decrees. He, therefore, waa moat reaponaible for what then trana-
pired. Having made the decision, on November 1, to accept Cadore's 
letter as proof of repeal of the French decrees, within the meaning of 
Macon's Bill No. 2, the President, on November 2, 1810, issued his 
proclamation, declaring that: 
••• it has been officially made known to this Government that 
the said edicts of France have been so revoked as that· they 
ceased, on the said first day of the prese~ month, to violate 
the neutral commerce of the United States. 
Also on November 2, instructions were sent to Armstrong, which 
included a printed copy of the President's proclamation. Armstrong waa 
to let the French Government know that the proclamation had been issued 
on the grounds that the repeal of these decrees included revoking all 
the edicts of France which actually violated American neutral rights, 
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and that in issuing the proclamation, the requisition . in the letter of 
July 5 to Armstrong, on the eubject ofaequestered property, would have 
45 been satisfied. 
Madison's decision was rash, but to him the moment seemed fleet-
ing. Napoleon's character was such that, if the United States had 
delayed or haggled, the Emperor could have imnediately swung back to 
the decrees that he had so tenaciously defended.46 To Madison, the re• 
peal of the French decrees promised at least an extrication from the 
dilemma of a shameful peace, or a war with both the great belligerents. 
In 1810, he was not confident about the prospects of a British repeal. 
He took consolation in the thought that, even if the desirable goals 
could not be attained without war, the country would at least unite 
when the time came to assert its rights. Writing to Jefferson, on 
October 19, 1810, Madison stated: ''We hope from this step the advantage 
47 
of at least having but one contest on our hands at a time." 
Unfortunately for Madison, he, like his predecessor, had not 
learned that logic did not always govern men's decisions. Madison 
ignored American partisanship and Anglophilia, and expected the people 
to support the government's demand for justice from England. The 
goverrunent also minimized the emotional commitment of England to her 
Orders in Council. The President had hoped that Great Britain would 
seek material advantages through concession; if she did not, he expected 
Perceval to be too sensitive to domestic criticism to prosecute an 
armed conflict with the United Statea.48 ''These miscalculations grew 
out of Madison'• central mistake, a belief that Napoleon could be 
49 trusted to execute the bargain he offered." However, Madison was not 
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so idealistic as to expect generosity, and the instructions of November 
2 showed that he was at least apprehensive that Napoleon would narrowly 
interpret the Cadore letter. Nevertheless, Madi1on did expect Napoleon 
to recognize the advantages that would come from uniting the United 
States against England, as well as the potential disadvantages of 
insulting people already balky due to Continental abuses. ''Hindsight 
shows us that most of them [Madlaon•a calculatlon.J were wrong, but the 
initial decisions understandable. The President is most to be con-
demned for failing to revise his analysis when new facts became avail-
50 
able." Again, the President must be held responsible for his actions, 
especially in light of reports from Armstrong's successors, Jonathan 
Russell and Joel Barlow clearly indicating that the decrees had not 
been repealed. When Madison, in spite of the evidence, allowed Non-
Intercourse to be reinstated on February i, 1811, he had committed the 
United States to Napoleon's Continental System, against Great Britain, 
which was likely to draw the country into a war with Great Britain. 
More than likely, Madison allowed this to happen, in part, because he 
had already suffered a great deal of humiliation over the Erskine 
Agreement. He refused to admit that he might have been wrong again. 51 
Melvin sums up the position which confronted Madison and the United 
States: 
When President Madison by his proclamation of 2 November 1810 
and 2 February 1811 met the co~ditions of Cadore's 5 August let-
ter, by which Napoleon had accepted the challenging repeal of 
the non-Intercourse law, the outcome was a pretty problem for 
diplomatic haggling •••• In American diplomacy it was a period of 
small honor, and much watchful waiting. It was a situation 
whlch invited the bullying of Wellesley, and the double-dealing 
of Napoleon. 52 
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ARMSTRONG CRITICIZED 
Aa might have been expected, Armatrong'• performance during the 
la•t couple of month• of hia diplomatic career in France ha• indeed 
53 been criticized. Some criticism may be justified. However, major 
critics have been excessively harah. The reasons for thia criticism 
need to be examined more closely to more accurately assess Armstrong's 
performance in France. 
The moat common complaints against Armstrong'• performance during 
his last two months in France are: (1) After having received the Cadore 
letter, Armstrong refrained from stating anything more than was neces-
sary in his reports. He failed to express an opinion as to the faith of 
the Emperor's promise. He also failed to make further protests against 
actual reprisals, keeping silent so aa not to deal with difficult quea-
tiona because he wanted to bask in what little glory there may have 
been in the receipt of Cadore'e letter itaelf.54 (2) Had Armstrong in-
slated upon the prompt release of the despatch schooner allotted to him 
a month earlier, or had he made proper use of the Hornet, which had been 
sent especially to receive hie de•patchea, and reached France about 
September 6, full knowledge of French policy would have reached Waahing-
ton before decisive atepa were taken by the President and Cabinet. In-
stead, Armstrong left Paria on September 14, and spent nearly two month9 
in French •eaporta waiting for the release of hie own transport, the 
55 Sally, which wa• caught up in a tax debate. (3) Armetrong did .not 
follow hie in•tructiona. tndeecl, hla entire· courae of action after 
Auguat S waa on par with thia dereliction. Had he obeyed hia July 5, 
1810 instructions, he would have notified Cadore on the day they ar-
rived, August 7, that France would have to agree to restore American 
property in order to bring about action against Great Britain. He 
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could have obtained "either an agreement or an equally illuminating 
refusal." When he finally did raise the issue of confiscations, on 
September 7, he gave no hint that restoration was a sine gua non. In-
stead, he invited an unfavorable reply by asking whether it was the 
Emperor's will that seizures should be a subject of present or future 
negotiations between the two goverrunents, or if the acts already taken 
by the Emperor were to be regarded as conclusive against remuneration. 
He had already infuriated Napoleon with a note castigating the miscon-
duct of French privateers, just after the Emperor had heard that his 
advice boat, La Franchise, had been seized at New Orleans. (It was not 
known that the President had ordered the ship released.) Finally, 
Armstrong's last action before leaving for Bordeaux was to propose that 
American ships be restored to their owners ~n conditions that they put 
up bonds equal to the full value of the property--the bonds to be 
payable'withinsix months if the Emperor made a decision to that effect. 
M. Petry presented the American case far more strongly to Cadore, and 
Cadore presented it far more strongly to the Emperor than Armstrong had 
to any of them. ''His inaction and weak action, contrary both to the 
spirit and command of his instructions, removed the last barrier to the 
sweep on Bonaparte's rapacity.1156 By withholding the Trianon Decree 
from publication, Napoleon retained a free hand either to keep on con-
fiscating American vessels seized before May 1, 1810, or to drop that 
policy without any visible inconsistency. Armstrong's delay forced the 
• 
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President to make his first and most important decision with a mis-
leading indication of French policy before him. His decision was 
simple, though. If harm resulted from hie action, it would be curable 
by Congress after February 2, 1811, when Non-Intercourse against Great 
Britain was to be renewed. 57 
(4)Armstrong used the concession from Napoleon, even though an 
ambiguous one, as the occasion for leaving his diplomatic post in order 
to avoid a potentially embarrassing situation, living in fear that the 
Administration would disgrace itself and him by revealing his position 
58 
as one of "mere gasconade." 
In response to the first criticism of General Armstrong, an exami-
nation of the official correspondence does seem to reveal that he may 
not have communicated as much as might have been normally expected 
after having received a letter such as Cadore 1s. He did, as has already 
been demonstrated, imnediately notify the Secretary of State and the 
President of the existence of Cadore'a letter of August 5, however, his 
failure to comment and aaaeaa the sincerity of Napoleon's intentions may 
have indicated, initially at least, that he believed he had finally 
achieved a diplomatic victory. No doubt Armstrong would have been de-
lighted to have capped his diplomatic career with auch a success. Al-
though Madison must bear the greatest responsibility for issuing his 
proclamation on November 2, Armstrong muat also accept some responaibi-
lity for possibly mialeading Madison initially. Quite possibly, however, 
Armstrong may have refrained from commenting more thoroughly about 
Cadore'a letter, because of hie desire to allow time to test the sin-
cerity of the Emperor's actions before forming any concrete conclusions. 
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Although Armstrong may not have offered aa much analyaia as he should 
have, he did, in fact, offer what he thought was a plausible explana-
tion for the letter. In hi1 de1patch to the President of August 5, 
1810, he had told the President that he attributed the Cadore letter 
59 to the fear of a possible war between the United States and France. 
Although this may have been overrated aa a reason, it was still an 
attempt at analysis of the circumstances which had produced the letter. 
To the charge that Armstrong did not further protest actual 
reprisals ao aa not to raise difficult questions, evidence to the con-
trary exists. In a letter to the Duke of Cadore of August 20, 1810, 
Armstrong informed him that a number of armed private vessels, flying 
the flag of France and acting under her authority, had violated the 
neutrality of the United States. Offensive and lawless as these acts 
were, they were more aggravating because of proof that they were not 
the isolated and occasional depredations of a few private adventurers, 
but the commencement of a system, origanized under the patronage of 
60 France. Thia would certainly seem to qualify aa a protest. 
To discount criticism that Armstrong attempted to avoid difficult 
questions, one need only refer to Armstrong's note to Cadore of 
August 20, in which he asked for a full and explicit written declara-
tion of the treatment that American commerce could expect to experience 
in the ports of France, both before and after November 1, and whether 
the seizures in Spain were to be regarded simply as sequestrations--
and open, of course, to future negotiation--or as confiscations, and 
beyond the limits of compromise.61 While he remained in Paris, 
Armstrong committed himself to press for an answer to this note. He 
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reported, however, that there did not appear to be the slightest 
disposition to make reparation for past wrongs (as required in Smith's 
July 5 instructions), although the French officials were careful to 
employ terms which would not eliminate the hope that some reparation 
62 
would be made. Armstrong again inquired of Cadore on September 7 as 
to this issue, and to seek to know what would be the effect of the 
Emperor's decree of July, 1810, on American commerce, which had for-
bidden the departure of neutral ships from the ports of France, unless 
63 provided with imperial licenses. 
Armstrong wrote to Secretary of State Smith on September 10, 1810, 
that he had not received anything worth communicating since his last 
despatch until Cadore•s letter to him of September 7. By this letter 
it was learned that the Rambouillet Decree was not in operation and 
that American ships entering French ports before November 1 would be 
judged under the Berlin and Milan Decrees. Armstrong offered the 
opinion that the system of which those decrees were a part, was 
11 
••• fast recovering the ground it had lost; & I should not be astonished, 
~ 
were it soon to become aa great a favorite as formerly." 
Armstrong did not fail to ask difficult questions as he sought to 
determine the effect the revocation of the decrees would have on Ameri-
can commerce, were they actually revoked, nor did he fail to protest 
outrages that were brought to his attention. Although he may not have 
elaborated a great deal in hia correspondence immediately after receipt 
of the Cadore letter, his letter of September 18, 1810, demonatrated 
that he waa aerioualy questioning the actual revocation of the decrees, 
which implicitly reflected on his faith in the Emperor'• promisea. 
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The second major criticism pertaining to the use of Armstrong's 
own transport ship, as opposed to others that he might have been able 
to employ, appears trivial. How was he to know that the Sally would be 
tied up in French red tape for as long as it was? In criticizing 
Armstrong on this point, one critic at least appears to be attempting 
to absolve Madison of his responsibility for the decisions that he 
made, by implying that if Armstrong had acted otherwise, information 
would have been received before Madison issued hie proclamation on 
65 November 2, 1810. The same critic appears to have overlooked the 
fact that Madison was inclined to action regardless of the information 
available to him. If he did not possess adequate information prior to 
issuing his decree, he did have the opportunity to delay his proclama-
tion. Again, in February, 1811, the President had the advantage not 
only of further despatches from Europe, but also of a personal meeting 
with Armstrong on his return to the United States. Disregarding all 
available evidence that Napoleon had not actually revoked his decrees, 
Madison gambled again, for whatever reasona, and issued the proclama-
tion of February 2, 1811. He alone must assume the responsibility for 
thia action which ultimately brought the United States into the 
Continental System, and hence, involved her in war with Great Britain. 
The third major criticism, although partially valid, is much too 
severe. One must bear in mind that transportation difficulties were 
a perennial problem during the early part of the 19th century. With a 
war taking place at the same time, diplamatic instructions, when finally 
received--if ever--were oftentimes outdated, or no longer appropriate 
for the representative abroad. The diplomat, therefore, needed to 
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rely upon his own good judgment to determine what course to pursue--
if any--a• a result of newly arrived instructions from his superiors. 
No one can know for sure why Armstrong did not notify Cadore on Au-
gust 7 that France would have to agree to restore American property in 
order to bring about action against Great Britain, or why he waited 
until September 7 to raise the issue of confiscations. Quite possibly, 
Armstrong had determined to allow time to paes so as to ascertain 
Napoleon's sincerity aa contained in the Cadore letter before launching 
into demands. Additionally, Armstrong ia accused of weak action, con-
trary to the spirit of his instructions, when, in his last action be-
fore leaving Paris, Armstrong proposed that American ships be restored 
to their owners on condition that they put up bonds equal to the full 
value of the property. Ironically, this same critic chastised 
Armstrong for having infuriated Napoleon with a note castigating the 
66 
mis-conduct of French privateers. On the one hand, Armstrong is 
criticized for being too firm, and on the other, he is criticized for 
being too weak. Agreeing that Armstrong may not have followed his 
instructions precisely, is not to support the contention that he was 
derelict in his duty. Such a conclusion is biased and misleading. 
Finally, Armstrong has been accused of using the opportunity 
created by the Cadore letter to withdraw from France and from a poten-
tially embarrassing position. Armstrong had determined, on various 
occasions, to return to the United States. When the Cadore letter was 
received on August 5, he was in the process of preparing for his depar-
ture, a departure that had been approved by the Secretary of State and 
67 
the President. Armstrong had been placed in an embarrassing position 
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almost from the very beginning of his mission. He, more than anyone 
else, was fully aware that his mission, at least until receipt of the 
Cadora letter, had failed to achieve its objectives. The United States 
was merely a pawn that was caught up in the struggle between Great 
Britain and France, with her honor completely shattered. Armstrong 
had advocated force to shore up America's prestige, but his counsel was 
consistently ignored. Having been subjected to Napoleonic humiliation 
for six years, Armstrong was anxious to return to the United States. 
His departure shortly after the receipt of the Cadore letter was, most 
likely, coincidental. The decision to leave had been made a long time 
before. 
Having examined the major criticisms of Armstrong's actions after 
August S, 1810, a student of history, with the distinct advantage of 
knowing what actually happened, may engage in academic debates as to 
the probable outcome of events if only the leading characters of the 
time had acted differently. However, who can say for sure that the 
course of history might have been appreciably different if he had 
commented more or leas about the sincerity of the Cadore letter; that 
he should have taken a different ship home; that he should have fol-
lowed this or that instruction more closely, or discarded this or that 
one; or that he should or should not have departed from France at the 
time he did? Granted, Armstrong's performance may not have been as 
exemplary during the last two months as it had been throughout most of 
his career, and he may even have been initially too hopeful that the 
decrees had been repealed, but neither was it as derelict as some would 
have students of history to believe, even though he was ending his 
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mission and preparing to return to the United States. In the final 
analysis, this writer contends that Armstrong's actions, even if they 
had been any different than what they were, would probably have not 
greatly altered the course of events that ultimately transpired. 
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CHAPTER XI 
END OF MISSION 
On September 14, 1810, General Armstrong ended his mission in 
Paris and departed for Bordeaux, where he waited to board his ship for 
the return voyage to the United States. Armstrong left Jonathan 
Russell, a newly arrived legation secretary and a native of Rhode 
1 Island, in charge of the American legation. Armstrong's last official 
despatch was addressed to Pinkney in London, and was dated September 29, 
1810, in which Armstrong offered suggestions to Pinkney on how to deal 
2 
with the British government in light of the Cadore letter. After 
contending with delay because of a tax squabble involving his transport 
3 
ship for almost two months, Armstrong and his family departed from 
Bordeaux in November, ending his six-year career as United States 
Minister to France. 
The thirty-day passage home was a good one until, while making 
land, Armstrong's ship struck a reef of rocks during a gail and was 
forced to lay at anchor without a rudder overnight. Miraculously, 
however, they made it into New London the next morning around the first 
of December.4 
Armstrong was feasted and honored by his fellow citizens in such 
cities as Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. There was talk of 
his running for Governor of Pennsylvania, Secretary of State, and even 
for President.5 
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In be~en feasts, Armstrong was preoccupied with tending to 
personal matters, which included settling his family in New York for 
the winter. These matters prevented him from travelling to Washington, 
D.C. immediately, and he expressed his apologies for this delay in a 
6 letter to the President, on December 11, 1810. With these matters 
disposed of, Armstrong journeyed to Washington during the middle of the 
7 
month, where he met with the President. One can speculate that 
Armstrong no doubt answered any questions as fully as he could regarding 
the Cadore letter, and the prospects for improved Franco-American rela-
tions. 
Armstrong's return to the United States was not received without 
apprehension on the part of the Administration. There was fear that he 
might plan to run for important political office, such as Vice-President 
if he moved his residence to Pennsylvania. It is almost certain that 
he was approached by Republican "malcontents", most probably the 
Clintons. Initially, he appearato have expressed no interest in the 
election of 1812, although he was privately disgusted with Madison's 
policies.8 Armstrong, however, was not inclined to be schismatic, even 
though he had the reputation of speaking his mind regardleaa of 
political expediencies. He believed as firmly as did Madison that any-
thing which disrupted the Republican Party was not only unwise, but 
wrong. No doubt the Administration was relieved the General did not 
settle in Pennsylvania, but retired to his wife's estates in New York, 
happy to merely observe the increasing political and diplomatic pro-
blems of the Adminiatration.9 As Minister to France, Armstrong had 
advocated the use of force to attain American objectives, and as a 
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private citizen again, he saw that that was the beat way of solving the 
country's Ula, though he knew the Administration lacked the "spirit" 
10 
to attempt it. 
The strained relations between Madison and the Smith brothers, 
in Robert Smith's removal as Secretary of State and subsequent public 
denunciation of theAdministration, and the appointment of James Monroe 
as Smith's successor, sparked Armstrong's interest in the 1812 election, 
causing speculation that Armstrong, himself, might even head an anti-
Madison ticket. Armstrong was personally annoyed by the Cabinet change. 
He not only had severe doubts about Monroe's ability as a diplomat, but 
also feared that Monroe would be placed in a favorable position to 
succeed Madison to the Presidency. Armstrong complained to Judge 
Spencer of New York about the prospects with Monroe. He felt that this 
would do more to disrupt the Republican Party and the country than 
"anything that has yet occurred," and that the strength of the Union 
was no more than that of a mere "bundle of twigs." He further pre-
dieted that if Monroe attempted to succeed to the Presidency, the 
Republican Party's ascendency "must and will go." In his opinion, 
neither the Western, Middle, not Northern states would "consent to 
take a third President in succession from Virginia.'-' Armstrong hoped 
that Monroe and his Virginia supporters "would steer us clear of this 
11 
rock" by turning down Madison's offer. In this, Armstrong was to be 
disappointed. 
When war finally broke out in 1812, DeWitt Clinton of New York, a 
Republican, determined to run for the Presidency against Madison, on an 
anti-war platform, appealing to "malcontent" Republicans and Federalists. 
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He naturally expected Armstrong's support. However, Armstrong came out 
tn support of Madison. On July 6, 1812, Armstrong accepted a commis-
sion as a brigadier-general with the command of New York City and its 
12 defenses. Subsequent events and circwnstances compelled Madison to 
nominate Armstrong for Secretary of War in January, 1813, and he held 
that position until the burning of Washington, D.C., which abruptly 
13 
ended Armstrong's public career when he resigned on September 3, 1814. 
Although General Armstrong's public career may have come to an 
end, he was by no means silenced. He retired to Red Hook, New York, 
and devoted the majority of his time to agriculture and writing numer-
ous works. His most important publication was Notices of the War of 
~ (1836), which was primarily a defense of his actions during the 
War of 1812. In this and other public works, aa well as in some of his 
letters, he demonstrated the same caustic writing ability which had 
first distinguished him as the author of the "Newburgh Letters." He 
also contributed a "Life of Richard Montgomery" and a "Life of Anthony 
14 Wayne" to the Library of American Biography, and A Treatise on 
Agriculture (1839), a series of articles that he had written for the 
15 Albany Argus. On April 1, 1843, General John Armstrong, soldier, 
farmer, author, and atateaman died in Red Hook, New York. He was laid 
to rest in Rhinebeck Cemetery, Rhinebeck, New York. 
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CHAPTER XII 
CONCLUSION 
Having examined the diplomatic career of General John Armstrong 
as United States Minister to France, emphasizing the years 1806-1810, 
when the United States was increasingly subjected to the hostile effects 
of Napoleon's Continental System, what conclusions can logically be 
drawn from this study regarding Armstrong's effectiveness and perfor-
mance? 
First, the position of any American diplomat in France at this 
particular juncture in history would have been inherently difficult, if 
not impossible. Napoleon was a man with unrivaled ambition. In order 
to accomplish his objectives, he did not shrink from employing not only 
force, but whatever other means were within his power, to obtain the 
desired results. He was, foremost, a man of expediency. He had abso-
lutely no qualms about breaking promises, deceiving, or outright lying 
Standard diplomatic interaction with such a man must necessarily have 
been a risky and exasperating experience. To Armstrong's credit, he 
discerned Napoleon's personal characteristics and tendencies very early 
in his career. Therefore, he had few illusions about the difficulties 
and dangers in dealing with the Emperor or with his ministers. Arm-
strong was, in most respects, a realist, in contrast to the majority of 
American leadership as represented by Jefferson and Madison, who dogged-
ly persisted in the belief for far too long that Napoleon, despite his 
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ambition, was still a reasonable man who could logically be counted on 
to act according to his best interests as they perceived them to be. 
Compounding the difficulty of Armstrong's position was the 
miserably weak military and naval posture of the United States, and 
American leadership's hesitancy to bolster it, as well as their conti-
nued reluctance to employ available force whenever more peaceable dip-
lomatic means had failed to obtain their objectives. Jefferson and 
Madison clung to faith in the principle of peaceable economic coercion, 
long after any reasonable hope for success existed. Recognizing that 
standard diplomatic means were not going to achieve diplomatic objec-
tives, Armstrong recommended more forceful measures on numerous occasi-
ons to acquire desired territorial objectives, resist increasing viola-
tion of American neutral rights by both France and Great Britain, or 
support such intangible interests as national honor. Although flexing 
American muscle would have entailed relatively little risk on several 
occasions, with almost certain success, the Administration consistently 
rejected Armstrong's advice and shied away from conflict. Armstrong 
was, therefore, left to defend the American position by any other means 
he could, while functioning in a world governed by force. 
As Napoleon intensified his Continental System, violating not 
only established international law, but also an existing Franco-Ameri-
can treaty, Armstrong's temper and accompanying official protests in-
creased proportionately. He firmly and persistently sought the repeal 
of the Napoleonic decrees that adversely affected American commerce, 
and waa constantly alert to possible new measures. He did not merely 
accept the superficial pretexts oftentimes offered by French officials 
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as the rationale for their actions, but earnestly sought to penetrate 
the diplomatic gloss to discern their true motives and intentions. 
Superb in debate and analysis, Armstrong possessed the ability to 
quickly discern errors, misstatements, and obvious fallacies of argu-
ment in the countless oral and written correspondences he received from 
representatives of the French government. Almost unequalled with a 
pen, his notes, when angry, were laced with the caustic tone which had 
long distinguished him. The Emperor himself was not immune when 
Armstrong felt he was deserving of harsh remonstrance, which was most 
of the time. 
From the year 1808 on, Armstrong was increasingly frustrated and 
pessimistic about his mission. He recognized the futility of maintain-
ing an American minister in France in light of the compounding circum-
stances. Despatches increasingly reflected his desire to return to the 
United States, although he postponed his departure on several occasions 
in order to remain and pursue other avenues which might have held a 
slight possibility of improving the American position. On numerous 
occasions, he demonstrated his willingness to take the initiative in 
diplomatic gambles. Twoexamples already diacuaaed, but characteristic 
of this trait, were hie efforts to enlist the support of Russian For-
eign Minister Romanzoff, and his visit to Holland to encourage the 
Emperor's own brother to aid American cormnercial interests. In both 
of these instances, as well as in others, Armstrong's knowledge and 
understanding-of events and personalities were obvious. Indeed, hia 
information was unusually good. Armstrong sought most any means as a 
potential source of information that might aid his poaition--certainly 
the mark of a good diplomat, though his own colleagues occasionally 
1 frowned on the character of eomeof his sources. 
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Despite Armstrong's diligent efforts to force Napoleon to respect 
American neutral rights, and angered by the Emperor's repeated demon-
strations of bad faith, Armstrong, after having exhausted all the nor-
mal means of diplomatic protest, pursued other means more unconventional 
that were quite bold. In his continual protest of Napoleonic abuses, 
one such means was Armstrong's ploy of absenting himself frorn Court. 
This was one way for Armstrong to express his extreme displeasure over 
Napoleon'• brutal enforcement of the Continental System. This form of 
protest was viewed by most as an effrontery to the Emperor, and not 
likely to enhance Armstrong's popularity with French officialdom. This 
move, combined with Armstrong's bold and forceful notes of protest, was 
a gesture which Napoleon could hardly fathom from the representative 
of a mere republic. 2 Consequently, by 1810, the Emperor's tolerance 
reached its limit, and he requested Armstrong's recall. Ordinarily, 
this would be a negative reflection on the minister being recalled, but 
given the circumstances and personalities involved, it must be viewed 
as a complinent to General Armstrong. Here, at least, was one repre-
sentative of a foreign government who was not easily intimidated by 
Napoleon's awesome power, and one who did not succumb to the Emperor's 
every whim. In standing up to Napoleon aa he did, Armstrong succeeded 
in ruffling the feathers of His Imperial Majesty--something to which 
Napoleon was not accustomed. While the United States may have been 
almost militarily inconsequential and its leadership unrealistic and 
vacillating• at least one individual stood up for her honor. 
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In the final analysis, however, Armstrong's mission must be judged 
a failure, insofar as he did not accomplish his diplomatic objectives 
in Paris, or in convincing American leadership to accept his advice and 
employ force on several occasions. Armstrong was unsuccessful in 
fore ing the Emperor to respect American neutrality by repealing hi• off en-
. d 3 si.ve ecrees. Even the Cadore letter, which at firat seemed to be the 
crowning achievement of Armatrong•a diplomatic career, aoon proved to 
4 be nothing more than deception ao characteriatic of Napoleon. 
Although Armstrong may not have been successful in accomplishing 
his objectives, he had at least accomplished as much as anyone could 
have, given the circumstances of the times, and the character of 
Napoleon. Indeed, the United States of the early 19th century would 
have had great difficulty finding another person who could have done 
better. There were certainly many who would not have done as well. 
Armstrong's successors in Paris, Russell and Barlow, for exat'lple, though 
both competent and able men, experienced the same frustrations and 
5 failures as had Armstrong. Armstrong's shear ability and stamina to 
persist in a European diplomatic post for six years during one of the 
most difficult periods in American history is a credible feat in itself. 
General Armatrong•a yeara as minister to France represented a tremen-
dous personal sacrifice on his part in the service of his country. He 
could have remained in the United States, guaranteed a prominent place 
in American politics, or returned from his post when he first recog-
nized the unlikely prospect for success or glory. Instead, he stayed 
for six long years. 
In spite of the publicity and debate that surrounded his subse-
quent tenure as Secretary of War, the United States owes him a great 
deal of gratitude and appreciation. As Armstrong returned to the 
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United State•, end1ng hi& diplomatic career, Jefferson expreaaed best 
the debt which the American people owed Armstrong for the years of ser-
vice he had devoted to his country. Jefferson wrote to Armstrong: "I 
am very happy to see that our fellow citizens are disposed to receive 
you with the welcome, and expressions of thankfulness which your exer-
tions for their good have merited. 06 
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